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According to First Amendment doctrine, speech and expression related to sex (henceforth 
referred to as “sex speech”) are considered low-value speech. As a result, sex speech receives 
marginal legal protection. But the lack of protection for sex speech seems inconsistent with 
American society in the 21st century. Thus, is sex speech really low-value?  
Guided by this question, this dissertation studied the social perceptions of sex speech to 
determine the scope of the disconnect between law and society on the value of sex speech. This 
dissertation relied on a combination of legal and social science research methods: a legal analysis 
of 108 U.S. Supreme Court cases on sex speech and a national public opinion survey of 1,300 
U.S. citizens.  
The case analysis and public opinion survey revealed that both the Court and the U.S. 
public perceive sex speech serves little social and political purposes and that sex speech is less 
valuable than other speech types. Additionally, the Court and the U.S. public perceive a value-
based speech hierarchy that ranks political speech at the top and sex speech near the bottom. But 
the two disagree on the distance between the speech rankings. The Court perceived significant 
differences between political speech and sex speech, while the U.S. public did not. This 
discrepancy likely explains why a disconnect between law and society exist on the value of sex 
iv 
 
speech. As a result, this dissertation recommends that the value of sex speech not be equated 
with its level of protection and that the level of constitutional scrutiny applied to sex speech be 
raised so that it is not treated differently from other speech types. Additionally, the low-value 
speech concept should incorporate speech mobility to allow for changes in speech value and 
status.  
Ultimately, the findings from this dissertation served three purposes: First, they shed light 
on the value of sex speech according to law and society. Second, they inform First Amendment 
doctrine regarding the protection of sex speech and the low-value speech concept. Finally, they 
demonstrate the usefulness of combining legal research and public opinion survey for questions 
about First Amendment doctrine.
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THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN LAW &  
SOCIETY ON THE VALUE OF SEX SPEECH  
 
On the evening of February 1, 2004, millions of Americans tuned in to watch Super Bowl 
Sunday XXXVIII. Two National League Football League teams, the New England Patriots and 
the Carolina Panthers, were battling for the championship but temporarily left the field for 
halftime.1 As the teams ran to their locker rooms, fans poured out onto the field as large stage 
equipment unfolded for the famous Super Bowl Halftime Show. That year the live broadcast 
performance featured international pop sensations Janet Jackson and Justin Timberlake.2  
The halftime show began with a roar of music and a cascade of lights. The two 
performers sang and danced with incredible spirit, captivating their audience of nearly 90 million 
viewers.3 The show was a near success until, in its final moments, a costume malfunction  
                                                          
1 For more a review of Super Bowl XXXVIII see Bernd Buchmasser, New England Patriots Super Bowl history: 
Super Bowl XXXVIII, SBNATION (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.patspulpit.com/2018/1/29/16944428/new-england-
patriots-history-super-bowl-38-carolina-panthers-brady-branch-vinatieri-vrabel-belichick.  
2 Bethonie Butler & Elahe Izadi, Everything you forgot about Janet Jackson and Justin Timberlake’s 2004 Super 
Bowl controversy, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-
entertainment/wp/2017/10/23/everything-you-forgot-about-janet-jackson-and-justin-timberlakes-2004-super-bowl-
controversy/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ccd412678203. 
3 Television rating data report the 2004 Super Bowl XXXVIII had 89.80 million viewers. Sports Media Watch, 





occurred. Fans gasped, and parents shielded the eyes of their children as Jackson’s breast was 
exposed on national television.4 
The immediate response to Jackson’s exposure was apology and reprimand. The 
performers issued apologies for the exposure,5 while the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) fined CBS, the show’s broadcaster, more than a half million dollars for the indecent 
images.6 But these replies left the event far from over. The hefty fines triggered a protracted 
legal fight between CBS and the FCC about the policies of fleeting indecent images.7 It took 
seven years for the courts to resolve the case, but, in the end, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit ruled in favor of CBS.8 The court vacated the fines on the grounds that the FCC 
had not adequately announced its policy about fleeting indecent images, and therefore 
improperly fined CBS for Jackson’s exposure.9  
                                                          
4 Bethonie Butler & Elahe Izadi, Everything you forgot about Janet Jackson and Justin Timberlake’s 2004 Super 
Bowl controversy, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-
entertainment/wp/2017/10/23/everything-you-forgot-about-janet-jackson-and-justin-timberlakes-2004-super-bowl-
controversy/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ccd412678203.  
5 Bethonie Butler & Elahe Izadi, Everything you forgot about Janet Jackson and Justin Timberlake’s 2004 Super 
Bowl controversy, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-
entertainment/wp/2017/10/23/everything-you-forgot-about-janet-jackson-and-justin-timberlakes-2004-super-bowl-
controversy/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ccd412678203. 
6 Exposure of sex organs, including a woman’s nipple, on broadcast media is punishable by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC). For Janet Jackson’s exposure CBS was initially fined $550,000 by the FCC, 
which cited the grave harm such exposure could have on the children and minors who were in the show’s audience. 
But the fines were ultimately determined invalid by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the fall of 
2011, CBS Corp. v. F.C.C., 663 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2011).  
7 CBS Corp. v. F.C.C., 663 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2011). 
8 CBS Corp. v. F.C.C., 663 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2011). 




Years have passed since the Jackson broadcast, but the event is a constant reminder of the 
fine line that exists in U.S. law between acceptable and punishable sex speech.10 But, the event 
also represents vast changes to sex speech over the last two generations. In the 1950s, primetime 
programs like “I Love Lucy” depicted married couples sleeping in separate beds,11 and films 
were outlawed for depicting promiscuity and infidelity.12 But 21st-century entertainment depicts 
unmarried couples fighting for the last condom,13 pornography stars as candidates for political 
office,14 and women obtaining legal abortions.15 Likewise, broadcast news regularly reports 
about politicians’ affairs,16 pornography use,17 and cases of sexual assault.18  
                                                          
10 See Chapter I, “Defining Sex Speech” of this dissertation. The term “sex speech” is used in this dissertation to 
represent all sexually-related speech and expression, including both protected and unprotected speech and 
expression.  
11 Adam Bulger, How the Hays Code Forced On-Screen Couples into Separate Beds - and Changed Hollywood 
Forever, VAN WINKLE’S (Dec. 28, 2016, 10:49 AM), https://vanwinkles.com/why-lucy-and-ricky-slept-in-separate-
beds.   
12 E.g., Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). 
13 In the 1994, NBC aired the popular TV series, Friends, which told the story of six friends living and working in 
New York City. Part of the storyline included the romantic relationships of the friends, which included explicit 
conversations between the characters about their birth control and condom use. Friends: The One Where Dr. 
Ramoray Dies (NBC television broadcast March 21, 1996).  
14 In 2009, NBC aired a popular TV series, Parks & Recreation, which told the story of a local Indiana Parks 
Department and its employees. A reoccurring character of the series was a fictional pornographic film actress, 
which, at one point in the series, was depicted as a political candidate for the local city council. Parks & Recreation: 
The Debate (NBC broadcast television April 26, 2012).   
15 In 2012, HBO aired a popular but controversial series, GIRLS, which depicted the lives and sexual relationships of 
four young women living in New York City. The series explicitly discussed birth control use and women’s 
reproductive health, including depictions of women receiving abortions from unplanned pregnancies. GIRLS: Close-
Up (HBO cable television Feb. 22, 2015). 
16 ENTMAN, ROBERT M. SCANDAL AND SILENCE: MEDIA RESPONSES TO PRESIDENTIAL MISCONDUCT (2012).  
17 Ryan Bort, Politicians and Porn: 10 Great Internet Fails, ROLLING STONE (Sep. 14, 2017), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/pictures/politicians-and-porn-10-great-internet-fails-w503069.  




The changes surrounding sex speech are credit to the great strides made in sex and 
society. In the 1950s, married women struggled to acquire birth control, even when they had the 
permission of their husbands.19 With few exceptions, abortion was illegal.20 And homosexuality 
was a crime.21 But in 21st century America, men and women of all ages and marital status can 
acquire contraceptives in the family planning aisles of pharmacies and supermarkets.22 Women 
have a constitutional right to abortion.23 Sodomy law has been overturned,24 and same-sex 
marriage is legally recognized in all fifty states.25  
Given these incredible strides, it is peculiar that exposure of a woman’s breast on 
broadcast television is punished by modern law.26 To that point, George Carlin’s seven dirty 
                                                          
19 Until Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), birth control use by married couples was criminalized under 
the Comstock Act. 
20 David Grimes, The Bad Old Day: Abortion in America Before Roe v. Wade, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2015), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-a-grimes/the-bad-old-days-abortion_b_6324610.html.  
21 Homosexuality was criminalized in all fifty states until 1962, when Illinois first decriminalized same-sex 
intercourse. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, History of Sodomy Laws and the Strategy that Led Up to Today’s Decision, 
Am. Civ. Liberties Union (last visited March 1, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/other/history-sodomy-laws-and-
strategy-led-todays-decision.  
22 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Court established the right of unmarried people to possess 
contraception on the same basis as married couples. 
23 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court established a woman’s right to an abortion under the right to 
privacy, which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; the decision gave women total autonomy over pregnancy 
during the first trimester but defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimester. 
24 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The Court struck down a Texas sodomy law and, by extension, 
invalidated sodomy laws in 13 other states, which made same-sex sexual activity legal in the U.S. 
25 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S._ (2015). The Court established that the fundamental right to marry is 
guaranteed to same-sex couples. 
26 Referring to the initial $550,000 fines issued by the FCC against CBS for Janet Jackson’s breast exposure during 




words are still censored in broadcast media.27 Federally-funded sex education teachers must still 
refrain from teaching about sexuality and safe sex practices.28 And, pornography was declared a 
public health crisis.29 Together, these decisions suggest there is an ongoing disconnect between 
the social progress of sex speech and the legal protection for sex speech.  
However, a disconnect between law and society in sex speech is explainable. First 
Amendment jurisprudence is clear that the freedoms of speech, expression, and press are not 
absolute and may be subject to regulation.30 First Amendment case law also makes clear that not 
all speech is equally protected, with some categories of speech receiving more constitutional 
protection than others.31 The justification for this hierarchy of speech is based on the idea that 
                                                          
27 During a midafternoon broadcast, a New York radio station aired comedian, George Carlin, and his monologue 
“Filthy Words,” which listed a series of profane words. The radio station was fined by the F.C.C. for the broadcast, 
and later the Court ruled that it is within the power of the F.C.C. to regulate and punish indecent broadcast content 
during the daytime hours when children are in the audience, F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
Decades later, George Carlin’s monologue is still considered indent and is punishable content on broadcast. Timothy 
Bella, The ‘7 Dirty Words’ Turn 40, but They’re Still Dirty, THE ATLANTIC (May 24, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/05/the-7-dirty-words-turn-40-but-theyre-still-dirty/257374/.  
28 Federally-funded sex education programs consist of abstinence-only education. This means educators of federally-
funded sex education programs are only permitted to educate students about abstaining from sex; the educators are 
not allowed to teach about safe sex practices, such as birth control and condom use. John Santelli et al., Abstinence 
and Abstinence-only Education: A Review of U.S. Policies and Programs. J. Adolescent Health. 38, 72-81 (2006). 
29 Starting in 2016, states began to declare pornography a ‘public health crisis,’ calling for more research and 
regulations to curb the negative effects of pornography exposure on citizens and communities. Niraj Chokshi, ‘Evil, 
degrading, addictive, harmful’: Utah officially deems porn a public health crisis, THE WASHINGTON POST (April 19, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/04/19/evil-degrading-addictive-harmful-utah-
officially-deems-porn-a-public-health-crisis/. 
30 E.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The Court established that the freedom of speech is not 
absolute, and that speech may be punished if the speech resulted in crime or posed a severe danger, “The most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic”). 
31 E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992). In its decision to invalidate a local ordinance 
banning cross burning as a form of fighting words the Court stated, “From 1791 to the present, however, our society, 
like other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, 
which are ‘of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’ We have recognized that ‘the freedom of speech’ referred 





speech varies in its value to society.32 For example, political speech is said to hold more value 
and influence than commercial speech.33 Thus, political speech receives greater First 
Amendment protection than commercial speech. The result of this practice is a system in which 
speech is classified as either “high-value” or “low-value.”34   
But classifying speech as high- or low-value is not static. Throughout the 20th century, 
seminal First Amendment cases changed the landscape of speech freedoms, with some 
categories, such as commercial speech, gradually gaining protection when it originally had 
none.35 Despite this apparent mobility of value, one category of speech has maintained its low-
value status since the inception of its First Amendment protection: sex speech.   
                                                          
32 E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). The Court established that obscenity is beyond the 
protection of the First Amendment because this type of speech is without social importance: “All ideas having even 
the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the 
prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach 
upon the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection 
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.” 
33 E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). The Court established that First Amendment prevents 
government from punishing speech and expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed: “One 
could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all ‘anti-Catholic bigots are misbegotten; but not that all ‘papists’ are, 
for that would insult and provoke violence “on the basis of religion.” St. Paul has no such authority to license one 
side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.” Within this 
decision the Court reinforced the social priority of political speech over other speech type and that political speech 
has more First Amendment protection because of its greater social purpose.   
34 Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2171 (2015). 
35 Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980). In its 
decision to invalidate a state law regulating advertisements by state utility companies, the Court reinforced the lower 
level of protection given to commercial speech when it stated, “Nevertheless, our decisions have recognized ‘the 
‘commonsense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area 
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.’ The Constitution therefore accords a 
lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. The protection available 
for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests 




In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Roth v. United States36 that obscene sex speech 
did not receive First Amendment protection. This decision was reaffirmed in 1973, amidst 
political and sexual revolution, when the Court in Miller v. California37 reconstructed the 
standard for identifying obscene sex speech. Since Miller, the Court’s decisions about obscene 
sex speech has remained untouched. Using Miller, courts decided that non-obscene sex speech is 
legal but receives minimal protection and may be subject to greater government regulation.38 
These decisions were made, in part, because of the courts’ beliefs that non-obscene sex speech 
serves few and insignificant purposes;39 thus it is low-value speech.  
But, in the near half-century since Miller, the U.S. experienced a digital revolution that 
changed the availability of information and media and a political revolution that challenged 
social norms around love, marriage, and sex.40 With those revolutions came monumental 
changes to the landscape of speech, especially in sex speech. The number of web pages 
                                                          
36 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
37 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
38 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976). In its decision to uphold a local zoning 
ordinance regulating the location of adult entertainment businesses, the Court stated, “Moreover, even though we 
recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some 
arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly 
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal 
comment.” 
39 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976). In its decision to uphold a local zoning 
ordinance regulating the location of adult entertainment businesses, the Court stated, “Moreover, even though we 
recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some 
arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly 
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal 
comment.” 
40 See, e.g., Barry Leiner et al., A brief history of the Internet. 39 ACM SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM. REV. 22 




containing sexually explicit media reaches into the millions,41 entire radio and podcast channels 
are dedicated to answering questions about sex and relationships,42 and mainstream 
entertainment depicts actors discussing sexual issues, such as sexually transmitted diseases and 
pornography use.43 Despite this progress, the law on sex speech remains unchanged - sex speech 
still has limited First Amendment protection and it is still perceived as low-value.44 But is this 
correct? Is sex speech still low-value speech?  
Guided by this question, this dissertation explored the relationship between the law on 
sex speech and the social perceptions of sex speech to determine the scope of the disconnect 
between law and society on the value of sex speech. To answer this inquiry, this dissertation 
relied on a combination of legal and social science research methods: a legal analysis of over 100 
U.S. Supreme Court cases on sex speech and a national public opinion survey of 1,300 U.S. 
citizens. Findings from this dissertation serve multiple purposes: First, the findings shed light on 
the value of sex speech for both legal and social science communities. Second, the findings 
inform First Amendment doctrine regarding the protection for sex speech and the concept of 
speech value. Finally, the findings demonstrate the value of combining legal and social science 
research methods to address questions about First Amendment doctrine. 
                                                          
41 See OGI OGAS & SAI GADDAM, A BILLION WICKED THOUGHTS: WHAT THE WORLD’S LARGEST EXPERIMENT 
REVEALS ABOUT HUMAN DESIRE (2011). Pornhub, 10 Years of Pleasure and Data, Pornhub (last visited April 15, 
2018), https://www.pornhub.com/event/10years.  
42 Ellen Huerta, The 10 Most Intimate Podcasts About Love and Sex, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ellen-huerta/the-10-most-intimate-podcasts-about-love-and-sex_b_9310214.html.   
43 Television shows like Friends and GIRLS are known for their explicit discussions on sexual issues like condom 
use and effectiveness, pornography use, and sexual diseases.  




Ultimately, the goal of this dissertation was to inform First Amendment doctrine on 
protections for sex speech and to serve as an example for First Amendment and social science 
research in the area of sexual speech and expression. This research is important because, in the 
wake of the revolutions involving sex and speech, the findings provide much-needed information 
for crafting legal protections and regulations for sex speech. Understanding how Americans view 
sex speech can provide a better foundation for justifying the government’s interest in regulating 
sex speech and ultimately crafting narrowly tailored regulation.  
 
A REVIEW OF SEX SPEECH LAW 
Defining Sex Speech 
Before reviewing the law on sex speech, the terminology must be defined. Within First 
Amendment jurisprudence and research, a web of terminology is used to describe speech and 
expression involving sex. Terms like “pornography,” “sexually explicit,” “indecent,” “erotica,” 
and “sexual expression” are used in the case law, legislation, and legal literature to describe the 
type and explicitness of sexual speech. The mix of terminology is likely the result of the vast 
array of sexual speech and expression at issue in First Amendment law. For example, First 
Amendment law uses different names for protected and unprotected sex speech: “obscenity” is 
used to classify unprotected sexual speech and expression,45 while “indecent” refers to sexual 
speech and expression in broadcast that is protected for adults but may be unprotected for 
children and minors.46 Other terms like “pornographic”47 and “sexually explicit”48 are 
                                                          
45 E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
46 E.g., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). During a midafternoon broadcast, a New York radio 
station aired comedian, George Carlin, and his monologue “Filthy Words,” which listed a series of profane words. 




sometimes employed to describe speech and expression, such as its level of explicitness. 
However, these terms are not used consistently and therefore muddy the terminology. For clarity, 
this dissertation uses one term to describe all speech and expression (protected and unprotected) 
related to sex: “sex speech.” If the content is sexual and it implicates the First Amendment, then 
it falls under the term “sex speech.”  
The term “sex speech” is used instead of terminology like “sexual expression” for three 
reasons. First, at the time of this dissertation, the term “sexual expression” may refer to ideas of 
sexual identity and classification, not expression that implicates the freedom of speech.49 To 
avoid confusion and to help readers understand that this work is about the protection for free 
speech and expression related to sex, not sexual identity, this dissertation relies on the term “sex 
speech.” Second, within First Amendment jurisprudence and research it is common for the term 
“speech” to be used as the “catch-all” for speech and expression. For example, speech and 
expression referring to political or commercial content are often referred to as “political speech” 
and “commercial speech,” respectively.50 Therefore, for the sake of consistency, this dissertation 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
F.C.C. to regulate and punish indecent broadcast content during the daytime hours when children are in the 
audience. 
47 E.g., American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit found an Indiana state law banning pornography unconstitutionally violated the freedom of 
speech. 
48 E.g., Ginzburg v. U.S., 383 U.S. 463 (1966). The Court established that the ways in which sexual but non-obscene 
content is advertised, such as exploiting the material for its sexual content, can lead the material to qualify as 
obscene. 
49 “Expression” is a termed used throughout the LGBTQQ definitions and terminology, and is connected with a 
common terms, like “gender expression.” Because of the frequent use of “expression” and for the sake of clarity, it 
is best to rely on the term “speech” when referring to speech and expression of a sexual nature. See, e.g., Human 
Rights Campaign, Glossary of Terms, Human Rights Campaign (last visited April 17, 2018), 
https://www.hrc.org/resources/glossary-of-terms.   




relies on the term “sex speech” instead of a term like “sexual expression.” Third, social science 
and public opinion research on free speech frequently uses the term “speech” when referring to 
speech and expression.51 Collectively, these justifications support the decision to use “sex 
speech” when referring to sexual speech and expression.  
Having established the terminology, the next section reviews sex speech law, starting 
with unprotected sex speech and moving onto protected sex speech. This history of sex speech 
law serves as the backbone for the rest of this dissertation.   
The Law on Unprotected Sex Speech 
Protecting and regulating sex speech has been an issue in U.S. law since the colonial 
era.52 The most significant starting point for sex speech law, however, is Roth v. United States,53 
a 1957 case in which the U.S. Supreme Court denied obscene speech protection under the First 
Amendment. In Roth, the operator of a book-selling business was prosecuted for violating 
provisions of federal mail law when he used the postal service to sell and distribute obscene 
materials.54 The business operator, Samuel Roth, argued that the law impeded his First 
Amendment right to free expression, but the Court reasoned that obscenity was “not within the 
                                                          
51 E.g., ROBERT O. WYATT, FREE EXPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: A SURVEY COMMEMORATING THE 200TH 
ANNIVERSARY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 91 (1991). Richard Wike & Katie Simmons, Global Support for Principle 
of Free Expression, but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 18, 2015), 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/11/18/global-support-for-principle-of-free-expression-but-opposition-to-some-
forms-of-speech/.  
52 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION: SEX, RELIGION, AND LAW FROM AMERICA’S ORIGINS TO 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2017). 
53 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 




area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”55 Ultimately, Roth’s conviction was upheld 
and federal precedent on sex speech freedoms took form.  
In Roth, the Court issued its first definition of obscenity: “Obscene material is material 
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest”,56 “i.e., material having a 
tendency to excite lustful thoughts”;57 and its first standard of obscenity: “whether to the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken 
as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”58 But the Roth standard held for only a decade until A 
Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General of 
Massachusetts.59 The book, which was written in the mid-1700s, detailed the life of a prostitute 
and was argued obscene.60 Upon review, the Court determined the book, despite any 
offensiveness, was not obscene because it was not “utterly without redeeming social value.”61 In 
Memoirs, the Court clarified the Roth standard with a three-prong test that must “coalesce” for 
speech to be obscene: (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a 
prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary 
community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the 
                                                          
55 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).   
56 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). 
57 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (n. 20) (1957).   
58 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).  
59 A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney Gen. of Com. of Mass., 383 U.S. 
413 (1966). 
60 A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney Gen. of Com. of Mass., 383 U.S. 
413 (1966).  
61 A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney Gen. of Com. of Mass., 383 U.S. 




material is utterly without redeeming social value.62 Most importantly, the Court explained that 
for speech to be obscene it must be entirely without value; even speech with only a “modicum of 
social value” was worthy of protection.63 
The Memoirs standard was a win for free speech because it made proving speech entirely 
without value virtually impossible. After the establishment of the Memoirs standard, the Court 
went nearly a decade without finding speech obscene.64 But changes to the composition of the 
Court near the end of the 1960s brought new decisions about sex speech. In late June of 1973, 
the new Court handed down three precedent-changing opinions: Miller v. California,65 Paris 
Adult Theater I v. Slaton,66 and Kaplan v. California.67 Miller involved the prosecution of 
mailing obscene advertisements;68 Paris Adult Theater I reviewed the powers of a local 
government to enjoin an adult movie theater from showing allegedly obscene films to consenting 
adults;69 and Kaplan concerned the conviction of an adult bookstore proprietor for selling a 
“plain-covered” but an explicitly natured book.70 In these three opinions, the Court ruled on a 
                                                          
62 A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney Gen. of Com. of Mass., 383 U.S. 
413, 418 (1966). 
63 A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney Gen. of Com. of Mass., 383 U.S. 
413, 420-21 (1966).   
64 In the seven years proceeding Memoirs, the Court gave opinions in roughly 45 cases, but in none of these opinions 
did it determine the content in question obscene.    
65 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
66 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).  
67 Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973).  
68 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
69 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).  




series of procedural and definitional issues, which included redefining the three-prong obscenity 
test:  (a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value.71 This test, commonly referred to as the Miller test, is the standard today for 
assessing obscenity.  
But when the Miller test was established, individual parts of the test were undefined. 
Thus, subsequent cases helped to clarify the test. For example, in Jenkins v. Georgia, which 
involved an obscenity conviction of a Georgia theater manager for showing the film “Carnal 
Knowledge,” the Court clarified that “patently offensive” must “depict or describe patently 
offensive ‘hard core’ sexual conduct.”72 Additionally, the Court provided two examples of how 
states could define the “patently offensive” part of the Miller test: 1) “representations or 
descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated,” and 2) 
“representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the 
genitals.”73 In Smith v. United States74 and Pope v. Illinois,75 both of which involved convictions 
for distributing obscene materials, the Court explained that the “prurient appeal” and “patently 
offensive” prongs of the Miller test were questions of fact and can, therefore, be assessed using 
                                                          
71 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).   
72 Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974).  
73 Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974). 
74 Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977). 




community standards,76 but the “value” prong of the test must be assessed using national 
standards, not community standards.77 Collectively, these cases defined the individual parts of 
the Miller test and provided clarity about how the test must be applied. In the end, these cases 
shaped one of the least protective standards for speech in First Amendment jurisprudence.  
Despite the less protective nature of the Miller test, speech is seldom determined obscene. 
One might, therefore, assume if speech is found non-obscene, then it should receive full First 
Amendment protection. But the law of non-obscene sex speech law is neither that simple nor 
generous.   
The Law on Protected Sex Speech  
 Since Roth, the U.S. Supreme Court has heard many cases involving sex speech, 
answering questions about search and seizure procedure,78 censorship schemes,79 licensing 
schemes,80 advertising regulations,81 jury instructions,82 and protections for specific types of sex 
                                                          
76 Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 293 (1977). 
77 Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500 (1987).  
78 E.g., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 63 (1989). The Court established that materials challenged 
as obscene cannot be seized and removed from circulation until officially found obscene, “While a single copy of a 
book or film may be seized and retained for evidentiary purposes based on a finding of probable cause, the 
publication may not be taken out of circulation completely until there has been a determination of obscenity after an 
adversary hearing.” 
79 E.g., Freedman v. State of Md., 380 U.S. 51 (1965). From the 1950s-80s it was common for local governments to 
use  censorship systems, like prior review of movies, to screen for obscene content, but the Court ruled that such 
systems had to include safeguards, such as prompt judicial review, to prevent unfair censorship.  
80 E.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990). It was common for local and state governments to 
establish special licensing schemes to regulate the location and business practices of adult entertainment companies.  
81 E.g., Ginzburg v. U.S., 383 U.S. 463 (1966). The Court established that the ways in which sexual but non-obscene 





speech.83 At the root of each case was the Court’s struggle to protect both free speech and 
society. Additionally, the Court recognized that perceptions of sex speech are context-specific 
and vary by community.84 As a result, the Court seldom made hard-and-fast rules about 
protecting sex speech, and it hesitated to define terms like “pornography” and “indecency” or to 
draw definitive lines of protection for non-obscene sex speech. But because of these hesitations, 
protection for non-obscene sex speech is somewhat unclear.  
According to the case law, the protection for sex speech depends on a variety of factors, 
such as the audience viewing the speech,85 the medium through which the speech is accessed,86 
where the speech is accessed,87 the state interests for regulating the speech,88 and, of course, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
82 E.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987). There was confusion in the lower courts about the instructions to juries 
on how to apply the three prongs of the Miller test for obscenity. In Pope, the Court held that, while the first two 
prongs of the Miller test may be determined based on contemporary community standards, the third prong must be 
determined based on whether a reasonable person would find value in the material.  
83 Within the sex speech case law there are a series of different sex speech types the Court addresses. For nude 
dancing see City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); for live entertainment see Southeastern Promotions, 
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); for broadcast media see United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 
529 U.S. 803 (2000); for child pornography see Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); for dial-a-porn/phone sex 
services see Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
84 The Court determined that obscenity (Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)), child pornography (Osborne v. 
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)), and indecent content on broadcast during daytime programming (F.C.C. v. Pacifica 
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)) were unprotected by the First Amendment.  
85 The Court was most concerned about protecting minors from exposure to sex speech. See, e.g., U.S. v. American 
Library Association, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003); U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); 
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); 
Ginsberg v. State of N. Y., 390 U.S. 629 (1968).  
86 According to the Court, the medium matters: “We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents 
special First Amendment problems,” Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) (citing Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969) and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).). 
87 Sex speech, both obscene and non-obscene, is legal in the privacy of one’s home: “If the First Amendment means 
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read 
or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power 
to control men’s minds.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). But sex speech may be regulated or 




speech itself.89 These ideas are also reflected in legal research on sex speech. For example, 
Milagros Rivera-Sanchez determined that the context of speech impacts its level of protection. 
Examining the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) dismissed indecency complaints, 
Rivera-Sanchez determined that the context of sex speech is crucial to its protection on broadcast 
media.90 According to Rivera-Sanchez, sex speech expressed in humor and non-educational 
contexts is more likely to be penalized by the FCC than sex speech used in purely educational, 
non-entertainment contexts.91 Thus, the context of sex speech is critical. Similarly, Stephen Sher 
determined the purpose of sex speech drives its level of protection. Analyzing the decency 
provision of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), Sher revealed that the Court gives 
variable protection to speech that lies on the border between artistic indecent speech and non-
artistic indecent speech (i.e., pornography), with more protection given to speech that is believed 
to have artistic merit, like nude dancing.92 Thus, protection for sex speech depends on its artistic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
88 State interests in regulating sex speech include protecting vulnerable audiences, like minors (F.C.C. v. Pacifica 
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)), protecting social order and morale (National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 
524 U.S. 569 (1998); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 204 (1975); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 
U.S. 49 (1973)), and preventing the secondary-effects of sex speech, such as increased crime and decreased property 
values (City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 
(2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 
(1986); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)). 
89 The Court determined that obscenity (Roth v. U.S. 354 U.S. 476 (1957)), child pornography (New York v. Ferber, 
458 U.S. 747 (1982)), and indecent content on broadcast during daytime programming (F.C.C. v. Pacifica 
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)) were unprotected by the First Amendment. 
90 Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, How Far Is Too Far? The Line Between “Offensive” and “Indecent” Speech, 49 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 327, 328 (1997). 
91 Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, How Far Is Too Far? The Line Between “Offensive” and “Indecent” Speech, 49 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 327, 328 (1997). 
92 Stephen N. Sher, The Identical Treatment of Obscene and Indecent Speech: The 1991 NEA Appropriations Act, 67 




value and perceived purpose.93 Finally, research by David Cole determined that the protection 
for sex speech depends on the social acceptability of sex speech. The Court is often concerned 
that sex speech brings private behavior into the public sphere. 94 As a result, the Court often 
balanced the right of free speech against social decency. This is reflected in Cole’s finding that 
society works to repress those speakers “who challenge the public/private line by making public 
sexual matters that the majority would prefer remained private.”95 This creates a system in which 
protection for sex speech depends on how much the speech violates social standards of decency 
and how much the speech breaks the spheres of public and private behavior.96 Collectively, the 
case law and the research show that the protection for non-obscene sex speech varies and is 
context-dependent.  
However, the Court’s perception of sex speech, both obscene and non-obscene,97 as low-
value speech contradicts the case-by-case nature of sex speech law. Regardless of speech’s 
context or content, the Court consistently classifies sex speech as low-value speech – speech that 
has less value to society than other categories of speech 98 and, therefore, is given less First 
                                                          
93 Stephen N. Sher, The Identical Treatment of Obscene and Indecent Speech: The 1991 NEA Appropriations Act, 67 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1107 (1991). 
94 David Cole, Playing by Pornography’s Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 115 
(1994). 
95 David Cole, Playing by Pornography’s Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 115 
(1994). 
96 David Cole, Playing by Pornography’s Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 111, at 
131 (1994). 
97 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) determined that obscenity is not protected by the First 
Amendment, while Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) determined that non-obscene 
sex speech is protected but receives only marginal First Amendment protection. 
98 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). When the Court upheld the conviction of a 
Jehovah’s Witness who was charged with breaching the peace, the Court stated that “There are certain well-defined 




Amendment protection.99 But is this true? Is sex speech really low-value speech? To guide these 
questions, the next section reviews the background and scholarship of low-value speech and its 
relationship with sex speech.  
 
LOW-VALUE SPEECH 
The Value of Speech 
Freedom of speech is not absolute, and not all speech is equally important.100 According 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, some speech is more valuable than others, and thus worthy of more 
First Amendment protection.101 This has created a two-tier structure of “high-value” and “low-
value” speech within the jurisprudence. This structure of high- and low-value speech is 
especially prevalent in the adjudication of regulations that control the content or messages of 
speech (i.e., content-based speech regulations).102 Accordingly, the degree of constitutional 
scrutiny afforded to content-based regulations depends on whether the speech the regulation 
targets is considered high- or low-value.103  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality” (internal citations omitted).  
99 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
100 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
101 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).  
102 Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 194-97 (1983). 




 High-value speech, such as political speech,104 is considered to be of the greatest social 
importance, and therefore worthy of the most First Amendment protection.105 As a result, 
content-based restrictions on high-value speech are generally presumed invalid.106 This is 
because content-based restrictions on high-value speech must survive strict scrutiny to be 
constitutional.107 Strict scrutiny is a test applied by the courts to assess the constitutionality of 
laws aimed at speech content.108 To pass strict scrutiny, the government must show a compelling 
interest in the regulation and that the regulation uses the least restrictive means available to 
directly advance the compelling interest.109 This is such a challenging standard that most 
content-based restrictions on high-value speech have been invalidated by the Court.110 Thus, 
content-based restrictions on high-value speech are rare. The same, however, cannot be said 
about content-based regulations of low-value speech.  
                                                          
104 Political speech is speech that comments on the government, policies and/or candidates for political office. For 
example, posting a yard sign that supports a candidate, or protesting outside a courthouse. Political speech is 
considered high-value speech because it promotes a free and functioning democracy, which the Court interprets as 
the core purpose of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
105 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).  
106 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992). The Court established that First Amendment 
prevents government from punishing speech and expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed: 
“One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all ‘anti-Catholic bigots are misbegotten; but not that all 
‘papists’ are, for that would insult and provoke violence “on the basis of religion.” St. Paul has no such authority to 
license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.” 
Within this decision the Court reinforced the social priority of political speech over other speech type and that 
political speech has more First Amendment protection because of its greater social purpose. 
107 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717-21 (2012). The Court struck down a portion of the Stolen 
Valor Act, which criminalized false statements about having a military medal, as an unconstitutional violation to the 
freedom of speech. Specifically, the Court determined that the government failed to meet the substantial interest this 
content-based restriction implicated.  
108 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717-21 (2012). 
109 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717-21 (2012). 




 Low-value speech is considered to have little or no social importance and therefore 
receives little to no First Amendment protection.111 As a result, content-based restrictions on 
low-value speech face a lower standard of constitutional scrutiny than high-value speech. 
However, because the level of protection given to low-value speech can range from little to no 
protection, the standard of scrutiny applied to content-based regulations of low-value speech 
varies. For example, obscenity is considered low-value speech that receives no First Amendment 
protection,112 while commercial speech is considered low-value speech but worthy of some First 
Amendment protection.113 For low-value speech types like obscenity, the constitutional scrutiny 
will be the lowest, meaning that rational basis review applies.114 Rational basis review assumes 
the constitutionality of reasonable legislation and applies a minimal level of scrutiny to 
government regulation.115 But for low-value speech worthy of some First Amendment 
protection, such as commercial speech, the need for constitutional scrutiny will be moderately 
                                                          
111 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).  
112 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).  
113 Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980). In its 
decision to invalidate a state law regulating advertisements by state utility companies, the Court reinforced the lower 
level of protection given to commercial speech when it stated, “Nevertheless, our decisions have recognized ‘the 
‘commonsense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area 
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.’ The Constitution therefore accords a 
lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. The protection available 
for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests 
served by its regulation” (internal citations omitted). 
114 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 709-14 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing 
rational basis review).  See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 (1981) (discussing “the 
familiar ‘rational basis’ test”). 
115 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 709-14 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing 
rational basis review).  See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 (1981) (discussing “the 




high, meaning the intermediate scrutiny test applies.116 To pass intermediate scrutiny, the 
government must show a substantial interest in the regulation and that the regulation is narrowly 
tailored so it imposes only an incidental restriction on speech freedoms.117 Despite these 
variations, what unites all low-value speech is that content-based regulations of low-value speech 
are subject to lower standards of constitutional scrutiny than high-value speech.118 As a result, 
identifying speech as either high- or low-value is a crucial step in the adjudication of content-
based speech regulations.  
Identifying Low-Value Speech  
 The U.S. Supreme Court begins its assessment of speech protection with the 
presumption that all speech is protected by the First Amendment.119 From this starting point, the 
Court carves out exceptions to the rule, such as creating classes of unprotected speech.120 But 
identifying low-value speech is a complex task. The concept of low-value speech first appeared 
                                                          
116 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C, 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).). See also Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission of New York, 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) for the test of regulations of commercial speech, specifically: “At the outset, we must 
determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that 
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted 
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest.” 
117 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C, 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).). 
118 Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2171 (2015). 
119 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189, 194 (1983), 
“the Court begins with the presumption that the first amendment protects all communication and then creates areas 
of nonprotection only after it affirmatively finds that a particular class of speech does not sufficiently further the 
underlying purposes of the First Amendment.”  
120 This process is referred to as “defining out” speech. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First 




in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.121 In Chaplinsky, the Court upheld the conviction of a 
Jehovah’s Witness who was charged with breaching the peace when he called a city marshal a 
“God-damned racketeer” and “a damned fascist.”122 In upholding the conviction, the Court 
reasoned there are: 
“certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention, and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. These 
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ 
words…It is well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”123  
 
This passage presents a few ways in which speech may be low-value: First, the Court points to a 
historical practice of certain categories of speech receiving no First Amendment protection. The 
Court cites categories like obscenity and libel and states that there has never been a problem with 
regulating or punishing such speech. In doing so, the Court implies that historical precedent 
justifies deeming speech low-value. Second, the Court is concerned with speech’s ability to 
transmit and explain ideas. Speech that fails to do so is not considered valuable speech. This 
reflects the notion that speech should further the tenants of the First Amendment, such as 
advancing political discourse. Therefore, speech that fails to further First Amendment values is 
less valuable than speech that does. Finally, the Court suggests a balancing test in which the 
value of speech is determined by weighing the social benefits and costs of speech. In Chaplinsky, 
                                                          
121 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
122 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).  




the Court determined that the value of the speech was minimal to the point that protecting the 
speech was outweighed by other social needs, such as maintaining social order and morale.124  
Using the Chaplinsky balancing test, several classes of speech have been deemed low-
value. Examples of low-value speech that do not receive First Amendment protection include 
incitement,125 libel,126 obscenity,127 fighting words,128 and child pornography.129 And examples 
of low-value speech that receives some First Amendment protection include commercial 
speech,130 hate speech,131 and non-obscene sex speech.132  
                                                          
124 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).  
125 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969). The Court decided that speech can be prohibited and deemed 
illegal incitement if it is “directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and it is “likely to incite or 
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Despite its frequent use in First Amendment law, the Chaplinsky approach was highly 
criticized.133 Thus, changes were made to the process of identifying low-value speech in 2010 
when the Court heard United States v. Stevens, a case that challenged the conviction of Robert 
Stevens, a pit-bull enthusiast who was charged with violating federal law banning depictions of 
animal cruelty, such as “crush” videos, when he sold dog fighting videos online.134 In Stevens, 
the government called for the Court to balance the value of the video’s speech against its social 
costs.135 In its application of the Chaplinsky test, the government claimed that the depictions of 
animal cruelty did not play an essential role in the exposition of ideas and that the social costs of 
the speech were so significant that the speech could be outlawed without violating the First 
Amendment.136 But the Court disagreed with the government for its suggestion that the Court 
should use such an approach for identifying speech as low-value: 
The Government thus proposes that a claim of categorical exclusion should be considered 
under a simple balancing test: “Whether a given category of speech enjoys First 
Amendment protection depends upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech 
against its societal costs.” Brief for United States 8; see also id., at 12. 
As a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, that sentence is startling 
and dangerous. The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to 
categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. 
The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits 
of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any 
attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.137 
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According to the Court, the First Amendment reflects a judgment by the American people that 
says the benefits of restricting government control outweigh any costs of speech. Put another 
way, while speech may have social costs, there is a greater cost in letting the government control 
speech. Ultimately, the Court held that the only acceptable content-based restrictions on speech 
are regulations that target speech that 1) falls into a “previously recognized, long-established 
category of unprotected speech”138 or, 2) constitutes “categories of speech that have been 
historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our 
case law”139 Thus, categories of unprotected speech, including novel ones, must be identified on 
the basis of historical evidence. However, even this “new and improved” method of identifying 
low-value speech has its critics.  
Critiques of Low-Value Speech   
 The concept of low-value speech led to major division within legal scholarship. Scholars 
like Geoffrey Stone,140 Fredrick Schauer,141 and Cass Sunstein,142 champion the concept, while 
other scholars like Thomas Emerson,143 Harry Kalven,144 and Kenneth Karst145 argue against its 
use. Supporters of the concept believe it is necessary for an effective First Amendment. To these 
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scholars, the leading benefit of low-value speech is its ability to reconcile the constitutional 
promises to protect free speech with the promise of the government to protect the public.146 For 
example, if all speech is equally protected, then it would be much harder for the government to 
regulate speech, such as sanction the press to ensure a fair trial or punish false statements of 
fact.147 Moreover, without a value approach, all speech regulations would likely be subject to the 
same standards of constitutional scrutiny, which means either the standard would be so high 
speech regulation would be impossible, or the standard would be so low that regulation would be 
very easy. Such a reality, scholars fear, would dilute the protection and importance of speech 
crucial to the democratic process – a central tenant of First Amendment jurisprudence and 
theory.148 Thus, supporters believe that the concept of speech value acts as a safety valve that 
allows the Court to recognize and address the possible harms of less important speech without 
simultaneously harming the protection for more important speech.149 Put another way, the value 
approach is a way to judge speech without actually judging the speech, thereby respecting First 
Amendment values while ensuring those values does not run amok.  
 But, to the opponents, a value-based approach violates the central principle of the First 
Amendment that says the government has no power to restrict speech because of its message or 
content – they believe that the courts and legislatures are precluded from assigning a value to 
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speech.150 These scholars argue that the value-based approach poses a grave danger to 
democracy and social progress because it gives the government power to suppress speech or 
speakers it does not like:  
Value, like beauty, resides in the eye of the beholder, and the meaning of any particular 
book, article, film, etc., changes from situation to situation. Expression has no constant 
value; rather, its value changes and shifts from one context to another. In one setting, 
speech may be taken as profane, racist, or obscene. In another setting the very same 
speech may be taken in a very different way.151  
 
According to the opponents, the subjectivity of a value approach is fundamentally at odds with 
the First Amendment.  
 Weighing the benefits and drawbacks leads scholars to question if the Court should use 
the low-value speech approach. Precedent demonstrates that the Court continues to apply the 
value approach despite its drawbacks, but changes to the approach – most notably the changes 
made in Stevens152 – suggest that perhaps the Court has concerns about a value-based system. As 
previously discussed, the Stevens Court decided that low-value speech will no longer be 
determined through ad hoc balancing of speech’s social costs and benefits as set forth in 
Chaplinsky, and instead, speech may be classified as low-value only if it is “historically 
unprotected.”153 This new method constrains judicial discretion by forcing judges to comply with 
original and fixed understandings of speech and constitutional protection – or so this is what the 
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Court argued as justification for this “historic categories” approach. But this new method has 
also come under scrutiny. For example, research by Genevieve Lakier suggests that there is little 
to no historical evidence to support the Stevens Court’s claim that the low-value speech 
recognized today was recognized during the 18th and 19th centuries.154 To that end, there were 
very few First Amendment cases during those early years, and of the cases that did emerge the 
courts did not create new rights – they only reaffirmed the rights that existed before the First 
Amendment was written.155 Most importantly, these cases show that the value approach is a 
product of recent First Amendment law, not history.156  
Altogether, the arguments made by supporters and opponents demonstrate the complex 
nature of low-value speech. Nonetheless, the Court relies on the low-value speech approach, 
especially within sex speech law.   
Sex Speech as Low-Value Speech  
 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, protecting sex speech is neither the motivation 
behind free speech nor is it the reason mothers and fathers send their children to war to protect 
our freedoms.157 But the Court also recognizes that the First Amendment will not permit the total 
suppression of sex speech.158 This has led the Court to a compromise: Sex speech is protected by 
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the First Amendment, but its protection is minimal and, as a result, regulations of sex speech are 
subject to low levels of constitutional scrutiny.159 These decisions are justified by the Court’s 
beliefs that sex speech holds little value, particularly when compared to other types of speech, 
like political speech.160 However, legal and social science research about the value of sex speech 
calls these beliefs into question.  
 First, legal research calls into question the categorizing of sex speech as low-value. 
Research by Arnold Loewy on the use, misuse and nonuse of low-value speech suggests that the 
approach has been misused by the Court to suppress unpopular speech.161 Specific to sex speech, 
Loewy found that the Court used the low-value speech approach to unfairly suppress adult movie 
theaters through zoning regulations and to censor total-nude dancing through public nudity 
bans.162 Similarly, research by Christopher Schultz showed that the value of speech is highly 
contextual.163 According to Schultz, sex speech may have the ability to “float” between 
categories of speech and levels of value.164 Pornography, in Schultz’s view, may be distasteful 
for showing the subordination of women, but at the same time, the speech may have high artistic 
and political value. For example, pornography’s portrayal of female subordination may be 
offensive, but it may also be an intentional call of attention to the patriarchy that exists in 
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American culture. But classifying speech as low-value, and therefore subjecting it to greater 
regulation, may unfairly censor speech before taking into account its other artistic and social 
values.165 Thus, Schultz argues the value approach needs to be reevaluated to take into 
consideration the context and mobility of sex speech’s value.166 Together, the research by Loewy 
and Schultz call into question the applicability of low-value speech to sex speech. 
Second, social science questions the Court’s perceptions of sex speech as low-value to 
society. Public opinion research on Americans’ support of the First Amendment dates back to the 
1930s,167 and repeatedly the studies found citizens support the right to free speech, including 
controversial and offensive speech.168 More recently, polls from the 1990s found that sex speech, 
specifically speech dealing with nudity and sexually suggestive behaviors like nude dancing, is 
the second most-supported type of expression, falling just behind political speech and tying with 
religious speech,169 while post-millennium polls found that more than half of Americans believe 
people have the freedom to say sexually explicit statements.170 Additionally, recent studies on 
attitudes towards specific types of sex speech, such as pornography, found citizens’ attitudes 
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toward sex speech are generally positive and that the use of sex speech is socially acceptable.171 
Collectively, social science suggests that society supports and values sex speech.  
These findings from both the legal and social scientific literature call into question the 
status of sex speech as low-value speech. Additionally, because the revolutions involving sex 
and speech occurred during and after the establishment of sex speech law, there is a reason to 
believe that the value of sex speech has changed, resulting in a disconnect between law and 
society about the value of sex speech. But within the legal and social scientific literature there 
lacks a comprehensive analysis of the value of sex speech. Specifically, the legal literature lacks 
a comprehensive examination of the value of sex speech according to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
while the social scientific literature lacks research about the value of sex speech according to the 
Court’s interpretation of speech “value.” To fill these gaps in the literature, this dissertation 
addresses the following Research Questions: 
1. What is the value of sex speech according to the U.S. Supreme Court?   
2. What is the value of sex speech according to the U.S. public?  
3. What do the findings from the case analysis (i.e., RQ1) and the public opinion survey 
(i.e., RQ2) suggest about the value of sex speech in the U.S.? 
4. What do the findings from the case analysis (i.e., RQ1) and the public opinion survey 
(i.e., RQ2) suggest about sex speech and the concept of low-value speech in First 
Amendment doctrine? 
To answer these questions this dissertation relies on a combination of qualitative legal analysis 
and a quantitative survey guided by Cohen and Gleason’s communication and law framework.172 
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This dissertation’s theoretical framework, methods, and its limitations are fully described in 
Chapter Two of this dissertation. 
 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter One introduced sex speech and the current disconnect between law and society 
in the protection of sex speech. Specifically, the chapter suggested that First Amendment 
jurisprudence on the value of sex speech does not reflect the current public opinion, and 
therefore calls for communication and law research on the value of sex speech. This chapter 
reviewed the law on obscene and non-obscene sex speech, the legal literature on low-value 
speech, and legal and social scientific literature on the value of sex speech. This chapter 
concluded with the purposes and importance of this research, listed the research questions and 
outlined the remainder of the dissertation.  
Chapter Two explains Cohen and Gleason’s Communication and Law framework, the 
theoretical framework selected to guide this dissertation. This chapter also details the mixed-
methods used in this interdisciplinary study of sex speech value. This chapter describes this 
dissertation’s two-part method, which involves, first, a qualitative legal analysis of sex speech 
cases, and second, a quantitative survey of public opinion on sex speech. This chapter explains 
how each dataset was analyzed and how the findings from the two methods were compared and 
synthesized. This chapter also addresses the methodological limitations of the research.  
Chapter Three uses the legal analysis to address RQ1 and to explain how the U.S. 
Supreme Court characterizes the value of sex speech. Importantly, this chapter reports the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




Court’s justifications for classifying sex speech as low-value and any comparisons by the Court 
on the value of sex speech and the value of other speech types/categories.  
Chapter Four uses the quantitative survey to address RQ2 and to identify the public’s 
opinion on the value of sex speech. Specifically, this chapter reports on various social 
perceptions of sex speech including, but not limited to, individual rights to sex speech, the value 
of sex speech individually and compared to other speech types/categories, and personal and 
societal beliefs about sex speech.  
Chapter Five is the discussion and conclusion of the dissertation. The chapter summarizes 
the results of Chapter Three and Chapter Four to address RQ3 and RQ4. Specifically, this 
chapter compares the results of the legal analysis conducted for Chapter Three with the results of 
the survey conducted for Chapter Four. The chapter reviews common themes and gaps between 
the legal and social characterizations of sex speech value. It also discusses the implications of 
these findings on low-value speech and its use within First Amendment law and provides 
recommendations on the status of sex speech and low-value speech. The chapter closes with 







THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & METHODS 
 
 The objective of this research is to question the status of sex speech as low-value in First 
Amendment law. To do so, this research bridges social science and law through communication 
research methods guided by Jeremy Cohen and Timothy Gleason’s research framework called 
“communication and law.”173 According to these scholars, communication research methods can 
answer legal questions, particularly those related to First Amendment law.174 The idea is that in 
addition to using social science to inform legislation or support a litigant, social science can 
explore the underlying questions and behaviors that emerge within First Amendment law.175 For 
example, libel law has an extremely low success rate for plaintiffs, yet plaintiffs regularly accept 
the challenges and costs of going to court, even when they know the odds are against them.176 
Applying the communication and law framework, social science has examined 1) the motives 
libel plaintiffs have for going to court, 2) the social outcomes that come from taking a libel case 
to court, and 3) the public attitudes and beliefs about libel plaintiffs willing to go to court.177 This 
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research revealed that when a plaintiff chooses to go to court, generally the objective is not to 
obtain damages but to use the case as a social symbol and a form of reputation repair.178 This is 
just one example, but it demonstrates how social science and law can be bridged to examine 
underlying behaviors related to First Amendment law.179  
 The communication and law framework also recognizes that legal and social science 
scholarship share questions, such as “How is free speech affected by regulation?”180 and “What 
are the community standards of decency?”181 But the approaches these two fields utilize to 
answer these shared questions are very different. For example, the law relies on normative and 
rational reasoning,182 while social science relies on calculated and empirically-driven findings.183 
Because of these different approaches, the research findings struggle to apply across disciplines. 
But the communication and law framework recognizes this problem and provides scholarship 
with a framework for answering shared questions between law and social science in a way that 
appeals to both fields.184 However, research of this king no easy task. Cohen and Gleason admit 
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that communication and law research is especially taxing because it requires researchers to have 
extensive knowledge of both law and social science185 – two massive pillars of study that, 
individually, can keep a researcher busy for a lifetime. As a result, research like the kind Cohen 
and Gleason propose is rare.186   
The Status of Communication and Law Research  
 In addition to its challenging nature, communication and law research is rare likely 
because it has difficulty gaining acceptance across disciplines. This is especially true of public 
opinion research. Previous studies employed Cohen and Gleason’s approach to assessing public 
opinion on issues like censorship187 and press rights.188 However, there are doubts about the 
utility of public opinion assessments in the law.189 For example, public opinion data may impact 
policymaking,190 legislators,191 and justices who are elected to the bench,192 but research on the 
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U.S. Supreme Court suggests that public opinion data has little to no direct effect on the 
justices.193 Additionally, if public opinion research has any impact it is only in the long run, not 
in the short term.194 Thus, part of the problem for communication and law research, especially 
public opinion research like in this dissertation, is proving its utility.  
 But doubts about the utility of communication and law and public opinion research are 
explainable. As previously discussed, the communication and law framework aims to produce 
research that appeals to the approaches of both social science and law scholarship.195 This effort 
likely stems from the fact that research findings from either field can be informative, but the 
findings lack applicability to the other discipline. For example, in the context of sex speech, 
social science has identified types of sex speech, such as pornography and sexually explicit 
media, and measured society’s perceptions of this speech, such as social acceptability of use,196 
support for censorship regulations,197 beliefs about harms,198 and general attitudes toward these 
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types of sex speech.199 But if a legal lens is applied to this social science research on sex speech, 
a legal interpretation may read the findings as informative but not entirely applicable to questions 
about doctrine or the legal protection of sex speech.  
These cross-disciplinary failures likely explain why social science and law scholarship 
struggle to accept one another’s research. However, the communication and law framework aims 
to avoid these cross-disciplinary failures. This framework tells researchers that they must first 
recognize the approaches of each discipline and then, design studies to marry those approaches 
together. If these steps are taken, then the research should be applicable and impactful across the 
disciplines of law and social science.  
Unfortunately, however, Cohen and Gleason do not provide a set of instructions for 
marrying the approaches and methods of law and social science. Put another way, the 
communication and law framework is simply a framework – it provides an outline for cross-
disciplinary legal and social science research but it lacks methodological instructions. This is 
possibly intentional because the approach for mixing disciplines and methods depends entirely 
on the issue or question being addressed. Moreover, the framework recognizes that the purposes 
of law and purposes of social science are ultimately different, which likely explains why 
communication and law research is difficult, rare, and often rejected. As a result, a contribution 
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Contribution to Interdisciplinary Research 
 This dissertation serves many purposes, but among them is its service as an example of 
communication and law research. Generally speaking, mixed-methods research is popular within 
social science,200 and it is gaining traction within legal research. But, as previously discussed, 
mixed-methods research, like the kind presented in the communication and law framework, 
struggles to satisfy the approaches of different disciplines and earn acceptance across disciplines. 
Moreover, the communication and law framework – a champion of mixed-methods research – 
lacks instructions about how to conduct such mixed-methods research, making this type of 
research that much more taxing and challenging. Altogether, this likely explains why 
communication and law research is seldom done. 
But, the challenge mixed-method legal and social scientific research presents is, in part, 
what makes it worth undertaking. The new and quickly-changing communication environment 
calls for a more in-depth understanding of communication, and mixed-methods research can 
meet the call for deeper, more robust findings. Additionally, if scholars avoid the challenge of 
mixed-methods research, then research may stifle in its growth and utility. For example, if 
mixed-legal and social scientific research is seldom done then instructions on how to conduct 
such research (like the kind missing from the communication and law framework) will struggle 
to develop. Therefore, this dissertation contributes to interdisciplinary legal and social scientific 
research by executing a communication and law study. This dissertation demonstrates how legal 
and communication research methods can be combined to answer a shared question between law 
and social science and produce findings that apply to both fields. Altogether, the contribution of 
                                                          




this dissertation lies in its ability to show how social science and law can work together and 




 Before reviewing the methods used in this dissertation, it is important to first explain why 
the methods were selected and how the two work together.  
The inspiration for this dissertation came from identifying the disconnect between law 
and society on the value of sex speech. As a result, the objective of this research is to determine 
the value of sex speech to ultimately explain and correct the disconnect. To meet this objective, 
this dissertation needed to use methods that could identify the value of sex speech according to 
law and the value of sex speech according to society. Herein lies why a case analysis and a 
public opinion survey were used: Because the case analysis could identify the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s perceptions on the value of sex speech and the public opinion survey could identify the 
U.S. public’s perceptions on the value of sex speech.  
But the reason for using these two methods extends beyond their ability to identify the 
value of sex speech. Much of why these methods were selected is because they can work 
together. This dissertation relied on a stepwise approach, which means that the methods were 
conducted one at a time and in a specific order. For this research, the case analysis was 
conducted first because doing so allowed for the findings from the case analysis to inform the 
public opinion survey. For example, the entire dissertation centers around the value of sex 
speech, but what does that mean? – What does “value of sex speech” represent or entail? 




questions were the reason for conducting the case analysis first: By conducting the case analysis 
first, its findings, such as those on the concept of speech value and the language and terminology 
used by the Court, could be incorporated into the public opinion survey, thus ensuring the public 
opinion survey accurately reflected the legal concepts and could be combined with the case 
analysis findings.  
In summary, there were two reasons this dissertation relied on a case analysis and public 
opinion survey: First, because the methods could identify the value of sex speech according to 
law and society and, second, because the two methods could work together, with the first method 
informing the second method to ensure the findings from each could merge. Having reviewed the 
reasons for using these two methods, the following explains the procedures for each method.  
Qualitative Case Analysis 
The first part of this dissertation was a qualitative analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court 
case law involving sex speech; this portion addressed RQ1. The objective of this analysis was 
twofold: First, to understand the Court’s reasoning for classifying sex speech as low-value, and 
second, to inform the national survey questions about the value of sex speech. To achieve these 
objectives this portion of the dissertation asked the following questions: 
1. What does it mean for speech to be “low-value,” according to the U.S. Supreme Court? 
2. What are the U.S. Supreme Court’s justifications for classifying sex speech as low-value? 
3. What has the U.S. Supreme Court said about the value of sex speech in comparison to 








To answer the questions listed above a qualitative case analysis of U.S. Supreme Court 
cases on sex speech was conducted. The analysis began with Roth v. United States201 and ended 
with F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.202 Roth was the designated starting point because it 
is the case in which the Court articulated that obscene sex speech is not protected by the First 
Amendment and created its first standard for identifying obscene sex speech.203 Prior to Roth, the 
Court addressed obscenity-related issues but failed to provide a definitive answer about 
obscenity’s protection.204 As a result, Roth was as an appropriate starting point for an analysis of 
the Court’s views about sex speech. Fox was the designated endpoint for this analysis because it 
is the last Supreme Court case involving sex speech at the time of this dissertation’s writing.205 
Positioned between these two cases, this case analysis consisted of more than 100 cases and 
spanned over sixty years of law.  
Identifying the cases for the analysis involved the following two-part process: First, the 
search tools within the legal database, Westlaw, identified sex speech cases. This search relied 
on the Case Key search tool “Sexual Expression, K2180-k2269,” which consisted of more than 
thirty subcategories of sex speech case law and research. Each subcategory was reviewed, and 
within each, the U.S. Supreme Court cases were collected. For example, the subcategory 
“Pornography in General” (Case Key number 2192) contained Westlaw’s content related to 
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pornography. Within this category, there were 59 state and federal cases. Filter tools were 
applied and removed all of the state and lower federal court cases. Ultimately, the initial pool of 
59 state and federal cases was reduced to one U.S. Supreme Court case. That one U.S. Supreme 
Court case was selected and added to the collection of sex speech cases. This first portion of the 
identification process produced 49 cases. 
The second part of the identification process consisted of reading the identified cases and 
checking the citations embedded within the opinions and footnotes. Citations were checked for 
their relevance to sex speech law and, if related, were added to the collection. This second 
portion of the case identification process found an additional 56 cases. In total, the identification 
process found 108 U.S. Supreme Court cases between Roth206 and Fox.207 A list of these 108 
cases is provided in Appendix A.  
Data Analysis 
 These 108 sex speech cases were read and analyzed for information about how the Court 
defined the value of sex speech. Specifically, for each case, any discussion by the U.S. Supreme 
Court about the value of sex speech was identified and logged into an Excel file. Compiled 
together in one Excel file, the logged discussions created a dataset on the value of sex speech 
according to the Court. The dataset was then used to answer the RQ1 and the sub-research 
questions listed at the start of this section. This was done by identifying patterns and themes 
within the Court’s discussions about the value of sex speech and synthesizing those findings. 
Findings from the case analysis are discussed at length in Chapter Three. The findings from the 
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case analysis were also used to inform the second method of this dissertation, a quantitative 
public opinion survey on the value of sex speech, which is discussed in the following section.  
Quantitative Public Opinion Survey 
The second part of this dissertation was a quantitative survey about the American 
public’s value of sex speech; this portion addressed RQ2. The objectives of this survey were 
threefold: First, and most importantly, was to determine the public’s value of sex speech. This 
was done by asking citizens about their perceptions of sex speech, such as sex speech’s value to 
society and sex speech’s value in comparison to other speech types. Second, the survey sought to 
determine if citizens perceived differences in their personal opinions of sex speech (i.e., first-
person perceptions) and “other’s” opinions of sex speech (i.e., third-person perceptions). The 
purpose of asking citizens about both their first-person and third-person perceptions of sex 
speech was to test for third-person effects. The third-person effect theorizes that people tend to 
think media messages have a greater impact on others than on themselves and that people 
generally overestimate the influence that media has on others’ attitudes and behaviors.208 Though 
this survey did not ask about the media effects of sex speech, the third-person effect was adapted 
into the survey to determine if citizens perceived differences in their personal views of sex 
speech and the views of sex speech held by the country, generally. Lastly, the survey wanted to 
know if and how the public’s perceptions about sex speech varied across demographic 
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characteristics, such as age, gender, and political ideology. To achieve these objectives this 
portion of the dissertation asked the following research questions: 
1. What are the first-person and third-person values of sex speech?  
2. What are the first-person and third-person values of sex speech in comparison to other 
types of speech? 
3. How do the values of sex speech differ across demographic characteristics? 
Participants & Procedure 
 To answer these questions this dissertation conducted a national survey of U.S. citizens. 
This dissertation used an online survey administered through Qualtrics, a software program 
designed for online data gathering and analysis.209 The survey was distributed by Survey 
Sampling International (SSI), a data and technology firm that has access to millions of survey 
participants worldwide.210 SSI distributed the survey on Monday, November 5, 2018, and closed 
the survey on Tuesday, November 13, 2018. During this time SSI recruited a study sample of 
1609 participants. Participants had to be citizens of the United States, 18 years or older, read 
English, and agree to participate in the study. Participants were compensated by SSI for taking 
part in the survey.211 All study procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board at 
the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.   
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A copy of the full survey is provided in Appendix B, but this section includes brief 
descriptions of the survey variables. Each of these survey variables served one of two purposes: 
1) determined the value of sex speech, or 2) benchmarked public perceptions about free speech 
or sex speech, generally. The primary objective of the survey was to determine the value of sex 
speech according to the U.S. public, thus many of the study variables focused on aspects of 
speech value and the value of sex speech – these variables are discussed first. But, to best 
understand the perceptions of the value of sex speech, the survey also included variables that 
assessed broader but related topics to sex speech, such as perceptions of free speech, generally, 
and personal attitudes toward sex speech. These variables served as benchmarks and helped to 
describe characteristics of the survey sample – these variables are discussed after the variables 
related to the value of sex speech.  
First-Person Values of Sex Speech: Previous research on free speech has yet to 
conceptualize the U.S. Supreme Court’s idea of “speech value.” However, this is why the case 
analysis was conducted prior to the survey: to allow the findings from the case analysis on the 
value of sex speech to inform the conceptualization and translation of “speech value” questions 
for this public opinion survey. According to the findings from the case analysis, “speech value” 
consists of three ideas: 1) that the speech serves a social purpose, such as having literary, artistic 
or scientific value; 2) that the speech serves a political purpose, such as creating an informed 
voting public; and 3) that these services be weighed against the harms of the speech, such as 
damaging children, unsuspecting adults, and social morale.212 Moreover, sex speech receives less 
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First Amendment protection because the Court perceived sex speech serves little social and/or 
political purpose and because it can be harmful. Thus, the survey asked questions about the 
purposes of sex speech to determine if the U.S. public shared the same perceptions of the 
purposes of sex speech as the Court, and the survey asked about the harms of sex speech to 
determine the degree to which the U.S. public perceived sex speech harms citizens and society.   
To measure the public’s perceptions of purposes and harms of sex speech, these ideas 
were adapted into seven questions that asked participants about the social purpose, political 
purpose, and harms of sex speech.213 Specifically, two questions asked about the extent of sex 
speech’s social and political purposes; four questions asked about the extent of sex speech’s 
harms on children/minors, adults, and society – both emotionally and physically (such as “social 
morale” and “community safety,” respectively); and one question asked about the extent to 
which the social and political purposes of sex speech exceed the harms of sex speech or vice 
versa. The four questions about the harms of sex speech to children/minors, adults, and society 
were collapsed into one harms scale (Cronbach’s alpha=.873, M=1.64, 0.84).  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
24 (1973)). State interests in regulating sex speech include protecting vulnerable audiences, like minors (F.C.C. v. 
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)), protecting social order and morale (National Endowment for the Arts v. 
Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 204 (1975); Paris Adult Theatre I v. 
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)), and preventing the secondary-effects of sex speech, such as increased crime and 
decreased property values (City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); City of Erie v. Pap’s 
A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 
Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)). See Chapter III of this 
dissertation for additional information on the purposes and harms of sex speech according to the sex speech case 
law.  
213 Prior to answering questions about sex speech, the survey included a brief definition/description of sex speech. 
The following is the description included in the survey: “‘Sex Speech’ is speech and/or expression about sex. 
Specifically, it is speech that involves the descriptions or depictions of nudity and actual or pretend sexual activities. 
Examples include nude/sexual art, nude dancing, phone sex services, adult films (X-rated movies), adult literature 
(books and magazines, like Playboy and online literature), etc. NOTE: This does NOT include descriptions or 
depictions of illegal sex acts, such as nonconsensual sex (i.e. rape), sex with a child or minor (i.e. child 




Except for the one question about the relationship between the purposes and harms of sex 
speech, participants reported their perceptions on a 4-point scale which included: “Zero,” “Low,” 
“Moderate,” and “High.” These response options were used, in this question and throughout the 
survey, because they mirror the language used in the low-value speech approach.214 Put another 
way, the four options of “Zero” “Low,” “Moderate,” and “High” were used because that is the 
language the Court and First Amendment doctrine use when referring to the value of speech.215 
For the last question on the relationship between sex speech’s purposes and harms, participants 
reported their perceptions on a 5-point scale which included: “Harms greatly exceed Purposes,” 
“Harms somewhat exceed Purposes,” “Harms and Purposes are equal,” “Purposes somewhat 
exceed Harms,” and “Purposes greatly exceed Harms.” 
Third-Person Values of Sex Speech: After the “First-Person Values of Sex Speech” 
questions, the participants answered the same seven sex speech value questions (with the same 
scales/response options) but from the perspective of “most U.S. citizens.” The purpose was to 
test for a third-person effect – to determine if the participants perceived a difference in their 
personal values of sex speech and other people’s, specifically “most U.S. citizens’,” values of 
sex speech. It was important to test for differences between the first-person and third-person 
value of sex speech because doing so revealed if and to what degree the public perceived 
differences in their personal opinions and the opinions of others. 
Note: The four third-person questions about harms of sex speech to children/minors, 
adults, and society were collapsed into one harms scale (Cronbach’s alpha=.862, M=1.71, 0.79). 
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First-Person Speech Comparisons: In addition to identifying the individual values of sex 
speech, the survey asked about the value of sex speech in comparison to three other types of 
speech: political speech, commercial speech, and hate/violent speech.216 Questions about the 
value of other speech types were included in the survey because the case analysis found that the 
Court regularly compared sex speech to other speech types, such as political speech, and used 
those comparisons to justify less protection for sex speech.217 As a result, the survey asked about 
the value of other speech types to determine the degree to which the public valued sex speech 
compared to other speech types.  
For each of the speech types studied (sex speech, political speech, commercial speech, 
and hate/violent speech) the survey asked four questions: first, the level of the speech’s 
importance to society; second, the level of society’s interest in protecting the speech from 
government regulation and suppression; third, the level of society’s value of the speech; and 
fourth, the level of legal protection from censorship or government regulation that should be 
                                                          
216 Prior to answering questions about the four different types of speech, the survey included a brief 
definition/description of each type of speech. The following are the descriptions included in the survey: “Sex Speech 
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books, magazines, and/or movies that depict nudity or characters engaging in sex.” “Political Speech comments on 
the government, policies and/or candidates for political office. Examples include making a speech about politics on 
a downtown street corner, picketing/protesting a company, supporting a candidate for President by putting a sign in 
your yard.” “Commercial Speech speaks on behalf of a business or service provider with the intent of earning a 
profit. Examples include television commercials for goods and/or services, or flyers and advertisement promoting a 
product or service.” “Hate/Violent Speech is speech that some view as deliberately offending, insulting, 
intimidating, or threatening an individual or group based on a trait or attribute, such as sexual orientation, religion 
and/or race. For some people, examples include using racial slurs to insult someone, burning a cross or wearing a 
swastika (the symbol of the Nazi Party).” 
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though the First Amendment would not tolerate total suppression of the adult movie theaters, “society’s interest in 
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled 
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Young were justified by the Court’s beliefs that sex speech lacked the level of value held by the political speech by 
Voltaire. In other words, sex speech was less valuable when compared to sex speech. See Chapter III “Sex Speech 
vs. Political Speech” for additional information on the comparisons the Court made among sex speech and other 




given to the speech. For all of these questions, participants reported their perceptions on a 4-
point scale which included: “Zero,” “Low,” “Moderate,” and “High.” Altogether, participants 
answered each of these four questions for each of the four types of speech. The four answers for 
each speech type were then combined into one speech value scale for each speech type – Sex 
speech: Cronbach’s alpha=.788, M=1.26, SD=0.76; Political speech: Cronbach’s alpha=.828, 
M=1.96, SD=0.75; Commercial speech: Cronbach’s alpha=.809, M=1.77, SD=0.71; 
Hate/Violent speech: Cronbach’s alpha=.809, M=1.21, SD=0.92.218  
 Third-Person Speech Comparisons: After the “First-Person Speech Comparisons” 
questions, the participants answered the same battery of speech comparison questions (with the 
same scales/response options) but from the perspective of “most U.S. citizens.” Like the 
questions on the “Third-Person Values of Sex Speech,” the purpose was to test for a third-person 
effect – to determine if the participants perceived a difference in their personal values of speech 
types and other people’s, specifically “most U.S. citizens’,” values of speech types. Again, it was 
important to test for differences between the first-person and third-person value of the speech 
types because doing so revealed if and to what degree the public perceived differences in their 
personal opinions and the opinions of others. 
Note: All of the third-person questions about the values of different speech types were 
collapsed into individual scales for each of the different speech types – Sex speech: Cronbach’s 
alpha=.846, M=1.22, SD=0.81; Political speech: Cronbach’s alpha=.864, M=1.92, SD=0.77; 
Commercial speech: Cronbach’s alpha=.865, M=1.76, SD=0.76; Hate/Violent speech: 
Cronbach’s alpha=.880, M=1.24, SD=0.96.  
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Free Speech Beliefs: The previous variables determined the value of sex speech, but this 
variable and the ones following it were the variables that assessed broader but related topics to 
sex speech. These variables were included because they served as benchmarks and informed the 
results on the characteristics of the survey sample. For example, this variable, “Free Speech 
Beliefs,” asked three questions about free speech beliefs, such as the importance of free speech 
to the participants, themselves, and its importance to U.S. democracy.219 Participants reported 
their beliefs on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” 
(Cronbach’s alpha=.942, M=6.11, SD=1.31).  
Rights to Sex Speech: After the free speech belief questions, an eleven-item question 
measured perceptions of U.S. citizens’ rights to sex speech.220 This question was asked because 
the case identified eleven types of sex speech (see the list provided below) within the sex speech 
case law and, as a result, the survey needed to identify the public’s perceptions of U.S. citizens’ 
rights to these sex speech types. The question read “Citizens have a right to…” followed by 
eleven types of sex speech identified from the sex speech case law. Examples of the types of sex 
speech include: “Read adult books and magazines that describe nudity and sexual activities” and 
“Watch adult movies that depict nudity and actual or pretend sexual activities.” Participants 
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reported their perceptions on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to 
“Strongly Agree” (Cronbach’s alpha=.971, M=3.34, SD=1.23).221 
11 Types of Sex Speech 
1. Read adult books and magazines that describe nudity and sexual activities. 
2. View photographs that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
3. Watch broadcast/network television that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
4. Watch cable television that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
5. Watch adult movies that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
6. Call and listen to phone messages that describe nudity and sexual activities. 
7. Play adult video games that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
8. Attend live entertainment clubs that offer/allow nude dancing. 
9. Use the internet to access erotic or sexually explicit writings/literature. 
10. Use the internet to access pictures and/or videos of that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
11. View art that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
 
Social Acceptability of Sex Speech: In addition to questions about the rights to sex 
speech, three questions measured perceptions of social acceptability to access/use sex speech.222 
These questions listed the individual types of sex speech previously asked about in the Rights to 
Sex Speech question and asked about the social acceptability of those sex speech types according 
to: the participants, themselves (Cronbach’s alpha=.980, M=4.16, SD=1.95); their community 
(i.e. their city/state) (Cronbach’s alpha=.979, M=4.08, SD=1.74); and the U.S. (Cronbach’s 
alpha=.981, M=4.50, SD=1.72). Participants reported their beliefs on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” 
                                                          
221 The survey portion of this dissertation was sponsored in part by another study led by UNC-Chapel Hill’s Richard 
Cole Eminent Professor, Dr. Dan Riffe, on citizens’ rights to free speech. Because of the overlap in the research by 
Dr. Riffe and this dissertation, the two studies combined to create one large survey on free speech. As a result, the 
11 items from “Rights to Sex Speech” are part of a much larger battery of questions about citizens’ rights to free 
speech. Specifically, in the full survey there are 37 items that ask about citizens’ rights to free speech, 11 of which 
are the “Rights to Sex Speech” items. A copy of the full survey is provided in Appendix B.  
222 These questions were adapted from previous studies on use and acceptance of pornography: Joseph Price et al., 
How much more XXX is Generation X consuming? Evidence of Changing Attitudes and Behaviors Related to 
Pornography Since 1973, 53 J. SEX RES. 12 (2016). Jason S. Carroll et al., Generation XXX: Pornography 




Feelings toward Sex Speech: As well as questions about the social acceptability of sex 
speech, one question measured personal feelings toward sex speech.223 Again, the individual 
types of sex speech previously asked about in the Rights to Sex Speech question were listed, but 
for this question, participants reported their personal feelings toward the types of sex speech. 
Participants reported their feelings on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “Extremely Negative” 
to “Extremely Positive” (Cronbach’s alpha=.974, M=3.58, SD=1.67). 
Demographics: The survey closed with a series of demographic questions which asked 
participants about their age, gender identify, sexuality, race and/or ethnicity, political ideology, 
religious affiliation, and the highest level of education acquired. A review of the sample 
demographics is provided in Chapter Four. 
Data Analysis  
 The data analysis consisted of three parts. First, descriptive analyses, such as frequencies 
and central measures, provided foundational information about the characteristics of the study 
sample. Additionally, reliability assessments tested the validity of the study’s measures and 
determined if items could be collapsed into scales. Second, paired t-test, repeated measures 
ANOVAs and post-hoc analyses answered the first- and third-person questions about the value 
of sex speech. Third, univariate general linear models assessed for significant differences in the 
value of sex speech based on demographic characteristics, such as age, sex, and political 
ideology. Findings from these analyses are discussed at length in Chapter Four. The results from 
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the qualitative case analysis and the quantitative survey were then combined to answer RQ3 and 
RQ4 of this dissertation; these findings are discussed at length in Chapter Five. 
Limitations 
 The mixed-methods and cross-disciplinary nature of this dissertation expose it to 
methodological and application limitations. The following reviews the study limitations, as well 
as the steps taken to minimize those limitations. 
Methodological 
Limitations of the qualitative legal analysis concern the risk that information may have 
been missed and cases may be missing from the pool. The sex speech case law exceeded 100 
cases, spanned over sixty years of law, and consisted of a wide range of speech and expression 
issues. Such a large and eclectic body of case law exposed the study to risks that information 
may have been missed or overlooked during the analysis. Moreover, this study was limited to the 
cases identified. There is always a possibility that cases were missed by the search tool, Westlaw, 
and/or in the citation review.  
Limitations of the quantitative survey concern the study participants and the survey 
questions. First, the survey relied on self-reported data which led to concerns about answer 
validity, such as participant honesty and accuracy.224 Second, participation was based on self-
selection, thus, only individuals with an interest in the survey topic participated. Last, the 
concepts asked about in the survey were abstract and complex, thus participants may have been 
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confused or not understood the survey topics and/or questions.225 In addition, aspects of the legal 
concepts may have been lost when they were translated into survey questions. To ensure the 
survey accurately reflected the legal concepts, the survey questions were designed to include 
legal language. For example, questions about the value and protection of speech types used 
terminology that mirrored the language used by the Court, such as “low-value” and “high-value.” 
But efforts to accurately translate the legal concepts into survey questions likely created a more 
challenging and taxing survey for participants to complete. For these reasons, generalizability of 
the findings was limited, and predictive claims were avoided.  
Application 
 Perhaps the greatest point of vulnerability for this research is its application. At its core, 
this dissertation was a public opinion assessment of legal doctrine, but the value of public 
opinion to the law is minimal. Research on the impact of public opinion research on the Court 
suggests that the public opinion lacks an immediate, direct impact on the law or Justices.226 To 
combat this challenge and improve the overall applicability of the research findings, two steps 
were taken: First, this dissertation applied Cohen and Gleason’s communication and law 
framework, a framework designed to successfully bridge law and social science through 
understanding the approaches of each discipline.227 Second, this dissertation used a step-wise 
approach in which the legal analysis was completed first and the public opinion survey second. 
                                                          
225 Prior to national distribution, the survey was pretested with a student pool in the School of Media and Journalism 
at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill. Results from the pretest showed the survey produced valid and 
reliable answers. This gave the researcher confidence that participants understood the survey topics and questions. 
But, despite pretesting, it is possible that participants in the national sample did not understand survey topics and/or 
questions due to their abstract and complex nature.  
226 Marvin Ammori, Public opinion and freedom of speech, JOHN S. AND JAMES L. KNIGHT FOUNDATION (July 14, 
2006), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Public_Affairs/ISP_PublicOpinion_fos.pdf.  




This stepwise approach allowed for the findings from the legal analysis to inform the public 
opinion survey, which further ensured the public opinion survey reflects legal discipline. 
Together, these steps aimed to alleviate applicability concerns and improve the overall utility of 








DECISIONS & JUSTIFICATIONS:  
UNDERSTANDING WHAT “LOW-VALUE” SPEECH MEANS & 
WHY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT CLASSIFIES SEX SPEECH AS LOW-VALUE 
 
The first part of this dissertation asks: What is the value of sex speech according to the 
U.S. Supreme Court? Even without a case analysis, it is clear from legal doctrine and literature 
that the Court considers sex speech low-value speech.228 This means that sex speech receives 
less First Amendment protection because the speech is believed to have less value to society than 
other types of speech, such as political speech. But what does it mean for speech to have value? 
And why does the Court consider sex speech low-value?  
This chapter sets out to answer these questions by reporting the findings from a 
qualitative case analysis of Supreme Court cases on sex speech, starting with Roth v. United 
States.229 and ending with F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.230 In total, 108 cases were 
reviewed for information on the value of sex speech. Of the 108 cases, only 18 contained 
statements by the Court that discussed its classification of sex speech as low-value speech (see 
Table 1 provided at the end of this section). The 18 cases were synthesized to answer the 
following questions:
                                                          
228 For legal literature see Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2177 
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1. What does it mean for speech to be “low-value” according to the U.S. Supreme Court? 
2. What are the U.S. Supreme Court’s justifications for classifying sex speech as low-value? 
3. What has the U.S. Supreme Court said about the value of sex speech in comparison to 
other speech types? 
Findings for each of these questions are discussed at length in the following sections, and they 
are later used to inform the public opinion survey which is discussed in the next chapter. But, 
ultimately, this chapter concludes that the Court classifies sex speech as low-value because the 
Court believes sex speech serves little purpose to society and that sex speech is not a priority for 
society. These beliefs are justified, in part, by comparisons the Court makes between sex speech 
and other speech types, like political speech. However, much of why the Court believes sex 
speech is low-value remains unknown because the Court does not explain or give a reason as to 
why it perceived sex speech is less valuable to society. Despite a lack of reason, the conclusion 
by the Court was always the same: Sex speech is low-value speech.  
Table 1: U.S. Supreme Court Cases Containing Sex Speech Value Information 
Case Name Citation Year 
Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476 1957 
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day 370 U.S. 478 1962 
Jacobellis v. State of Ohio 378 U.S. 184 1964 
Ginzburg v. United States 383 U.S. 463 1966 
Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 1973 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton  413 U.S. 49 1973 
Kaplan v. California  413 U.S. 115 1973 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.  427 U.S. 50 1976 
Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.) v. Pacifica 
Foundation  
438 U.S. 726 1978 
New York v. Ferber  458 U.S. 747 1982 
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser 478 U.S. 675 1986 
Osborne v. Ohio  495 U.S. 103 1990 
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.  529 U.S. 277 2000 
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.  529 U.S. 803 2000 




United States v. Williams  553 U.S. 285 2008 
Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.) v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. 
556 U.S. 502 2009 
United States v. Stevens 559 U.S. 460 2010 
 
What does it mean for speech to be “low-value” according to the U.S. Supreme Court?  
 As previously stated, the Supreme Court perceived sex speech is low-value speech. But 
to understand why the Court classifies sex speech as low-value, it must first be understood what 
the Court means when it says speech is low-value. Starting at the broadest level, the case analysis 
revealed that 16 of the 18 cases included information that explained what the Court meant by 
speech “value” (see Table 2 provided below). According to these cases, “value,” in the context of 
sex speech, represents two ideas: first, that speech has value if the speech serves a purpose, and 
second, that speech has value if society, itself, prioritizes the speech. These two ideas and how 
they relate to the idea that sex speech is low-value speech are discussed in the following sections.  
Table 2: U.S. Supreme Court Cases Containing Information on the Meaning of Speech “Value” 
Case Name Citation Year 
Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476 1957 
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day 370 U.S. 478 1962 
Jacobellis v. State of Ohio 378 U.S. 184 1964 
Ginzburg v. United States 383 U.S. 463 1966 
Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 1973 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton  413 U.S. 49 1973 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.  427 U.S. 50 1976 
Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.) v. Pacifica 
Foundation  
438 U.S. 726 1978 
New York v. Ferber  458 U.S. 747 1982 
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser 478 U.S. 675 1986 
Osborne v. Ohio  495 U.S. 103 1990 
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.  529 U.S. 803 2000 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition  535 U.S. 234 2002 
United States v. Williams  553 U.S. 285 2008 
Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.) v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. 
556 U.S. 502 2009 







Valuable Speech has Purpose, Low-Value Speech has Little to None   
 The first idea behind speech value is the notion that valuable speech serves a purpose. 
This idea emerged throughout the case analysis, but most often in the obscenity case law. For 
example, in Roth v. United States,231 the Court stated, “The protection given speech and press 
was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.”232 This statement suggests that the purpose of speech is to 
help society progress. As a result, speech that is believed to aid in social or political progress is 
thought to serve a purpose and, therefore, is perceived as valuable. Similarly, speech that 
prompts and promotes the exchange of ideas, even unpopular ones, serves a purpose and, 
therefore, is valuable. This idea originated in Jacobellis v. State of Ohio.233 In that case, the 
Court decided if a film that depicted and advocated for adultery should be deemed obscene. The 
Court determined “that material dealing with sex in a manner that advocates ideas, or that has 
literary or scientific or artistic value or any other form of social importance, may not be branded 
as obscenity and denied the constitutional protection.”234 Here, the Court explained that speech is 
perceived as valuable, and therefore legally protected, so long as the speech advocates or 
supports the exchange of ideas. Together, these statements by the Court suggest that speech 
value is dependent on speech purpose. More specifically, speech value depends on the extent to 
which speech aids in social or political progress and/or the extent to which the speech promotes 
and advocates ideas.  
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 According to the Court, sex speech serves little, if any, purpose. This idea emerged 
predominately in the obscenity case law and is reflected in the Court’s earliest obscenity 
decision, Roth,235 when the Court likened obscenity to fighting words: “It has been well observed 
that such utterances [obscenity] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”236 According to the Court, obscenity 
does not aid in the exchange of ideas, and as a result, it is perceived as having little to no value; 
thus it is low-value speech. This idea held consistent throughout the obscenity case law, but the 
most notable definition arrived in Miller v. California237 when the Court redefined the obscenity 
standard. There, it stated, “in our view, to equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and 
political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand conception 
of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom.”238 Similarly, 
on the same day the Court decided Miller, the Court reiterated in a related obscenity case, Paris 
Adult Theater I v. Slaton,239 that obscenity did not involve the “communication of ideas,” and 
therefore had no value.240 Together, these statements by the Court demonstrate that the reason 
obscenity is classified as low-value is that obscenity is believed to serve no part in the exchange 
and communication of ideas. Moreover, the statements represent a justification based in self-
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governance, which suggests speech is protected because it is believed to serve the people and 
their state; speech that fails to serve the people and government may be regulated, especially if 
the regulation, in turn, serves the people and state.241   
Furthermore, the standard for obscenity and its related cases, like U.S. v. Stevens,242 
suggest that obscenity is perceived as serving so little purpose that the only way obscenity can be 
protected is if the speech is thought to have “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value.”243 It has been suggested by the Court that much of speech, in general, lacks serious value, 
but because the purpose of obscenity is believed to be so minimal, a “serious” level of value is 
required to protect potentially obscene speech.244 Furthermore, even if obscene speech were 
found to have “serious” value, the speech would likely be limited to low-value.  
 To summarize, the relationship between speech purpose and speech value is linear: the 
more speech is perceived as having purpose, like aiding in social progress or promoting the 
exchange of ideas, the more valuable speech is perceived to be. However, this means that the less 
speech is perceived as having purpose, such as aiding in social and political progress, the less 
valuable speech is perceived to be. Unfortunately, the latter is the case for sex speech, 
particularly obscenity. Obscenity is perceived as having little to no purpose – it is not believed to 
further social or political progress and it is not believed to further the exchange of idea. As a 
result, obscene speech is classified as low-value speech. But what about non-obscene sex speech 
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– speech that falls on the other side of the line and into First Amendment protection? According 
to the case analysis, such speech is protected, but it is neither prioritized nor valued.  
Society Prioritizes Speech, But Not Low-Value Speech 
The second idea of speech value is the notion that valuable speech is prioritized by 
society. This idea emerged in the case law involving non-obscene sex speech, such as adult 
movies245 and nude dancing.246 Throughout these cases, the Court states that it would not go 
against the principles of the First Amendment to deny non-obscene sex speech protection. 
However, the Court also believes that protecting non-obscene sex speech is not a societal 
priority, particularly when such speech is compared to other types of speech. Consider the 
following statement from Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.247 when the Court upheld a 
series of zoning laws that only targeted sexually oriented businesses: 
Moreover, even though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total 
suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that 
society’s interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, 
magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire’s 
immortal comment. Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to 
applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our duty to 
defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would march our sons and 
daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see “Specified Sexual Activities” 
exhibited in the theaters of our choice. Even though the First Amendment protects 
communication in this area from total suppression, we hold that the State may 
legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for placing them in a different 
classification from other motion pictures.248   
 
                                                          
245 For an example of an adult movies/adult movie theater case see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 
50 (1976). 
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247 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 




This statement by the Court demonstrates that while non-obscene sex speech is worthy of First 
Amendment protection, the Court believes that society, itself, is not interested in protecting non-
obscene sex speech to the same level as other types of speech, like political speech. This suggests 
that the value of speech is dependent on how much society prioritizes the speech. Put another 
way, it is believed that society has a priority system – like a ranking order – that does not 
privilege non-obscene sex speech. As a result, less prioritized speech is perceived as less 
valuable, thus it is low-value.   
 Statements like the one in Young emerge throughout the non-obscene sex speech case 
law, with some outright discussing a “hierarchy” of speech. For example, in F.C.C. v. Pacifica, 
the Court decided that the Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.) had the power to 
regulate indecent content (including non-obscene sex speech) on broadcast media after a New 
York radio station played George Carlin’s monologue “7 Dirty Words” during daytime radio.249 
In its decision, the Court stated that such speech fell to the bottom of speech hierarchy when it 
likened the content to fighting words and obscenity:   
These words [George Carlin’s “7 Dirty Words”] offend for the same reasons that 
obscenity offends. Their place in the hierarchy of First Amendment values was aptly 
sketched by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said: “Such utterances are no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality.”250 
 
A similar perception by the Court emerged in United States v. Playboy251 when the Court 
overturned a series of content-based restrictions on sexually explicit cable programming but not 
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without pointing to the speech’s lack of priority: “We cannot be influenced, moreover, by the 
perception that the regulation in question is not a major one because the speech is not very 
important.”252 No matter how the Court said it, the idea stayed the same: Society does not 
prioritize sex speech, thus sex speech is low-value.  
Altogether these findings from the sex speech case law suggest another linear relationship 
exists, but this time one between speech priority and speech value: the more the Court perceived 
society prioritizes speech, the more valuable speech is perceived to be. But this means that the 
less society prioritizes speech, the less valuable speech is perceived to be. Again, the latter is the 
case for sex speech.  
From the case analysis it is evident that the Court believes sex speech 1) serves little to 
no purpose and 2) is not a priority to society. As a result, it is now understood what the Court 
means when it says sex speech is “low-value.” But what is not known is why the Court believes 
this about sex speech. What reasons does the Court have for believing that sex speech serves 
little to no purpose and is not a priority to society? This is what the case analysis set out to 
understand, and its findings are discussed in the following.   
What are the U.S. Supreme Court’s justifications for classifying sex speech as low-value? 
 The central objective of the case analysis was to determine why the Court classifies sex 
speech as low-value speech. But what the analysis revealed is rather disappointing. Put simply, 
the Court does not justify its reasons for classifying sex speech as low-value speech. Throughout 
the 18 cases, the Court makes claims that sex speech lacks purpose and social priority, but the 
Court never supplies any evidence or data to support its claims. For example, the Court made 
                                                          




claims about sex speech like “the speech is not very important,”253 and “there is surely a less 
vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between 
pornography and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political 
significance,”254 but the Court never explained why or how it drew these conclusions about sex 
speech. At no point did the Court quote testimonials or studies that suggested sex speech lacks 
purpose and/or social priority – the Court simply stated these claims. Admittedly, the Court is 
not required to supply evidence or citations for all of its claims, but it is interesting that the Court 
made these assertions about sex speech without any clear justifications.  
 However, there is a caveat to this finding. While the Supreme Court never gave any clear 
reasons or justifications for its low-value perceptions of sex speech, many of the Court’s claims 
were accompanied by comparisons of sex speech to other types of speech. Put another way, the 
Court never outright explained why it believed sex speech lacked purpose or social priority, but 
when the Court discussed the value – i.e. purpose and/or priority – of sex speech often times the 
Court commented on sex speech in comparison to other types of speech, like political speech. 
For example, when the Court in Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.,255 decided that non-
obscene sex speech is protected by the First Amendment but is low-value speech, the Court 
stated, “that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and 
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire’s 
immortal comment.”256 This claim suggests that the reason sex speech is low-value is that sex 
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speech does not amount to the value of “Voltaire’s immortal comment,” a reference to the book, 
“The Friends of Voltaire.” The book, by S. G. Tallentrye, tells the stories of ten men, which 
include challenges against tyranny and the famous quote: “I disapprove of what you say, but I 
will defend to the death your right to say it.”257 Admittedly, the Young Court never explained 
why it believed the sex speech was not as important to society as Voltaire’s speech. As a result, 
the case analysis could not determine in Young – or in any other case – the Court’s justifications 
for such a claim. Nonetheless, the statement suggests that the sex speech in Young is low-value 
because of the Court’s belief that the sex speech was not as important to society as Voltaire’s 
speech. Thus, the Court’s decision manifested as a result of speech comparisons. This means that 
comparing sex speech to other types of speech was a way in which the Court justified its 
decisions to classify sex speech as low-value speech.  
 Because the Court relied on speech comparisons in its decisions about the value of sex 
speech, a separate research question was asked to examine the comparisons the Court made 
between sex speech and other types of sex speech. The findings from this second research 
question are discussed in the following section.  
What has the U.S. Supreme Court said about the value of sex speech in comparison to 
other speech types? 
 
 Out of the 18 cases analyzed, 12 cases contained comparisons between sex speech and 
other types of speech (see Table 3 provided below). From these 12 cases, two themes of speech 
comparisons emerged: first were comparisons of sex speech to political speech, and second, were 
comparisons of sex speech to speech that generally “promotes the exchange of ideas.” These two 
                                                          




types of comparisons and how they relate to sex speech’s classification as low-value are 
discussed in the following sections.  
Table 3: U.S. Supreme Court Cases Containing Comparisons between Sex Speech and Other Speech 
Types 
Case Name Citation Year 
Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476 1957 
Ginzburg v. United States 383 U.S. 463 1966 
Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 1973 
Kaplan v. California  413 U.S. 115 1973 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.  427 U.S. 50 1976 
Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.) v. Pacifica 
Foundation  
438 U.S. 726 1978 
New York v. Ferber  458 U.S. 747 1982 
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser 478 U.S. 675 1986 
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.  529 U.S. 277 2000 
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.  529 U.S. 803 2000 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition  535 U.S. 234 2002 
United States v. Williams  553 U.S. 285 2008 
 
Sex Speech vs. Political Speech 
 Much of why the Supreme Court classifies sex speech as low-value is because the Court 
perceived sex speech is not as valuable to society as political speech – a type of speech the Court 
holds in the highest regard.258 The case analysis revealed that the Court compared sex speech to 
political speech in the cases where the Court had to determine the level of protection for non-
obscene sex speech. For example, in Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.,259 the Court had to 
determine the extent of First Amendment protection for adult movie theaters after the City of 
Detroit passed a series of zoning laws that discriminated businesses on the basis of their speech 
content. In Young, the Court ultimately upheld the zoning laws on the grounds that 1) the 
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regulation did not control the speech, itself, and 2) that the speech was not as valuable to society, 
and therefore not a high priority to protect. The latter of these two decisions was supported by 
the following statements: 
The fact that the First Amendment protects some, though not necessarily all, of that 
material [the adult movies] from total suppression does not warrant the further conclusion 
that an exhibitor’s doubts as to whether a borderline film may be shown in his theater, as 
well as in theaters licensed for adult presentations, involves the kind of threat to the free 
market in ideas and expression that justifies the exceptional approach to constitutional 
adjudication recognized in cases like Dombrowski v. Pfister.260  
 
Here, the Court compared sex speech to a landmark First Amendment case, Dombrowski v. 
Pfister,261 a case in which the Court reversed a regulation that threatened to suppress the speech 
of civil rights activists. In making this comparison between sex speech and Dombrowski, the 
Court claimed that the threat to speech the zoning laws posed to adult movie theaters in Young 
was not nearly as concerning as the threat to speech posed to the civil rights activists in 
Dombrowski. As a result, the speech-based regulations of adult movie theaters were acceptable 
under the First Amendment. Moreover, the Court explained that though the First Amendment 
would not tolerate total suppression of the adult movie theaters, “society’s interest in protecting 
this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in 
untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal comment.”262 Thus, the zoning 
laws in Young were justified by the Court’s beliefs that sex speech lacked the level of value held 
by the political speech in Dombrowski and speech by Voltaire.  
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 Comparisons like the ones the Court made in Young emerged in another non-obscene sex 
speech case, City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.263 In City of Erie, the Court upheld a public nudity ban 
that led to the loss of total nude dancing in local clubs. The Court did so by reiterating its claims 
in Young and suggesting that nude dancing, unlike political speech, was not the kind of speech 
worth sending children off to war to defend.264 But the case analysis revealed that Court would 
do more than compare sex speech to examples of political speech like Voltaire’s.  
Comparing sex speech and political speech revealed that the Court would also justify its 
decisions with the context of sex speech, such as its distribution channels. For example, in 
F.C.C. v. Pacifica,265 the Court decided that the government could control indecent speech on 
broadcast media after a New York radio station aired George Carlin’s monologue “7 Dirty 
Words” during daytime radio, but the Court noted that in other contexts Carlin’s speech may 
have been protected. According to the Court, had the speech served a greater purpose – such as a 
political purpose – the speech may have been protected: 
But the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for 
suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is 
a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First 
Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas. If there 
were any reason to believe that the Commission’s characterization of the Carlin 
monologue as offensive could be traced to its political content—or even to the fact that it 
satirized contemporary attitudes about four-letter words—First Amendment protection 
might be required. But that is simply not this case. These words offend for the same 
reasons that obscenity offends.266 
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Here, the Court suggested that the problem with Carlin’s monologue is that it did little more than 
simply offend the audience. However, had the monologue – or words from the monologue – 
been used for political purposes, the speech may have had more value and, therefore, received 
First Amendment protection. This comparison by the Court demonstrates that the comparisons 
between sex speech and political speech were not confined to two different types of speech being 
compared against one another (i.e. adult movies vs. Voltaire’s political commentary). Instead, 
the Court might compare the speech, itself, in different contexts (i.e. offensive speech used for 
political discourse v. offensive speech used just to offend). In doing so, the Court drew 
conclusions about the sex speech’s value and its level of First Amendment protection. But 
unfortunately for George Carlin and the sex speech case law, there was never a case in which the 
Court found sex speech to serve a high-value purpose like political speech.  
 Altogether, these findings show that the Court decided the value of sex speech by 
comparing it to political speech. Specifically, the Court justified its decisions to classify sex 
speech as low-value by comparing sex speech to examples of political speech, like Voltaire’s 
political comment, or by comparing the contexts – political and non-political – of the sex speech. 
But regardless of the method for comparison, the conclusion by the Court was always the same: 
sex speech pales in comparison to political speech, thus sex speech is low-value speech.  
Sex Speech v. Speech that Promotes the “Exchange of Ideas” 
 In addition to its comparisons of sex speech to political speech, the Supreme Court 
compared sex speech to a perceivably more valuable type of speech: speech that promotes the 
“exchange of ideas.” Admittedly, this is a broad category of speech that overlaps with political 




comparisons between sex speech and this broad category of speech. Thus, this is a comparison 
worth analysis.  
 Comparisons between sex speech and speech that promotes the exchange of ideas 
emerged predominately in the obscenity case law. For example, the Court in Roth v. United 
States stated that obscenity was not worth protecting because, like fighting words, such speech 
has “no essential part of any exposition of ideas.”267 Similarly, in Miller v. California, when the 
Court established its three-prong standard for finding speech obscene, the Court stated, “in our 
view, to equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial 
exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment and its 
high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom.”268 Thus, to the Court, the reason obscenity is 
low-value is that, in comparison to other types of speech, obscenity fails to promote the 
exchange of ideas. Moreover, in accordance with self-governance theory, obscenity fails to 
promote valuable speech, thus, the speech fails to serve the people and state.269  
 It is worth noting, however, that sex speech did not always fail to promote the exchange 
of ideas. In 1964, the Supreme Court heard Jacobellis v. Ohio,270 a case that involved the 
prosecution of a movie theater manager for possessing and exhibiting a French film called “Les 
Amants” – “The Lovers.” The film was charged as obscene because of its portrayal of adultery 
and its explicit love scene at the end of the film.271 Upon review, the Court decided that the film 
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was not obscene because the Court believed 1) that the portrayal of sex, alone, was not sufficient 
to deny the film First Amendment protection, and 2) that the film portrayed sex in a way that 
advocated ideas: 
We would reiterate, however, our recognition in Roth that obscenity is excluded from the 
constitutional protection only because it is ‘utterly without redeeming social importance,’ 
and that ‘(t)he portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself 
sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and 
press.’ It follows that material dealing with sex in a manner that advocates ideas, or that 
has literary or scientific or artistic value or any other form of social importance, may not 
be branded as obscenity and denied the constitutional protection.272 
 
According to the Court, the film’s promotion of ideas gave the sex portrayals greater purpose 
than only offending its audience and appealing to prurient interests. As a result, the Court 
determined the film promoted the exchange of ideas, and therefore was socially valuable. 
Altogether, these findings from the case analysis suggest that the Court determined the value of 
sex speech by comparing sex speech to speech that promoted the exchange of ideas. In some 
cases, this comparison led to the degradation of sex speech’s value, but in others, it led to the 
protection of sex speech.   
In summary, the case analysis revealed that the Court compared sex speech to two types 
of speech: political speech and speech that promotes the exchange of ideas. These comparisons 
were used, predominately, to justify lower levels of protection for sex speech, but sometimes the 
comparisons gave way to protecting sex speech. Altogether, these findings demonstrate that the 
Court used comparisons of sex speech to other types of speech as a way to determine and justify 
sex speech as low-value speech.  
 
                                                          




Conclusion   
The legal literature and doctrine are clear that sex speech receives less First Amendment 
protection because of the long-held belief that sex speech is less valuable to society.273 Thus, the 
purpose of this analysis was to do more than determine how the Court classifies sex speech – its 
purpose was to understand what the Court meant when it classified sex speech as low-value 
speech and why the Court classified sex speech as low-value speech. Findings revealed that the 
meaning behind “low-value speech” revealed two ideas: first, that the speech serves little, if any, 
social purpose; and second, that society, itself, holds little priority for the speech. Thus, sex 
speech is low-value speech because the Court believes that the speech both serves little social 
purpose and that society does not prioritize the speech. But the reasons for these beliefs are 
minimal. While the case analysis revealed ample information on the meaning of sex speech as 
low-value speech, reasons, and justification by the Court for classifying sex speech as low-value 
speech were practically nonexistent. All that emerged were a series of comparisons the Court 
made between sex speech and other types of speech, specifically political speech and a broad 
category of speech referred to as “speech that promotes the exchange of ideas,” to justify sex 
speech as low-value speech, and even these comparisons came with no explanations.  
Admittedly, the findings of sex speech lacking purpose and priority to society suggest 
that the Court projects self-governance as a reason for not giving sex speech high levels of 
protection. According to self-governance theory, speech is protected because it serves the state, 
but according to the Court, sex speech serves little purpose to society and that society does not 
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prioritize sex speech.274 Thus, it is possible that sex speech is low-value because it fails to 
support self-governance. Additionally, the findings of sex speech’s inability to promote the 
exchange of ideas275 reflect tones of marketplace theory, which suggests the free exchange of 
ideas will lead to truth.276 Thus, perhaps the Court’s decisions to give sex speech less First 
Amendment protection lay in the belief that sex speech fails to contribute to the search for truth. 
But these conclusions are only speculation. At no point in any of the cases did the Court cite to 
theories as justification for classifying sex speech as low-value. Instead, the Court relied on 
comparing sex speech to other speech types and, case after case, the conclusion was the same: 
sex speech pales in comparison to other speech, therefore sex speech is low-value speech.  
Despite the unanswered question as to why the Court classified sex speech as low-value 
speech, the case analysis revealed important concepts. For example, the findings determined 
what the Court meant when it classified sex speech as low-value speech – it served low social 
purpose, and it was a low social priority. The findings also revealed that the Court determined 
the value of sex speech, in part, by comparing sex speech to other types of speech.  
This information not only informs the legal literature on sex speech, but it also provided 
the much-needed information for translating the legal concept of “low-value speech” into 
measures and questions for the second part of this dissertation, the public opinion survey. These 
findings act as a definition of “low-value speech” and as indicators for measuring the public’s 
opinion on the value of sex speech. Thus, this case analysis served two purposes: it determined 
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the value of sex speech according to the U.S. Supreme Court and it informed the public opinion 






THE PUBLIC’S OPINION:  
DETERMINING THE VALUE OF SEX SPEECH  
ACCORDING TO U.S. CITIZENS  
 
The second part of this dissertation asks: What is the value of sex speech according to the 
American public? Historically, Americans have supported rights to free speech, particularly 
speech related to sex and sexual expression.277 However, the U.S. Supreme Court and First 
Amendment doctrine perceive that sex speech is low-value speech.278 Specifically, sex speech is 
believed to serve little social purpose and be of little priority to society.279 But is this true? Does 
society perceive sex speech as low-value and in these ways?    
To answer these questions this chapter reports the findings from a national public opinion 
survey which was developed from the case analysis about the value of sex speech. Survey data 
from 1,300 participants were analyzed to answer the following questions:  
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1. What are the first-person and third-person280 values of sex speech?  
2. What are the first-person and third-person281 values of sex speech in comparison to other 
speech types? 
3. How do the values of sex speech differ across demographic characteristics? 
Findings for each of these questions are discussed at length in the following sections, but 
ultimately this chapter concludes that the American public perceived sex speech is less socially 
valuable but worthy of legal protection. Specifically, citizens perceived sex speech has low 
social and political purpose and is of lesser value when compared to other types of speech, like 
political and commercial speech. However, citizens, particularly younger and more politically 
liberal citizens, believe that sex speech, despite its low social value, should be protected from 
government regulation and censorship. In total, this chapter concludes that the American public 
perceived sex speech as low value, but they do not translate that low-value status to equally 
lower First Amendment protection.  
Sample Demographics 
Before delving into the results about the value of sex speech it is important to first review 
the demographic characteristics of the study sample. In total, the sample consisted of 1,300282 
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U.S. citizens. Results for the individual demographic questions are listed in Table 4 (provided at 
the end of this section),283 but the following are brief summaries of the sample’s demographics:  
• Age: The sample ranged from ages 18-84 (M=49.35, SD=16.68). Of the sample, 25% 
were Millennials (ages 18-34), 22% were Generation Xers (ages 35-50), 43% were Baby 
Boomers (ages 51-69), and 10% were Silent Generationers (ages 70+).  
• Gender & Sexuality: The majority of the sample was female and reported preferring only 
male partners. For gender, 43% of the sample identified as male, 56% identified as 
female, and 1% as “other.” Overall, 55% reported preferring only male sexual partners, 
39% reported preferring only female partners; and 6% reported preferring multiple 
partner types, such as both men and women. When sexuality was broken down by gender 
the results found 91% of the females, 8% of males and 25% of “other” reported 
preferring only male partners; 87% of males and 3% of females reported preferring only 
female partners; and 3% of males, 3% of females and 63% of “other” reported preferring 
multiple partner types. 
• Race: The sample was predominately White/Caucasian, as 81% identified as 
White/Caucasian, 7% identified as Black, 4% identified as Asian, 4% identified as 
Multiracial, and 3% identified as Latinx.    
• Education: The sample was highly educated as nearly 15% of the participants reported 
that their highest level of education as a graduate degree, 24% a Bachelor’s degree, 20% 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
participation was 18, as a result that participant’s data was removed. Additionally, 1,060 participants did not fully 
complete the survey. As a result, the data from “incomplete” participants were removed. After these participants 
were removed, the final sample was 1,300.  
283 For all of the demographic variables, except age and level of education, data was collapsed to reduce the number 
of response categories. For example, “race” had seven options for participants to select from; these seven were then 




an Associate’s degree, 37% a high school diploma/GED, and only 4% as less than a high 
school diploma.  
• Political Ideology: The sample was well-distributed in terms of political ideology as 33% 
identified as “Extremely Libera/Liberal/Somewhat Liberal,” 34% as “Extremely 
Conservative/Conservative/Slightly Conservative,” and 33% as “Moderate.”  
• Religious Affiliation: The sample was predominately Christian as nearly 66% affiliated 
with the Christian faith, followed by 12% “Other,” 10% “Spiritual/Agnostic,” 6% non-
Christian faiths, and 6% Atheist.  
Collectively, this sample is more educated than the national census, however, the other 
demographics strongly reflect national representativeness.284  
Table 4: Sample Demographics 
Variable  
N % Mean SD 
Age (range 18-86)   49.35 16.68 
18-34 (Millennials) 326 25.1   
35-50 (Generation X) 279 21.5   
51-69 (Baby Boomers) 560 43.1   
70+ (Silent Generation)  135 10.4   
 
Gender Identity   - - 
Male 557 42.8   
Female 735 56.5   
Transgender Male 1 0.1   
Transgender Female 0 0   
No Gender Conformity 7 0.5   
Collapsed Categories   - - 
Male 557 42.8   
Female 735 56.5   
Other 8 0.6   
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Sexuality   - - 
Prefer Male 711 54.7   
Prefer Female 510 39.2   
Prefer Gender Fluid 4 0.3   
Prefer Multiple 43 3.3   
Sexuality Not Listed 32 2.5   
Collapsed Categories   - - 
Prefer Male 711 54.7   
Prefer Female 510 39.2   
Prefer Multiple/Other 50 6.1   
 
Race/Ethnicity   - - 
American Indian 14 1.1   
Asian 51 3.9   
Black 93 7.2   
Pacific Islander 4 0.3   
White 1058 81.4   
        Latinx 39 3.0   
        Multi-racial 41 3.2   
Collapsed Categories   - - 
         Non-white 242 18.6   
         White 1058 81.4   
 
Highest Level of Education   - - 
        Less than a high school diploma 44 3.4   
        High school diploma/GED 483 37.2   
        Associate’s degree 263 20.2   
        Bachelor’s degree 314 24.2   
        Graduate degree 193 14.8   
        Missing 3 0.2   
 
Political Ideology   - - 
         Extremely Liberal 117 9.0   
         Liberal 180 13.8   
         Slightly Liberal 126 9.7   
         Moderate, Middle of the road 430 33.1   
         Slightly Conservative 140 10.8   
         Conservative 182 14.0   
         Extremely Conservative 1255 9.6   
Collapsed Categories   - - 
         Liberal  423 32.5   
         Moderate 430 33.1   





Religious Affiliation   - - 
         Catholic 303 23.3   
         Protestant 272 20.9   
         Christian  284 21.8   
         Jewish 44 3.4   
         Muslim 13 1.0   
         Buddhist 17 1.3   
         Hindu 4 0.3   
         Atheist 82 6.3   
         Spiritual/Agnostic 131 10.1   
         Other 150 11.5   
Collapsed Categories   - - 
         Christian 859 66.1   
         Non-Christian 441 33.9   
 
Sample Characteristics of Sex Speech 
In addition to traditional demographic characteristics, this survey asked participants to 
report their personal characteristics specific to the topics in the survey, such as beliefs about free 
speech, their perceptions of rights to sex speech, their perceptions of social acceptability of sex 
speech, and their personal feelings toward sex speech. The results of these questions are listed in 
the tables provided at the end of each section, but the following are summaries of the data.  
Free Speech Beliefs: At the start of the survey participants answered three questions 
about the importance of free speech (see Table 5 provided at the end of this section).285 
Reliability analysis determined that these three questions significantly related to one another 
(α=.94), and therefore were combined to create one item about participants’ beliefs about free 
speech. Overwhelmingly the participants agreed that free speech is important to themselves, 
other U.S. citizens and the health of U.S. democracy (M=6.11, SD=1.25).  
 
                                                          





Table 5: Free Speech Beliefs  
Variable  
N Range Mean SD 
Free Speech Beliefs (1-7 scale, Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree) 
        Free speech is important to me. 1299 1-7 6.13 1.34 
        Free speech is important 
   
1298 1-7 6.22 1.29 
Free speech is essential to a healthy U.S. democracy 
(i.e. free speech makes the U.S.’s 
democracy/government work effectively). 
1295 1-7 6.13 1.32 
Scale: Cronbach’s α = .94 1293 1-7 6.15 1.25 
 
Rights to & Feelings toward Sex Speech: After answering these general free speech 
questions, participants answered eleven questions about the degree to which U.S. citizens should 
have a right to certain types of sex speech, such as “view photographs that depict nudity and 
sexual activities” and “read adult books and magazines that describe nudity and sexual activities” 
(see Table 6 provided at the end of this section).286 Like the battery of free speech questions, 
reliability analysis determined the eleven rights to sex speech questions significantly related to 
one another (α=.97) and were combined into one item about sex speech rights. The results 
suggest that participants fall more in the middle of the scale when it comes to rights to sex 
speech, with the average response being that participants “Neither agreed nor disagreed” with 
citizens having a right to sex speech (M=3.37, SD=1.21). This finding, however, may be 
explained by the personal feelings participants have toward sex speech. At the end of the survey, 
participants answered questions about their level of positive/negative feelings toward the same 
types of sex speech asked about in the “rights to sex speech” questions.287 This battery of 
questions about feelings toward sex speech held together and was collapsed into one measure 
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(α=.97) and the results determined that the average “feeling” towards sex speech was “Neither 
negative nor positive” (M=3.57, SD=1.65). Thus, perhaps participants’ perceptions of rights to 
sex speech fell to the middle of the scale because their personal feelings towards sex speech also 
fell in the middle of the scale.  
Table 6: Rights to and Feelings toward Sex Speech  
Variable  
N Range Mean SD 
Rights to Sex Speech (1-5 scale, Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree) 
U.S. citizens should have a right to… 
Read adult books and magazines that describe nudity 
and sexual activities. 
 
1300 1-5 3.56 1.32 
View photographs that depict nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1300 1-5 3.35 1.40 
Watch broadcast/network television that depicts 
nudity and sexual activities. 
1300 1-5 3.24 1.40 
Watch cable television that depicts nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1300 1-5 3.50 1.33 
Watch adult movies that depict nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1300 1-5 3.52 1.33 
Call and listen to phone messages that describe 
nudity and sexual activities. 
1300 1-5 3.09 1.43 
Play adult video games that depict nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1300 1-5 3.31 1.41 
Attend live entertainment clubs that offer/allow nude 
dancing. 
1300 1-5 3.46 1.34 
Use the internet to access erotic or sexually explicit 
writings/literature. 
1300 1-5 3.27 1.44 
Use the internet to access pictures and/or videos of 
that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
1300 1-5 3.24 1.46 
View art that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 1300 1-5 3.51 1.32 
Scale: Cronbach’s α = .97 1300 1-5 3.37 1.21 
 
Sex Speech Feelings (1-7 scale, Extremely Negative – Extremely Positive) 
How do you feel – positive or negative – about the following types of sex speech?  
Reading adult books and magazines that describe 
nudity and sexual activities. 
 
1298 1-7 3.77 1.87 
Viewing photographs that depict nudity and sexual 
activities. 




Watching broadcast/network television that depicts 
nudity and sexual activities. 
1297 1-7 3.52 1.80 
Watching cable television that depicts nudity and 
sexual activities. 
1297 1-7 3.73 1.82 
Watching adult movies that depict nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1297 1-7 3.76 1.87 
Calling and listening to phone messages that describe 
nudity and sexual activities. 
1295 1-7 3.09 1.73 
Playing adult video games that depict nudity and 
sexual activities. 
1298 1-7 3.35 1.83 
Attending live entertainment clubs that offer/allow 
nude dancing. 
1299 1-7 3.33 1.83 
Using the internet to access nudity and sexual 
 
1295 1-7 3.52 1.92 
Viewing art that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 1298 1-7 4.02 1.82 
Scale: Cronbach’s α = .97 1273 1-7 3.57 1.65 
 
Social Acceptability of Sex Speech: Despite reporting moderate/middle ground 
perceptions on the rights to sex speech and personal feelings toward sex speech, the participants 
reported relatively positive perceptions about the social acceptability of sex speech.288 At the end 
of the survey participants answered three sets of questions about the social acceptability of sex 
speech. Specifically, participants reported the degree to which it is socially acceptable to 
access/use types of sex speech 1) to themselves, 2) in their community, and 3) in the U.S. (see 
Table 7 provided at the end of this section). Each set of questions held together and were 
collapsed into individual measures (“acceptable to you” α=.98; “acceptable in your community” 
α=.98; “acceptable in the U.S.” α=.98), and the results found that across all three levels of 
community participants reported relatively positive perceptions of social acceptability. 
Specifically, participants “somewhat agreed” that it was socially acceptable to themselves to 
access/use sex speech (M=4.20, SD=1.94), “somewhat agreed” that it was socially acceptable in 
their communities to access/use sex speech (M=4.14, SD=1.71), and “somewhat agreed” that it 
                                                          





was socially acceptable in the U.S. to access/use sex speech (M=4.55, SD=1.65). Interestingly, 
participants perceived it was most socially acceptable to access/use sex speech at the larger U.S. 
level, then themselves personally, and then their local community.  
Altogether, sample characteristics revealed the participants shared beliefs about free 
speech, sex speech rights, feelings toward sex speech, and the social acceptability of sex speech.  
Table 7: Social Acceptability of Sex Speech  
Variable  
N Range Mean SD 
Sex Speech Social Acceptability – “You” (1-7 scale, Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree) 
It is acceptable to you to… 
Read adult books and magazines that describe nudity 
and sexual activities. 
 
1299 1-7 4.40 2.08 
View photographs that depict nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1294 1-7 4.24 2.11 
Watch broadcast/network television that depicts 
nudity and sexual activities. 
1295 1-7 4.10 2.09 
Watch cable television that depicts nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1294 1-7 4.35 2.07 
Watch adult movies that depict nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1298 1-7 4.40 2.09 
Call and listen to phone messages that describe 
nudity and sexual activities. 
1298 1-7 3.84 2.17 
Play adult video games that depict nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1299 1-7 4.05 2.16 
Attend live entertainment clubs that offer/allow nude 
dancing. 
1298 1-7 4.06 2.14 
Use the internet to access nudity and sexual 
 
1298 1-7 4.10 2.17 
View art that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 1293 1-7 4.59 2.02 
Scale: Cronbach’s α = .98 1275 1-7 4.20 1.94 
 
Sex Speech Social Acceptability – “Community” (1-7 scale, Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree) 
It is acceptable in your community (i.e. your city/state) to… 
Read adult books and magazines that describe nudity 
and sexual activities. 
 
1298 1-7 4.30 1.84 
View photographs that depict nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1297 1-7 4.17 1.88 
Watch broadcast/network television that depicts 
nudity and sexual activities. 




Watch cable television that depicts nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1295 1-7 4.25 1.88 
Watch adult movies that depict nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1290 1-7 4.25 1.88 
Call and listen to phone messages that describe 
nudity and sexual activities. 
1293 1-7 3.90 1.89 
Play adult video games that depict nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1297 1-7 4.05 1.89 
Attend live entertainment clubs that offer/allow nude 
dancing. 
1293 1-7 4.02 1.89 
Use the internet to access nudity and sexual 
 
1297 1-7 4.13 1.92 
View art that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 1297 1-7 4.37 1.83 
Scale: Cronbach’s α = .98 1269 1-7 4.14 1.71 
 
Sex Speech Social Acceptability – “The U.S.” (1-7 scale, Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree) 
It is acceptable in the U.S. to… 
Read adult books and magazines that describe nudity 
and sexual activities. 
 
1293 1-7 4.68 1.81 
View photographs that depict nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1293 1-7 4.61 1.84 
Watch broadcast/network television that depicts 
nudity and sexual activities. 
1297 1-7 4.35 1.87 
Watch cable television that depicts nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1295 1-7 4.60 1.83 
Watch adult movies that depict nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1296 1-7 4.68 1.82 
Call and listen to phone messages that describe 
nudity and sexual activities. 
1300 1-7 4.35 1.89 
Play adult video games that depict nudity and sexual 
activities. 
1296 1-7 4.51 1.83 
Attend live entertainment clubs that offer/allow nude 
dancing. 
1297 1-7 4.53 1.84 
Use the internet to access nudity and sexual 
 
1297 1-7 4.50 1.86 
View art that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 1295 1-7 4.76 1.81 









 In addition to the sample characteristics, it is important to review the descriptive data of 
the study variables before answering the survey research questions.289 This review reports 
participants’ responses to each of the variables analyzed and explains if and how measures were 
combined. Tables are provided throughout these sections for additional descriptives, and Table 
12 (see Appendix C) reports the zero-order Pearson correlations between the measured variables. 
As shown in Table 12, nearly all of the study variables significantly related to each other, 
however, the strength of those relationships was weak to moderate, at best.290 
First-Person Values of Sex Speech: The first set of questions asked participants about 
their perceptions of the value of sex speech. Specifically, participants answered questions about 
the social purposes, political purposes, and the harms of sex speech (see Table 8 provided at the 
end of this section). Participants answered questions about the purposes of sex speech because 
the case analysis revealed that sex speech receives less First Amendment protection due to the 
Court’s perceptions that sex speech serves little social and/or political purpose.291 Thus, the 
survey asked questions about the purposes of sex speech to determine if the U.S. public shared 
the same perceptions as the Court. Additionally, the survey asked about the harms of sex speech 
because many of the regulations of sex speech target the harms of sex speech, such as negative 
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effects on children and social morals.292 As a result, questions about the harms of sex speech 
were incorporated to determine the degree to which the U.S. public perceived sex speech harms 
citizens and society.   
Descriptive results indicate that the ratings for all of these variables, on average, were on 
the low end of the scale:293 For example, participants, on average, reported the social purpose of 
sex speech as low (M=1.11, SD=0.92), and the political purposes of sex speech as low (M=0.75, 
SD=0.87). Additionally, participants reported that sex speech has low to moderate harms for 
people and society. Specifically, participants perceived sex speech harms children the most 
(M=2.01, SD=1.01), then society emotionally (such as harming social order and morale) 
(M=1.61, SD=0.97), then adults (M=1.50, SD=0.94), and then society physically (such as 
harming community property values and community safety) (M=1.40, SD=0.98). These four 
“harms” were combined into one item about the harms of sex speech, which found that 
participants perceived sex speech has low to moderate harms (Cronbach’s α=.88, M=1.63, 
SD=0.83). Last, the participants answered one question about the relationship between the 
purposes and harms of sex speech; specifically, the degree to which the purposes of sex speech 
                                                          
292 State interests in regulating sex speech include protecting vulnerable audiences, like minors (F.C.C. v. Pacifica 
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)), protecting social order and morale (National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 
524 U.S. 569 (1998); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 204 (1975); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 
U.S. 49 (1973)), and preventing the secondary-effects of sex speech, such as increased crime and decreased property 
values (City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 
(2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 
(1986); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)). 
293 The “social purpose of sex speech,” “political purpose of sex speech,” and “harms of sex speech” were measured 




weigh against the harms of sex speech (henceforth referred to as “purposes vs. harms” of sex 
speech). Participants ratings were around the midpoint of the scale294 (M=2.65, SD=1.17).  
Table 8: First-Person Values of Sex Speech 
Variable     
N Range Mean SD 
1st-Person Values of Sex Speech (0-3 scale; Zero-High) 
In your view, how much does Sex Speech… 
Serve a social purpose, such as contributing 
to literature, art and/or science? 
1300 0-3 1.11 0.92 
Serve a political purpose, such as informing 
government and/or democracy? 
1300 0-3 0.75 0.87 
Harm children/minors, such as corrupting their minds 
and causing deviant/delinquent behavior? 
1300 0-3 2.01 1.01 
Harm adults, such as causing antisocial or violent 
behavior? 
1300 0-3 1.50 0.94 
Harm society emotionally, such as disrupting social 
order and morale? 
1300 0-3 1.61 0.97 
Harm society physically, such as threatening 
community property values and safety? 
1300 0-3 1.40 0.98 
Harms Scale: Cronbach’s α = .87 1300 0-3 1.63 0.84 
 
Harms v. Purposes of Sex Speech (1-5 scale; Harms greatly exceed Purposes – Purposes greatly 
exceed Harms) 
1st-person 1300 1-5 2.65 1.17 
 
Third-Person Values of Sex Speech: After answering the first-person questions about the 
purposes and harms of sex speech, the survey asked the participants the same questions again but 
from the perspective of “most U.S. citizens” (see Table 9 provided at the end of this section).295 
The purpose of asking the questions again but from a different perspective was to test for third-
                                                          
294 The “purposes vs. harms of sex speech” was measured on a 5-point scale which included: Harms greatly exceed 
Purposes, Harms somewhat exceed Purposes, Harms and Purposes are equal, Purposes somewhat exceed Harms, 
and Purposes greatly exceed Harms. 
295 The scales for the third-person questions were the same ones used in the first-person questions: The “social 
purpose of sex speech,” “political purpose of sex speech,” and “harms of sex speech” were measured on a 4-point 
scale which included: Zero, Low, Moderate, and High. The “purposes vs. harms of sex speech” was measured on a 
5-point scale which included: Harms greatly exceed Purposes, Harms somewhat exceed Purposes, Harms and 




person effects.296 In other words, the survey wanted to determine if the participants perceived 
differences in their opinions and the opinions of others, specifically “most U.S. citizens.” The 
analyses and results of the third-person effect tests are discussed later in this chapter, but the 
following report the descriptive data from these third-person questions.  
Participants, on average, reported third-person perceptions on the low end of the scale.297 
For example, participants reported the social purpose of sex speech as low (M=1.22, SD=0.86) 
and low political purpose of sex speech as low (M=0.96, SD=0.88). Additionally, participants 
reported third-person perceptions that sex speech has low to moderate harms for people and 
society, with the most amount of harm to children  (M=2.08, SD=0.97), then society emotionally 
(M=1.66, SD=0.93), then adults (M=1.61, SD=0.90), and then society physically (M=1.48, 
SD=0.93). These four “harms” questions were combined into one item about the harms of sex 
speech, which found that participants perceived “most U.S. citizens” think sex speech has low to 
moderate harms (Cronbach’s α=.86, M=1.71, SD=0.79). Additionally, when asked about the 
“purposes vs. harms” of sex speech, participants reported third-person ratings around the 
midpoint of the scale298 (M=2.56, SD=1.13).  
 
                                                          
296 The third-person effect says that people tend to think media messages have a greater impact on others than on 
themselves, and they generally overestimate the influence that media has on others’ attitudes and behaviors. See W. 
Phillips Davison, The Third-Person Effect in Communication, 47 PUB. OPINION Q. 1 (1983). But the questions in 
this survey did not focus solely on the effects of sex speech. In addition to the harms (i.e., effects) of sex speech, this 
research asked about the value and levels of protection about sex speech and tested for significant differences in the 
variables between first- and third-person data to determine if a degree of dissonance between the first- and third-
person emerged in variables not focuses on “effects.” 
297 The “social purpose of sex speech,” “political purpose of sex speech,” and “harms of sex speech” were measured 
on a 4-point scale which included: Zero, Low, Moderate, and High. 
298 The “purposes vs. harms of sex speech” was measured on a 5-point scale which included: Harms greatly exceed 
Purposes, Harms somewhat exceed Purposes, Harms and Purposes are equal, Purposes somewhat exceed Harms, 




Table 9: Third-Person Values of Sex Speech 
Variable     
N Range Mean SD 
3rd-Person Values of Sex Speech (0-3 scale; Zero-High) 
In the view of most U.S. citizens, how much does Sex Speech… 
Serve a social purpose, such as contributing 
to literature, art and/or science? 
1300 0-3 1.22 0.86 
Serve a political purpose, such as informing 
government and/or democracy? 
1300 0-3 0.96 0.88 
Harm children/minors, such as corrupting their minds 
and causing deviant/delinquent behavior? 
1300 0-3 2.08 0.97 
Harm adults, such as causing antisocial or violent 
behavior? 
1300 0-3 1.61 0.90 
Harm society emotionally, such as disrupting social 
order and morale? 
1300 0-3 1.66 0.93 
Harm society physically, such as threatening 
community property values and safety? 
1300 0-3 1.48 0.93 
Harms Scale: Cronbach’s α = .86 1300 0-3 1.71 0.79 
 
Harms v. Purposes of Sex Speech (1-5 scale; Harms greatly exceed Purposes – Purposes greatly 
exceed Harms) 
3rd-person 1300 1-5 2.56 1.13 
 
First-Person Speech Comparisons: The second set of questions asked participants about 
their perceptions of the value of sex speech in comparison to three other speech types: political 
speech, commercial speech, and hate/violent speech. Questions about the value of other speech 
types were included in the survey because the case analysis found that the Court regularly 
compared sex speech to other speech types, such as political speech, and used those comparisons 
to justify less protection for sex speech.299 As a result, the survey asked about the value of other 
                                                          
299 For example, in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976), the Court explained that 
though the First Amendment would not tolerate total suppression of the adult movie theaters, “society’s interest in 
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled 
political debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal comment.”  Thus, the regulations of sex speech implicated in 
Young were justified by the Court’s beliefs that sex speech lacked the level of value held by the political speech by 
Voltaire. In other words, sex speech was less valuable when compared to sex speech. See Chapter III “Sex Speech 





speech types to determine the degree to which the public valued sex speech compared to other 
speech types.  
For each of the speech types, participants answered questions about the speech’s 
importance to society, society’s interest in protecting the speech from government regulation and 
suppression, society’s value of the speech, and the amount of legal protection from censorship or 
government regulation that should be given to the speech (see Table 10 provided at the end of 
this section). These questions were then combined into one item about the overall value of each 
speech type. The following reports participants’ answers for each of the speech types:   
• Sex Speech: On average, participants rated the importance of sex speech as low300 
(M=1.10, SD=0.94); society’s interest in protecting sex speech from government 
regulation and suppression as low to moderate (M=1.33, SD=0.97); society’s value of sex 
speech as low (M=1.15, SD=0.93); and the level of legal protection from censorship or 
government regulation as low to moderate (M=1.45, SD=1.02). These four questions 
were combined into one item for an overall value of sex speech which participants 
reported as low (Cronbach’s α=.78, M=1.26, SD=0.75). 
• Political Speech: On average, participants rated the importance of political speech as 
moderate301 (M=2.06, SD=0.88); society’s interest in protecting political speech from 
government regulation and suppression as moderate (M=1.94, SD=0.95); society’s value 
of political speech as moderate (M=1.95, SD=0.88); and the level of legal protection 
                                                          
300 The “speech’s importance,” “society’s interest in protecting the speech from government regulation and 
suppression,” “society’s value of the speech” and “the amount of legal protection from censorship or government 
regulation” were measured on a 4-point scale which included: Zero, Low, Moderate, and High. 
301 The “speech’s importance,” “society’s interest in protecting the speech from government regulation and 
suppression,” “society’s value of the speech” and “the amount of legal protection from censorship or government 




from censorship or government regulation as moderate (M=1.93, SD=0.96). These four 
questions were combined into one item for an overall value of political speech which 
participants reported as moderate (Cronbach’s α=.82, M=1.97, SD=0.74). 
• Commercial Speech: On average, participants rated the importance of commercial speech 
as moderate302 (M=1.74, SD=0.84); society’s interest in protecting commercial speech 
from government regulation and suppression as moderate (M=1.75, SD=0.91); society’s 
value of commercial speech as moderate (M=1.80, SD=0.86); and the level of legal 
protection from censorship or government regulation as moderate (M=1.78, SD=0.91). 
These four questions were combined into one item for an overall value of commercial 
speech which participants reported as moderate (Cronbach’s α=.81, M=1.77, SD=0.70). 
• Hate/Violent Speech: On average, participants rated the importance of hate/violent 
speech as low303 (M=1.00, SD=1.14); society’s interest in protecting hate/violent speech 
from government regulation and suppression as low (M=1.11, SD=1.10); society’s value 
of hate/violent speech as low (M=1.80, SD=0.86); and the level of legal protection from 
censorship or government regulation as low to moderate (M=1.33, SD=1.19). These four 
questions were combined into one item for an overall value of hate/violent speech which 
participants reported as low (Cronbach’s α=.80, M=1.21, SD=0.90). 
 
 
                                                          
302 The “speech’s importance,” “society’s interest in protecting the speech from government regulation and 
suppression,” “society’s value of the speech” and “the amount of legal protection from censorship or government 
regulation” were measured on a 4-point scale which included: Zero, Low, Moderate, and High. 
303 The “speech’s importance,” “society’s interest in protecting the speech from government regulation and 
suppression,” “society’s value of the speech” and “the amount of legal protection from censorship or government 




Table 10: First-Person Speech Comparisons 
Variable  
N Range Mean SD 
1st-Person “Importance of Speech to Society” (0-3 scale; Zero importance-High importance) 
Sex Speech 1300 0-3 1.10 0.94 
Political Speech  1300 0-3 2.06 0.88 
Commercial Speech 1300 0-3 1.74 0.84 
Hate/Violent Speech  1300 0-3 1.00 1.14 
1st-Person “Interest in Protecting Speech” (0-3 scale; Zero interest-High interest) 
Sex Speech 1300 0-3 1.33 0.97 
Political Speech  1300 0-3 1.94 0.95 
Commercial Speech 1300 0-3 1.75 0.91 
Hate/Violent Speech  1300 0-3 1.39 1.15 
1st-Person “Society’s Value of Speech” (0-3 scale; Zero value-High value) 
Sex Speech 1300 0-3 1.15 0.93 
Political Speech  1300 0-3 1.95 0.88 
Commercial Speech 1300 0-3 1.80 0.86 
Hate/Violent Speech  1300 0-3 1.11 1.10 
1st-Person “Legal Protection of Speech” (0-3 scale; Zero protection-High protection) 
Sex Speech 1300 0-3 1.45 1.02 
Political Speech  1300 0-3 1.93 0.96 
Commercial Speech 1300 0-3 1.78 0.91 
Hate/Violent Speech  1300 0-3 1.33 1.19 
1st-person Collective Speech Value Scale (0-3 scale; Zero-High) 
Sex Speech Cronbach’s α =.78 1300 0-3 1.26 0.75 
Political Speech Cronbach’s α =.82 1300 0-3 1.97 0.74 
Commercial Speech Cronbach’s α =.81 1300 0-3 1.77 0.70 
Hate/Violent Speech Cronbach’s α =.80 1300 0-3 1.21 0.90 
 
Third-Person Speech Comparisons: After answering questions about the value of sex 
speech in comparison to other speech types from the first-person, participants answered the same 
questions again but from the perspective of “most U.S. citizens” (see Table 11 provided at the 
end of this section). The purpose of asking the sex speech value questions again but from a 
different perspective was to test for third-person effects.304 The analyses and results of the third-
                                                          
304 The third-person effect says that people tend to think media messages have a greater impact on others than on 




person effect tests are discussed later in this chapter, but the following report the descriptive data 
from these third-person questions:  
• Sex Speech: On average, participants, thinking of “most U.S. citizens,” rated the 
importance of sex speech as low305 (M=1.15, SD=0.94); society’s interest in protecting 
sex speech from government regulation and suppression as low to moderate (M=1.27, 
SD=0.99); society’s value of sex speech as low (M=1.12, SD=0.96); and the level of 
legal protection from censorship or government regulation as low to moderate (M=1.31, 
SD=1.00). These four questions were combined into one item for an overall third-person 
value of sex speech which participants reported as low (Cronbach’s α=.84, M=1.21, 
SD=0.80). 
• Political Speech: On average, participants, thinking of “most U.S. citizens,” rated the 
importance of political speech as moderate306 (M=2.00, SD=0.86); society’s interest in 
protecting political speech from government regulation and suppression as moderate 
(M=1.91, SD=0.92); society’s value of political speech as moderate (M=1.91, SD=0.90); 
and the level of legal protection from censorship or government regulation moderate 
(M=1.90, SD=0.95). These four questions were combined into one item for an overall 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Phillips Davison, The Third-Person Effect in Communication, 47 PUB. OPINION Q. 1 (1983). But the questions in 
this survey did not focus solely on the effects of sex speech. In addition to the harms (i.e., effects) of sex speech, this 
research asked about the value and levels of protection about sex speech and tested for significant differences in the 
variables between first- and third-person data to determine if a degree of dissonance between the first- and third-
person emerged in variables not focuses on “effects.” 
305 The “speech’s importance,” “society’s interest in protecting the speech from government regulation and 
suppression,” “society’s value of the speech” and “the amount of legal protection from censorship or government 
regulation” were measured on a 4-point scale which included: Zero, Low, Moderate, and High. 
306 The “speech’s importance,” “society’s interest in protecting the speech from government regulation and 
suppression,” “society’s value of the speech” and “the amount of legal protection from censorship or government 




third-person value of political speech which participants reported as moderate 
(Cronbach’s α=.86, M=1.93, SD=0.76). 
• Commercial Speech: On average, participants, thinking of “most U.S. citizens,” rated the 
importance of commercial speech as moderate307 (M=1.80, SD=0.86); society’s interest 
in protecting commercial speech from government regulation and suppression as 
moderate (M=1.73, SD=0.90); society’s value of commercial speech as moderate 
(M=1.77, SD=0.87); and the level of legal protection from censorship or government 
regulation moderate (M=1.75, SD=0.93). These four questions were combined into one 
item for an overall third-person value of commercial speech which participants reported 
as moderate (Cronbach’s α=.86, M=1.76, SD=0.75). 
• Hate/Violent Speech: On average, participants, thinking of “most U.S. citizens,” rated the 
importance of hate/violent speech as low308 (M=1.22, SD=1.11); society’s interest in 
protecting hate/violent speech from government regulation and suppression as low to 
moderate (M=1.33, SD=1.13); society’s value of hate/violent speech as low (M=1.12, 
SD=1.11); and the level of legal protection from censorship or government regulation as 
low to moderate (M=1.25, SD=1.16). These four questions were combined into one item 
for an overall third-person value of hate/violent speech which participants reported as low 
(Cronbach’s α=.87, M=1.23, SD=0.96). 
 
                                                          
307 The “speech’s importance,” “society’s interest in protecting the speech from government regulation and 
suppression,” “society’s value of the speech” and “the amount of legal protection from censorship or government 
regulation” were measured on a 4-point scale which included: Zero, Low, Moderate, and High. 
308 The “speech’s importance,” “society’s interest in protecting the speech from government regulation and 
suppression,” “society’s value of the speech” and “the amount of legal protection from censorship or government 




Table 11: Third-Person Speech Comparisons 
Variable  
N Range Mean SD 
3rd-Person “Importance of Speech to Society” (0-3 scale; Zero importance-High importance) 
Sex Speech 1300 0-3 1.15 0.94 
Political Speech  1300 0-3 2.00 0.86 
Commercial Speech 1300 0-3 1.80 0.86 
Hate/Violent Speech  1300 0-3 1.22 1.11 
3rd-Person “Interest in Protecting Speech” (0-3 scale; Zero interest-High interest) 
Sex Speech 1300 0-3 1.27 0.99 
Political Speech  1300 0-3 1.91 0.92 
Commercial Speech 1300 0-3 1.73 0.90 
Hate/Violent Speech  1300 0-3 1.33 1.13 
3rd-Person “Society’s Value of Speech” (0-3 scale; Zero value-High value) 
Sex Speech 1300 0-3 1.12 0.96 
Political Speech  1300 0-3 1.91 0.90 
Commercial Speech 1300 0-3 1.77 0.87 
Hate/Violent Speech  1300 0-3 1.12 1.11 
3rd-Person “Legal Protection of Speech” (0-3 scale; Zero protection-High protection) 
Sex Speech 1300 0-3 1.31 1.00 
Political Speech  1300 0-3 1.90 0.95 
Commercial Speech 1300 0-3 1.75 0.93 
Hate/Violent Speech  1300 0-3 1.25 1.16 
3rd-person Collective Speech Value Scale (0-3 scale; Zero-High) 
Sex Speech Cronbach’s α =.84 1300 0-3 1.21 0.80 
Political Speech Cronbach’s α =.86 1300 0-3 1.93 0.76 
Commercial Speech Cronbach’s α =.86 1300 0-3 1.76 0.75 
Hate/Violent Speech Cronbach’s α =.87 1300 0-3 1.23 0.96 
 
What are the first-person and third-person values of sex speech?  
The overarching question of this dissertation asks: What is the value of sex speech? To 
answer this question participants reported their perceptions about the purposes and harms of sex 
speech as these were the characteristics the Court considered when it decided that sex speech is 
low-value speech.309 Specifically, participants reported their first- and third-person perceptions 
                                                          
309 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976). In its decision to uphold a local zoning 




of the 1) social purpose of sex speech, 2) the political purpose of sex speech, 3) the harms of sex 
speech, and 4) the “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech. 
In general, participants’ average ratings of the social purpose,310 political purpose311 and 
harms312 of sex speech with respect to the self and to others were at the low end of their 
respective scales. Additionally, the “purposes vs. harms”313 ratings were in the middle of the 
scale. Overall, the data show that the first- and third-person perceptions about sex speech were 
similar, which suggests third-person effects might not exist in the purposes and harms of sex 
speech.314 But these conclusions are based solely on descriptive results. As a result, the 
following analyses tested for any differences participants might have had between their first- and 
third-person values of sex speech: an unadjusted paired t-test, an adjusted repeated measures 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some 
arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly 
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal 
comment.” 
310 The “social purpose of sex speech” was measured on a 4-point scale which included: Zero, Low, Moderate, and 
High. 
311 The “political purpose of sex speech” was measured on a 4-point scale which included: Zero, Low, Moderate, 
and High. 
312 The “harms of sex speech” were measured on a 4-point scale which included: Zero, Low, Moderate, and High. 
313 The “purposes vs. harms of sex speech” was measured on a 5-point scale which included: Harms greatly exceed 
Purposes, Harms somewhat exceed Purposes, Harms and Purposes are equal, Purposes somewhat exceed Harms, 
and Purposes greatly exceed Harms. 
314 The third-person effect says that people tend to think media messages have a greater impact on others than on 
themselves, and they generally overestimate the influence that media has on others’ attitudes and behaviors. See W. 
Phillips Davison, The Third-Person Effect in Communication, 47 PUB. OPINION Q. 1 (1983). But the questions in 
this survey did not focus solely on the effects of sex speech. In addition to the harms (i.e., effects) of sex speech, this 
research asked about the value and levels of protection about sex speech and tested for significant differences in the 
variables between first- and third-person data to determine if a degree of dissonance between the first- and third-




ANOVA, and, in the case of significant findings, post-hoc analyses, such as one-way ANOVAs 
and/or independent sample t-tests.315  
Paired t-tests were conducted because they can test for significant differences between 
two different variables but for the same group of cases. Additionally, paired t-tests are the 
common method of analysis to determine a third-person effect.316 The paired t-test, however, 
does not allow control variables317 to be tested or entered into the analyses. Thus, the paired t-
test is an “unadjusted” analysis because it cannot adjust for the impact control variables, such as 
demographic characteristics like age and gender, may have on the relationship between two 
variables. As a result, after the paired t-tests, repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted.  
Repeated measures ANOVAs are an extension of the paired t-test because they, too, can 
test for significant differences between two variables, but they also allow for control variables. 
As a result, the repeated measures ANOVAs are “adjusted” analyses, as they can adjust for the 
impact of other variables. For each of the repeated measures ANOVAs conducted, the first- and 
third-person value of sex speech variables were entered as the “within-subjects variables” and 
the following control variables were entered as the “between-subjects variables”: age, gender, 
sexuality, race, political ideology, and religious affiliation. If the overall model from the repeated 
measures ANOVA showed significant differences between first- and third-person data, then the 
analyses concluded that a third-person effect occurred.   
                                                          
315 The type of post-hoc analysis used depended on the on the demographic variable in question. For example, a 
demographic variable made of two groups called for an independent samples t-test, while a demographic variable 
that had three or more groups called for a one-way ANOVA. 
316 See, e.g., Mike Schmierbach, Michael P. Boyle & Douglas M. McLeod, Understanding person perceptions: 
Comparing four common statistical approaches to third-person research, 11 MASS COMM. & SOC’Y 4 (2008).  
317 Control variables are constant and unchanged variables. For example, a participant’s age can be a control variable 
because it is an unchanged characteristics of the participant that may impact other variables, such as perceptions of 




In addition to an overall third-person effect, the results of the repeated measures ANOVA 
can show a third-person effect based on the control variables. For example, the repeated 
measures ANOVA may find that the first- and third-person social purpose of sex speech (i.e., the 
within-subjects variables) significantly differ among participants based on their political 
ideology (i.e., the between-subjects variables). In the event of a third-person effect based on a 
control variable, post-hoc analyses, such as one-way ANOVAs or independent sample t-tests, 
were conducted to explore the interactions between the within-subjects and between-subjects 
variables. To interpret the post-hocs, the analyses relied on “difference scores.” A “difference 
score” was made by subtracting the third-person variable from the first-person variable, to get a 
number which represents the difference between the first- and third-person variable.318 
Therefore, in the example that the first- and third-person social purpose of sex speech 
significantly differ by political ideology, a “difference score for the social purpose of sex 
speech” was made by subtracting the third-person social purpose of sex speech from the first-
person social purpose of sex speech, which resulted in a new variable that reported the difference 
between the first- and third-person social purpose of sex speech. That “difference score for the 
social purpose of sex speech” was then used to determine a significant difference between the 
participants based on political ideology. Thus, for all of the post-hoc analyses, “difference 
scores” were made and used to test for significant difference between the participants based on 
the control variable(s) found to be significant in the repeated measures ANOVA.319 Put another 
                                                          
318 A positive “difference score” indicated that the first-person data was larger than the third-person data, while a 
negative “difference score” indicated that the first-person data was smaller than the third-person data.  
319 Consider the following example: If the repeated measures ANOVA found that the first- and third-person social 
purpose of sex speech significantly differ by political ideology, then two things happened. First, a “difference score” 




way, the “difference score” was the variable used to determine the extent of third-person effects 
that emerged between participants within a demographic group. 
In total, up to three steps of analyses were taken for each of the value of sex speech 
variables: an unadjusted paired t-test, an adjusted repeated measures ANOVA, and post-hoc 
analyses. The following are the results of these steps for the first- and third-person value of sex 
speech variables: social purpose of sex speech, political purpose of sex speech, harms of sex 
speech, and “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech. 
Social Purpose of Sex Speech:  
The first set of analyses examined the relationship between the first- and third-person 
data on the social purpose of sex speech, (i.e., the extent to which the participants perceived sex 
speech contributes to literature, art and/or science). Descriptive results found that the 
participants, on average, reported both the first- and third-person social purpose of sex speech as 
low,320 but the following analyses tested for differences between the first- and third-person data. 
First, the unadjusted paired t-test found that the third-person social purpose of sex speech 
(M=1.22, SD=0.86) was significantly higher than the first-person social purpose of sex speech 
(M=1.11, SD=0.23), t(1299)=-4.42, p<.001.321 These results suggest a third-person effect exists 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
person social purpose of sex speech. Second, those “difference scores” were used as the variable to test for 
significant differences in the first- and third-person social purpose of sex speech between the political ideologies. 
Thus, what the analysis has done is compared “difference scores” of Liberals against the “difference scores” of 
Conservative and the “difference scores” of Moderates to determine which of those political ideologies has the 
biggest and smallest differences between their first- and third-person social purpose of sex speech. Thereby 
determining the extent of the third-person effect based on political ideology.  
320 The “social purpose of sex speech” was measured on a 4-point scale which included: Zero, Low, Moderate, and 
High. 
321 To be determined as significant, the p-value was set to .025. Typically, significance is found when p-values are 
less than or equal to .05. But because two analyses, a paired t-test and a repeated measures ANOVA, were 
conducted on the same set of variables, the original p-value of .05 was divided by two and set to .025, thus raising 




in which the participants perceived the social purpose of sex speech is greater according to “most 
U.S. citizens” than to themselves.  
Second, to evaluate whether the findings of the paired t-test hold when the control 
variables are included, an adjusted repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. For the ANOVA, 
the first- and third-person social purposes of sex speech were entered as the “within-subjects” 
variables and demographic variables age, sexuality, race, political ideology, and religious 
affiliation were entered as the “between-subjects” variables. The repeated measures ANOVA, 
with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction, determined that the social purpose of sex speech was not 
statistically significantly different between the first- and third-person perceptions (F(1, 
1288)=0.46, p=.50), thus no overall third-person effect emerged. However, the results showed 
significant differences between first- and third-person perceptions of the social purpose of sex 
speech based on political ideology (F(2, 1288)=16.24, p<.001) and religious affiliation (F(1, 
1288)=17.22, p<.001).  
Finally, post-hoc analyses explored the interactions between 1) political ideology and the 
first- and third-person perceptions of the social purpose of sex speech, and 2) religious affiliation 
and the first- and third-person perceptions of the social purpose of sex speech.322 To determine 
differences across political ideology, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. The one-way ANOVA 
found there was a statistically significant difference between the political ideologies (F(2, 
1297)=22.58, p<.001). A Bonferroni post-hoc test revealed that Conservatives (M=-0.34, 
SD=0.94) perceived significantly greater differences between first- and third-person social 
purpose of sex speech than Moderates (M=-0.07, SD=.87, p<.001) and Liberals (M=0.08, 
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SD=0.96, p<.001). However, no significant differences emerged between Moderates and 
Liberals (p=.05). These findings suggest that a third-person effect emerged in the social purpose 
of sex speech based on political ideology. Specifically, Conservatives and Moderates reported a 
lower first-person social purpose of sex speech than third-person social purpose of sex speech, 
while Liberals reported a higher first-person social purpose of sex speech than third-person 
social purpose of sex speech. 
To determine differences across religious affiliation an independent sample t-test was 
conducted. The t-test found there was a statistically significant difference between religious 
affiliation (t(1298)=-5.73, p<.001), as Christians (M=-0.22, SD=0.91) perceived significantly 
greater differences between first- and third-person social purpose of sex speech than Non-
Christians (M=0.19, SD=0.96). These findings suggest that a third-person effect emerged in the 
social purpose of sex speech based on religious affiliation. Specifically, Christians reported a 
lower first-person social purpose of sex speech than third-person social purpose of sex speech, 
while Non-Christians reported a higher first-person social purpose of sex speech than third-
person social purpose of sex speech. 
In sum, the paired t-test suggested there were significant differences between the first- 
and third-person social purpose of sex speech, but the repeated measures ANOVA determined 
that, overall, there were no significant differences between first- and third-person social purpose 
of sex speech. Instead, post-hoc analyses revealed that a third-person effect emerged based on 
participants’ political ideology and religious affiliation. Conservatives and Christians reported a 
lower first-person social purpose of sex speech than third-person social purpose of sex speech, 
while Liberals and Non-Christians reported a higher first-person social purpose of sex speech 




Political Purpose of Sex Speech:  
The second set of analyses examined the relationship between the first- and third-person 
data on the political purpose of sex speech, (i.e., the extent to which the participants perceived 
sex speech contributes to informing government and/or democracy). Descriptive results found 
that the participants, on average, reported both the first- and third-person political purpose of sex 
speech as low,323 but the following analyses tested for differences between this first- and third-
person data. These analyses followed the same procedures as the “Social Purpose of Sex Speech” 
but examined the relationship between the first- and third-person data on the political purpose of 
sex speech. The results are as follows: The unadjusted paired t-test found that the third-person 
political purpose of sex speech (M=0.96, SD=0.88) was significantly higher than the first-person 
political purpose of sex speech (M=0.75, SD=0.87), t(1299)=-8.38, p<.001.324 Similarly, when 
the control variables were included, the adjusted repeated measures ANOVA,325 with a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction, determined that the political purpose of sex speech was 
statistically significantly different between the first- and third-person perceptions (F(1, 
1288)=5.58, p<.025). Thus, a third-person effect emerged in which the participants perceived the 
political purpose of sex speech is greater according to “most U.S. citizens” than to themselves.  
                                                          
323 The “political purpose of sex speech” was measured on a 4-point scale which included: Zero, Low, Moderate, 
and High. 
324 To be determined as significant, the p-value was set to .025. Typically, significance is found when p-values are 
less than or equal to .05. But because two analyses, a paired t-test and a repeated measures ANOVA, were 
conducted on the same set of variables, the original p-value of .05 was divided by two and set to .025, thus raising 
the threshold for significance and making the results more conservative in their conclusions.  
325 For the repeated measures ANOVA, the first- and third-person political purpose of sex speech were entered as 
the “within-subjects” variables and demographic variables age, sexuality, race, political ideology, and religious 




The results of the ANOVA also showed significant differences between first- and third-
person perceptions of the political purpose of sex speech based on political ideology (F(2, 
1288)=10.35, p<.001), and religious affiliation (F(1, 1288)=15.45, p<.001). To determine 
differences across political ideology,326 a one-way ANOVA was conducted. The one-way 
ANOVA found there was a statistically significant difference between the political ideologies 
(F(2, 1297)=15.05, p<.001). A Bonferroni post-hoc test revealed that Conservatives (M=-0.35, 
SD=0.86) perceived significantly greater differences between first- and third-person political 
purpose of sex speech than Liberals (M=-0.03, SD=0.95, p<.001), and Moderates (M=-0.23, 
SD=0.83) perceived significantly greater differences between first- and third-person political 
purpose of sex speech than Liberals (p<.005). No significant differences between the first- and 
third-person political purpose of sex speech emerged between Conservatives and Moderates 
(p=.16). These findings suggest that a third-person effect exists in the political purpose of sex 
speech based on political ideology. Specifically, participants of all three political ideologies 
reported a lower first-person political purpose of sex speech than third-person political purpose 
of sex speech but Conservatives perceived the greatest difference between their first- and third-
person political purposes of sex speech.   
To determine differences across religious affiliation an independent sample t-test was 
conducted. The t-test found there was a statistically significant difference between religious 
affiliation (t(1298)=-5.19, p<.001), as Christians (M=-0.30, SD=0.86) perceived significantly 
greater differences between first- and third-person political purpose of sex speech than Non-
Christians (M=-0.03, SD=0.91). These findings suggest that a third-person effect exists in the 
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political purpose of sex speech based on religious affiliation. Specifically, participants of both 
religious affiliations reported a lower first-person political purpose of sex speech than third-
person political purpose of sex speech, but Christians perceived the greatest difference between 
their first- and third-person political purposes of sex speech.  
In total, the paired t-test and the repeated measures ANOVA determined that, overall, 
there were significant differences between first- and third-person political purpose of sex speech, 
thus, a third-person effect emerged. Additionally, post-hoc analyses revealed that all of the 
participants reported a lower first-person political purpose of sex speech than third-person 
political purpose of sex speech, but Conservatives and Christians perceived the greatest 
difference between their first- and third-person political purposes of sex speech.  
Harms of Sex Speech:  
The third set of analyses examined the relationship between the first- and third-person 
data on the harms of sex speech, (i.e., the extent to which the participants perceived sex speech 
collectively harms children, adults, and society). Descriptive results found that the participants, 
on average, reported both the first- and third-person harms of sex speech as low,327 but the 
following analyses tested for differences between this first- and third-person data. These analyses 
also followed the same procedures as the “Social Purpose of Sex Speech” but examined the 
relationship between the first- and third-person data on the harms of sex speech. The results are 
as follows: The unadjusted paired t-test found that the third-person harms of sex speech 
(M=1.71, SD=0.79) were significantly higher than the first-person harms of sex speech (M=1.63, 
                                                          




SD=0.83), t(1299)=-3.43, p<.001.328 However, when the control variables were included, the 
adjusted repeated measures ANOVA,329 with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction, determined that 
the harms of sex speech were not statistically significantly different between the first- and third-
person perceptions (F(1, 1288)=4.49, p=.03). Thus, no third-person effect emerged. 
Despite the overall results of the repeated measures ANOVA, the analysis showed 
significant differences between first- and third-person perceptions of the harms of sex speech 
based on political ideology (F(2, 1288)=23.88, p<.001) and religious affiliation (F(1, 
1288)=10.17, p<.001). To determine differences across political ideology,330 a one-way ANOVA 
was conducted. The one-way ANOVA found there was a statistically significant difference 
between the political ideologies (F(2, 1545)=33.56, p<.001). A Bonferroni post-hoc test revealed 
that Liberals (M=-0.27, SD=0.79) perceived significantly greater differences between first- and 
third-person harms of sex speech than Moderates (M=-0.10, SD=0.70, p<.005) and 
Conservatives (M=0.14; SD=0.82, p<.001). Additionally, Conservatives perceived significantly 
greater differences between first- and third-person harms of sex speech than Moderates (p<.001). 
These findings suggest that a third-person effect exists in the harms of sex speech based on 
political ideology. Specifically, Liberals and Moderates reported lower first-person harm of sex 
                                                          
328 To be determined as significant, the p-value was set to .025. Typically, significance is found when p-values are 
less than or equal to .05. But because two analyses, a paired t-test and a repeated measures ANOVA, were 
conducted on the same set of variables, the original p-value of .05 was divided by two and set to .025, thus raising 
the threshold for significance and making the results more conservative in their conclusions.  
329 For the repeated measures ANOVA, the first- and third-person harms of sex speech were entered as the “within-
subjects” variables and demographic variables age, sexuality, race, political ideology, and religious affiliation were 
entered as the “between-subjects” variables. 
330 Each of these analyses relied on a “difference score” variable, which was created by subtracting participants’ 




speech than third-person harms of sex speech, while Conservatives reported higher first-person 
harm of sex speech than third-person harms of sex speech. 
 To determine differences across religious affiliation an independent sample t-test was 
conducted. The t-test found there was a statistically significant difference between religious 
affiliations (t(1298)=5.15, p<.001), as Non-Christians  (M=-0.23, SD=0.81) perceived 
significantly greater differences between first- and third-person harms of sex speech than 
Christians (M=0.004, SD=0.77). These findings suggest that a third-person effect exists in the 
harms of sex speech based on religious affiliation. Specifically, Non-Christians reported lower 
first-person harm of sex speech than third-person harm of sex speech, while Christians reported 
higher first-person harm of sex speech than third-person harms of sex speech. 
In sum, the paired t-test suggested there were significant differences between the first- 
and third-person harms of sex speech, but the repeated measures ANOVA determined that, 
overall, there were no significant differences between first- and third-person harms of sex 
speech. Instead, post-hoc analyses revealed that a third-person effect emerged based on 
participants’ political ideology and religious affiliation. Liberals and Non-Christians reported 
lower first-person harm of sex speech than third-person harms of sex speech, while 
Conservatives and Christians reported higher first-person harm of sex speech than third-person 
harms of sex speech. 
Purposes vs. Harms of Sex Speech:  
The last set of analyses examined the relationship between the first- and third-person data 
on the “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech (i.e., the degree to which participants perceived the 
purposes of sex speech weigh against the harms of sex speech). Descriptive results found that the 




speech as equal to one another,331 but the following analyses tested for significant differences 
between this first- and third-person data on the “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech. These 
analyses also followed the same procedures as the “Social Purpose of Sex Speech” but examined 
the relationship between the first- and third-person data on the “purposes vs. harms” of sex 
speech. The results are as follows: The unadjusted paired t-test found that the first-person 
“purposes vs. harms” of sex speech (M=2.65, SD=1.17) was significantly greater than the third-
person “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech (M=2.56, SD=1.13), t(1594)=2.48, p<.025.332 On 
their face, these results suggest there is no third-person effect because the first-person data is 
larger than the third-person data. However, the scale used to assess “purposes vs. harms” says 
that lower scores represent beliefs that the harms of sex speech outweigh the purposes of sex 
speech, while higher scores represent the opposite. Thus, while the paired t-test says the first-
person data is significantly larger, what that means is that participants, themselves, perceived 
there is more of a balance between the purposes and harms of sex speech, while the participants 
perceived “most U.S. citizens” think the harms of sex speech outweigh the purposes of sex 
speech. Thus, there is evidence of a third-person effect in which the participants perceived the 
“purposes vs. harms” of sex speech is greater according to “most U.S. citizens” than to 
themselves. But when the control variables were included, the repeated measures ANOVA,333 
                                                          
331 The “purposes vs. harms of sex speech” was measured on a 5-point scale which included: Harms greatly exceed 
Purposes, Harms somewhat exceed Purposes, Harms and Purposes are equal, Purposes somewhat exceed Harms, 
and Purposes greatly exceed Harms. 
332 To be determined as significant, the p-value was set to .025. Typically, significance is found when p-values are 
less than or equal to .05. But because two analyses, a paired t-test and a repeated measures ANOVA, were 
conducted on the same set of variables, the original p-value of .05 was divided by two and set to .025, thus raising 
the threshold for significance and making the results more conservative in their conclusions.  
333 For the repeated measures ANOVA, the first- and third-person “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech were entered 
as the “within-subjects” variables and demographic variables age, sexuality, race, political ideology, and religious 




with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction, determined that the “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech 
was not statistically significantly different between the first- and third-person perceptions (F(1, 
1288)=3.996, p=.05).  
Despite the overall results of the repeated measures ANOVA, the analysis showed  
significant differences between first- and third-person perceptions of the “purposes vs. harms” of 
sex speech based on political ideology (F(2, 1288)=20.23, p<.001) and religious affiliation (F(1, 
1288)=19.80, p<.001). To determine differences across political ideology,334 a one-way ANOVA 
was conducted. The one-way ANOVA found there was a statistically significant difference 
between the political ideologies (F(2, 1297)=27.83, p<.001). A Bonferroni post-hoc test revealed 
that Liberals (M=0.44, SD=1.34) perceived significantly greater differences between first- and 
third-person “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech than Moderates (M=0.01, SD=1.11, p<.001) and 
Conservatives (M=-0.17, SD=1.24, p<.001), but there were no significant differences between 
Moderates and Conservatives (p=.10). These findings suggest that a third-person effect emerged 
in the “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech based on political ideology. Specifically, Liberals and 
Moderates reported a lower first-person “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech than third-person 
“purposes vs. harms” of sex speech, while Conservatives reported a higher first-person “purposes 
vs. harms” of sex speech than third-person “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech. 
To determine differences across religious affiliation an independent sample t-test was 
conducted. The t-test found there was a statistically significant difference between religious 
affiliations (t(1298)=-6.06, p<.001), as Non-Christians (M=0.38, SD=1.34) perceived 
significantly greater differences between first- and third-person “purposes vs. harms” of sex 
                                                          
334 Each of these analyses relied on a “difference score” variable, which was created by subtracting participants’ 




speech than Christians (M=-0.06, SD=1.18). These findings suggest that a third-person effect 
emerged in the “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech based on religious affiliation. Specifically, 
Non-Christians reported a lower first-person “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech than third-
person “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech, while Christians reported a higher first-person 
“purposes vs. harms” of sex speech than third-person “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech. 
In total, the paired t-test suggested there were significant differences between the first- 
and third-person “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech, but the repeated measures ANOVA 
determined that, overall, there were no significant differences between first- and third-person 
“purposes vs. harms” of sex speech. Instead, post-hoc analyses revealed that a third-person effect 
emerged based on participants’ political ideology and religious affiliation. Liberals and Non-
Christians reported a lower first-person “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech than third-person 
“purposes vs. harms” of sex speech, while Conservatives and Christians reported a higher first-
person “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech than third-person “purposes vs. harms” of sex speech. 
Summary of Findings 
 The objective of this research question was to determine the value of sex speech and to 
test for a third-person effect: the effect of participants perceiving significant differences between 
themselves and others.335 To determine the value of sex speech, participants reported their first- 
and third-person perceptions of the purposes and harms of sex speech, as these were the 
characteristics the Court considered when it decided sex speech was low-value speech.336 More 
specifically, participants considered the following four variables about sex speech: its social 
purpose, its political purpose, its harms, and the “purposes vs. harms.”  
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From the onset of these analyses, the descriptive results suggested that no third-person 
effect might emerge because the first- and third-person data were similar. On average, the 
participants reported first- and third-person perceptions that sex speech serves low social purpose 
and low political purpose, but participants also reported low harms and a balance between the 
perceived purposes and harms of sex speech (i.e., “purposes vs. harms). Similarities in the first- 
and third-person data were confirmed when the paired t-tests and repeated measures ANOVA 
showed that, for most of the variables, there were no overall third-person effects, meaning there 
were no significant differences between the participants’ personal perceptions and the 
perceptions of “most U.S. citizens.” However, post-hoc tests revealed third-person effects based 
on demographic variables. In fact, for all four of the of sex speech variables, a third-person effect 
emerged based on political ideology and religious affiliation. These findings suggest that, 
broadly, third-person effects did not exist, but that third-person effects did exist among the 
participants within certain groups.   
In total, the findings suggest that the U.S. public perceived sex speech serves low social 
and political purposes, which is evidence that the public perceived sex speech is low-value 
speech. Additionally, there were generally no significant differences between the public’s 
personal perceptions and the perceptions of others on the purposes and harms of sex speech, thus 
an overall third-person effect did not emerge. However, findings indicate perceptions varied 
based on demographics of the public, such as their political ideologies and religious affiliations, 






What are the first-person and third-person values of sex speech in comparison to other 
speech types? 
 
The previous research question determined that participants perceived sex speech serves 
low social and political purpose, thus it is likely low-value speech. But to further understand the 
status of sex speech this next research question examined the value of sex speech in comparison 
to three other speech types: political speech, commercial speech, and hate/violent speech. The 
case analysis found that the Court regularly compared sex speech to other speech types.337 As a 
result, accordingly, the survey asked participants about the value of other speech types to 
determine the degree to which the public valued sex speech in comparison to other speech types. 
Specifically, for each of these four speech types, participants were asked about the speech’s 
importance, society’s interest in protecting the speech from government regulation and 
suppression, society’s value of the speech and the amount of legal protection from censorship or 
government regulation the speech should receive.338 These variables were then combined into 
one, overall “value” score for each of the speech types.339 
In general, participants’ average ratings of the value of sex speech and hate/violent 
speech with respect to the self and to others were at the low end of their respective scales, while 
                                                          
337 For example, in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976), the Court explained that 
though the First Amendment would not tolerate total suppression of the adult movie theaters, “society’s interest in 
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled 
political debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal comment.”  Thus, the regulations of sex speech implicated in 
Young were justified by the Court’s beliefs that sex speech lacked the level of value held by the political speech by 
Voltaire. In other words, sex speech was less valuable when compared to sex speech. See Chapter III “Sex Speech 
vs. Political Speech” for additional information on the comparisons the Court made among sex speech and other 
speech types. 
338 The “speech’s importance,” “society’s interest in protecting the speech from government regulation and 
suppression,” “society’s value of the speech” and “the amount of legal protection from censorship or government 
regulation” were measured on a 4-point scale which included: Zero, Low, Moderate, and High. 
339 The overall “value” score for each of the speech types were measured on a 4-point scale which included: Zero, 




ratings of the value of political speech and commercial speech with respect to the self and to 
others were at the high end of their respective scales.340 Moreover, descriptive results from both 
the first- and third-person data on the value of these four speech types suggest a hierarchy of 
speech exists in which speech types are ranked as more valuable than other speech types. For 
both first- and third-person perceptions, participants reported political speech as the most 
valuable type of speech, commercial speech as the second-most valuable type of speech, and sex 
speech and hate/violent speech tied for the least valuable type of speech. Collectively, the 
findings suggest that across first- and third-person perceptions, sex speech is reported as less 
valuable than political and commercial speech but in a contest against hate/violent speech. But 
these conclusions are based solely on descriptive results. As a result, in-depth analyses were 
conducted to test for significant differences between the value of sex speech and the value of 
other speech types and to test for third-person effects. 
 For these tests, the results were broken into three sections: 1) first-person speech 
comparisons, 2) third-person speech comparisons, and 3) first-person vs. third-person speech 
comparisons. First, the analyses determined what the participants, themselves, perceived is the 
value of sex speech in comparison to other speech types (i.e., the first-person data); second, the 
analyses determined what the participants perceived “most U.S. citizens” think is the value of 
sex speech in comparison to other speech types (i.e., the third-person data); and finally, the 
results from the first- and third-person speech comparisons were reviewed to determine if 
differences emerged between the two sets of speech comparisons (i.e., third-person effects).  
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 The following analyses tested for any differences participants might have had between 
their first- and third-person speech comparisons: an unadjusted paired t-test, an adjusted repeated 
measures ANOVA, and post-hoc analyses, such as one-way ANOVAs and/or independent 
sample t-tests. The analyses used for the speech comparisons mirror the analyses used in the first 
research question, thus the procedures from the previous analyses are the same for the analyses 
on the speech comparisons, including the use of “difference scores” for post-hoc analyses. The 
only difference lies in the variables tested. 
First-Person Speech Comparisons 
The first set of analyses examined the first-person value of sex speech compared to the 
first-person values of political speech, commercial speech, and hate/violent speech. In other 
words, this section of analyses tested for significant differences between the participants’ 
personal perceptions of the value of sex speech and participants’ personal perceptions of the 
value of other speech types. For each of these comparisons, the analyses include an unadjusted 
paired t-test, an adjusted repeated measures ANOVA, and, when needed, post-hoc analyses.  
Sex Speech vs. Political Speech: When the first-person value of sex speech was 
compared against the first-person value of political speech,341 the unadjusted paired t-test found 
that the value of sex speech (M=1.26, SD=0.75) was significantly lower than the value of 
political speech (M=1.97, SD=0.74), t(1299)=-31.69, p<.001.342 Similarly, when the control 
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342 To be determined as significant, the p-value was set to .008. Typically, significance is found when p-values are 
less than or equal to .05. But because the variable “first-person value of sex speech” will be tested a total of six 
times (three comparisons with a paired t-test and a repeated measures ANOVA per comparisons), the original p-
value of .05 was divided by 6 and set to .008, thus raising the threshold for significance and making the results more 




variables were considered, the repeated measures ANOVA,343 with a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction, found that the value of sex speech was significantly lower than the value of political 
speech (F(1, 1288)=34.00, p<.001). The results also showed significant differences between the 
value of sex speech and the value of political speech based on age (F(3, 1288)=23.90, p<.001). 
To determine differences across age,344 a one-way ANOVA was conducted. The one-way 
ANOVA found statistically significant differences across the age groups (F(3, 1296)=32.772, 
p<.001). A Bonferroni post-hoc test revealed that Silent Generationers345 (M=-0.93, SD=0.81) 
perceived significantly greater differences between the value of sex speech and the value of 
political speech than Millennials346 (M=-0.41, SD=0.73, p<.001) and Generation Xers347 (M=-
0.58, SD=0.79, p<.001). Additionally, Baby Boomers348 (M=-0.89, SD=0.79) perceived 
significantly greater differences between the value of sex speech and the value of political speech 
than Millennials (p<.001) and Generation Xers (p<.001), but no significant differences emerged 
between Silent Generationers and Baby Boomers (p=1.00). Lastly, Generation Xers perceived 
significantly greater differences between the value of sex speech and the value of political speech 
than Millennials (p<.05). Altogether, the participants reported a lower first-person value of sex 
                                                          
343 For the repeated measures ANOVA, the first-person value of sex speech and the first-person value of political 
speech were entered as the “within-subjects” variables and demographic variables age, sexuality, race, political 
ideology, and religious affiliation were entered as the “between-subjects” variables. 
344 Each of these analyses relied on a “difference score” variable, which was created by subtracting participants’ 
first-person value of political speech from participants’ first-person value of sex speech. 
345 Participants ages 70+. 
346 Participants ages 18-34. 
347 Participants ages 35-50. 




speech than first-person value of political speech, but older participants perceived the greatest 
difference between the value of sex speech and the value of political speech. 
In total, both the paired t-test and repeated measures ANOVA found that the value of sex 
speech was significantly lower than the value of political speech. Additionally, post-hoc analyses 
revealed all of the participants reported a lower first-person value of sex speech than first-person 
value of political speech, the older the participants were, the more they perceived a difference 
between the values of sex speech and political speech.  
Sex Speech vs. Commercial Speech: When the first-person value of sex speech was 
compared against the first-person value of commercial speech,349 the unadjusted paired t-test 
found that the value of sex speech (M=1.26, SD=0.75) was significantly lower than the value of 
commercial speech (M=1.77, SD=0.70), t(1299)=-23.40, p<.001.350 Similarly, when the control 
variables were considered, the repeated measures ANOVA,351 with a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction, found that the value of sex speech was significantly lower than the value of 
commercial speech (F(1, 1288)=19.46, p<.001). The results also showed significant differences 
between the value of sex speech and the value of commercial speech based on age (F(3, 
1288)=16.25, p<.001) and religious affiliation (F(1, 1288)=4.48, p<.005). 
                                                          
349 The value of the speech types was measured on a 4-point scale which included: Zero, Low, Moderate, and High. 
350 To be determined as significant, the p-value was set to .008. Typically, significance is found when p-values are 
less than or equal to .05. But because the variable “first-person value of sex speech” will be tested a total of six 
times (three comparisons with a paired t-test and a repeated measures ANOVA per comparisons), the original p-
value of .05 was divided by 6 and set to .008, thus raising the threshold for significance and making the results more 
conservative in their conclusions.  
351 For the repeated measures ANOVA, the first-person value of sex speech and the first-person value of commercial 
speech were entered as the “within-subjects” variables and demographic variables age, sexuality, race, political 




First, to determine differences across age,352 a one-way ANOVA was conducted. The 
one-way ANOVA found statistically significant differences across the age groups (F(3, 
1296)=24.05, p<.001). A Bonferroni post-hoc test revealed that Silent Generationers (M=-0.75, 
SD=0.80) perceived significantly greater differences between the value of sex speech and the 
value of commercial speech than Millennials (M=-0.23, SD=0.67, p<.001) and Generation Xers 
(M=-0.42, SD=0.79, p<.001). Additionally, Baby Boomers (M=-0.64, SD=0.78) perceived 
significantly greater differences between the value of sex speech and the value of commercial 
speech than Millennials (p<.001) and Generation Xers (p<.001), but no significant differences 
emerged between Silent Generationers and Baby Boomers (p=.76). Lastly, Generation Xers 
perceived significantly greater differences between the value of sex speech and the value of 
commercial speech than Millennials (p<.05). In total, all of the participants reported a lower 
first-person value of sex speech than first-person value of commercial speech, but older 
participants perceived the greatest difference between the value of sex speech and the value of 
commercial speech.  
Second, to determine differences across religious affiliation, an independent sample t-test 
was conducted. The t-test found there was a statistically significant difference between religious 
affiliations (t(1298)=-4.68, p<.001), as Christians (M=-0.58, SD=0.81) perceived significantly 
greater differences between the value of sex speech and the value of commercial speech than 
Non-Christians (M=-0.37, SD=0.70). In total, the participants reported a lower first-person value 
of sex speech than first-person value of commercial speech, but Christians perceived the greatest 
difference between the value of sex speech and the value of commercial speech.  
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In sum, the paired t-test and the repeated measure ANOVA found that the value of sex 
speech was significantly lower than the value of commercial speech. Additionally, post-hoc 
analyses revealed all the participants reported a lower first-person value of sex speech than first-
person value of commercial speech, but older participants and Christians perceived the greatest 
difference between the value of sex speech and the value of commercial speech.  
Sex Speech vs. Hate/Violent Speech: When the first-person value of sex speech was 
compared against the first-person value of hate/violent speech,353 the unadjusted paired t-test 
found that the value of sex speech (M=1.26, SD=0.75) was not significantly different from the 
value of hate/violent speech (M=1.21, SD=0.90), t(1299)=2.20, p=.03.354 Similarly, when the 
control variables were considered, the repeated measures ANOVA,355 with a Greenhouse-
Geisser correction, found that the value of sex speech was not statistically different from the 
value of hate/violent speech (F(1, 1288)=1.85, p=.17. However, the results showed significant 
differences between value of sex speech and the value of hate/violent speech based on race (F(1, 
1288)=9.67, p<.005), political ideology (F(2, 1288)=13.45, p<.001) and religious affiliation (F(1, 
1288)=7.14, p<.008). 
                                                          
353 The value of the speech types was measured on a 4-point scale which included: Zero, Low, Moderate, and High. 
354 To be determined as significant, the p-value was set to .008. Typically, significance is found when p-values are 
less than or equal to .05. But because the variable “first-person value of sex speech” will be tested a total of six 
times (three comparisons with a paired t-test and a repeated measures ANOVA per comparisons), the original p-
value of .05 was divided by 6 and set to .008, thus raising the threshold for significance and making the results more 
conservative in their conclusions.  
355 For the repeated measures ANOVA, the first-person value of sex speech and the first-person value of hate/violent 
speech were entered as the “within-subjects” variables and demographic variables age, sexuality, race, political 




First, to determine differences across race,356 an independent sample t-test was 
conducted. The t-test found there was a statistically significant difference between races 
(t(1298)=-2.52, p<.05), as Non-White participants (M=-0.09, SD=0.86) perceived significantly 
greater differences between the value of sex speech and the value of hate/violent speech than 
Whites participants (M=0.08, SD=0.85). The findings suggest that White participants reported a 
higher first-person value of sex speech than first-person value of hate/violent speech, while Non-
White participants reported a lower first-person value of sex speech than first-person value of 
hate/violent speech.  
Second, to determine differences across political ideology, a one-way ANOVA was 
conducted. The one-way ANOVA found statistically significant differences across the political 
ideologies (F(2, 1297)=13.33, p<.001). A Bonferroni post-hoc test revealed that Liberals    
(M=0.22, SD=0.92) perceived significantly greater differences between the value of sex speech 
and the value of hate/violent speech than Moderates (M=0.001, SD=.89, p<.001) and 
Conservative (M=-0.06, SD=0.72, p<.001). However, no significant differences emerged 
between Moderates and Conservatives (p=.82). Together, these findings suggest that Liberals 
and Moderates reported a higher first-person value of sex speech than first-person value of 
hate/violent speech, while Conservatives reported a lower first-person value of sex speech than 
first-person value of hate/violent speech. 
Third, to determine differences across religious affiliation, an independent sample t-test 
was conducted. The t-test found there was a statistically significant difference between the 
religious affiliations (t(1298)=-3.55, p<.001), as Non-Christians (M=0.17, SD=0.92) perceived 
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significantly greater differences between the value of sex speech and the value of hate/violent 
speech than Christians (M=-0.01, SD=0.81). The findings suggest that Non-Christians reported a 
higher first-person value of sex speech than first-person value of hate/violent speech, while 
Christians reported a lower first-person value of sex speech than first-person value of 
hate/violent speech. 
In total, the paired t-test and the repeated measures ANOVA found no significant 
differences between the first-person values of sex speech and hate/violent speech. However, 
post-hoc analyses revealed Non-Whites, Christians and Conservative reported a lower first-
person value of sex speech than first-person value of hate/violent speech.  
Summary of Findings: Overall, the findings from these first-person speech comparisons 
revealed two conclusions: 1) that sex speech is significantly less valuable than political speech 
and commercial speech, and 2) that sex speech is not significantly more or less valuable than 
hate/violent speech. First, the analyses determined the participants, themselves, perceived sex 
speech is significantly less valuable than political speech and commercial speech. These findings 
held true across demographic variables. The post-hoc analyses found that some participants, such 
as Liberals, Non-Christians, and younger participants, perceived less of a difference between the 
value of sex speech and the value of political speech and commercial speech. But even so, these 
participants perceived sex speech is less valuable than political speech and commercial speech.  
Second, the analyses determined the participants, themselves, perceived sex speech is no 
more or less valuable than hate/violent speech. But post-hoc analyses determined that some 
participants, such as Whites, Non-Christians, Liberals and Moderates, perceived sex speech is 
more valuable than hate/violent speech, while other participants, such as Non-Whites, Christians, 




findings suggest significant differences between the value of sex speech and the value of 
hate/violent speech, but differences between the value of sex speech and hate/violent speech can 
emerge based on demographic characteristics of the participants. 
Collectively, these results suggest that, according to first-person perceptions, sex speech 
is less valuable than other speech types. The participants perceived that sex speech is less 
valuable than political speech, commercial speech, and, in some cases, hate/violent speech. Thus, 
the first-person speech hierarchy is as follows: political speech at the top, commercial speech in 
the middle, and sex speech and hate/violent speech tied for the bottom, with some instances of 
sex speech out ranking hate/violent speech and vice versa.    
Third-Person Speech Comparisons 
The second set of analyses examined the third-person value of sex speech compared to 
the third-person values of political speech, commercial speech, and hate/violent speech. In other 
words, this section of analyses tested for significant differences between what the participants 
perceived “most U.S. citizens” think is the value of sex speech and what the participants 
perceived “most U.S. citizens” think is the value of other speech types. For each of these 
comparisons, the analyses include an unadjusted paired t-test, an adjusted repeated measures 
ANOVA, and, when needed, post-hoc analyses.  
Sex Speech vs. Political Speech: When the third-person value of sex speech was 
compared against the third-person value of political speech,357 the unadjusted paired t-test found 
that the value of sex speech (M=1.21, SD=0.80) was significantly lower than the value of 
                                                          




political speech (M=1.93, SD=0.76), t(1299)=-28.85, p<.001.358 Similarly, when the control 
variables were considered, the repeated measures ANOVA,359 with a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction, found that the value of sex speech was significantly lower than the value of political 
speech (F(1, 1288)=40.28, p<.001). The results also showed significant differences between the 
value of sex speech and the value of political speech based on age (F(3, 1288)=33.60, p<.001). 
To determine differences across age,360 a one-way ANOVA was conducted. The one-way 
ANOVA found statistically significant differences across the age groups (F(3, 1296)=31.62, 
p<.001). A Bonferroni post-hoc test revealed that Silent Generationers (M=-0.90, SD=0.84) 
perceived significantly greater differences between the value of sex speech and the value of 
political speech than Millennials (M=-0.39, SD=0.81, p<.001) and Generation Xers (M=-0.57, 
SD=0.92, p<.005). Additionally, Baby Boomers (M=-0.94, SD=0.89) perceived significantly 
greater differences between the value of sex speech and the value of political speech than 
Millennials (p<.001) and Generation Xers (p<.001). Lastly, no significant differences emerged 
between Silent Generationers and Baby Boomers (p=1.00) and no significant differences 
emerged between Generation Xers and Millennials (p=.07). Altogether, the participants reported 
a lower third-person value of sex speech than third-person value of political speech, but older 
                                                          
358 To be determined as significant, the p-value was set to .008. Typically, significance is found when p-values are 
less than or equal to .05. But because the variable “first-person value of sex speech” will be tested a total of six 
times (three comparisons with a paired t-test and a repeated measures ANOVA per comparisons), the original p-
value of .05 was divided by 6 and set to .008, thus raising the threshold for significance and making the results more 
conservative in their conclusions.  
359 For the repeated measures ANOVA, the third-person value of sex speech and the third-person value of political 
speech were entered as the “within-subjects” variables and demographic variables age, sexuality, race, political 
ideology, and religious affiliation were entered as the “between-subjects” variables. 
360 Each of these analyses relied on a “difference score” variable, which was created by subtracting participants’ 




participants perceived the greatest difference between the value of sex speech and the value of 
political speech. 
In sum, the paired t-test and the repeated measures ANOVA found that the third-person 
value of sex speech was significantly lower than the third-person value of political speech. 
Additionally, post-hoc analyses revealed all the participants, in the view of “most U.S citizens,” 
reported a lower third-person value of sex speech than third-person value of political speech, but 
older participants perceived the greatest difference between the value of sex speech and the value 
of political speech. 
Sex Speech vs. Commercial Speech: When the third-person value of sex speech was 
compared against the third-person value of commercial speech,361 the unadjusted paired t-test 
found that the value of sex speech (M=1.21, SD=0.80) was significantly lower than the value of 
commercial speech (M=1.76, SD=0.75), t(1299)=-23.38, p<.001.362 Similarly, when the control 
variables were considered, the repeated measures ANOVA,363 with a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction, found that the value of sex speech was significantly lower than the value of 
commercial speech (F(1, 1288)=22.64, p<.001).  
The results also showed significant differences between the value of sex speech and the 
value of commercial speech based on age (F(3, 1288)=20.80, p<.001) and religious affiliation 
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less than or equal to .05. But because the variable “first-person value of sex speech” will be tested a total of six 
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conservative in their conclusions.  
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(F(1, 1288)=8.39, p<.008). First, to determine differences across age,364 a one-way ANOVA was 
conducted. The one-way ANOVA found statistically significant differences across the age 
groups (F(3, 1296)=25.39, p<.001). A Bonferroni post-hoc test revealed that Silent 
Generationers (M=-0.78, SD=0.81) perceived significantly greater differences between the value 
of sex speech and the value of commercial speech than Millennials (M=-0.27, SD=0.73, p<.001) 
and Generation Xers (M=-0.43, SD=0.90, p<.001). Additionally, Baby Boomers (M=-0.72, 
SD=0.85) perceived significantly greater differences between the value of sex speech and the 
value of commercial speech than Millennials (p<.001) and Generation Xers (p<.001). Lastly, no 
significant differences emerged between Silent Generationers and Baby Boomers (p=1.00) and 
no significant differences emerged between Generation Xers and Millennials (p=.14). In sum, all 
of the participants reported a lower third-person value of sex speech than third-person value of 
commercial speech, but older participants perceived the greatest difference between the value of 
sex speech and the value of commercial speech. 
Second, to determine differences across religious affiliation, an independent sample t-test 
was conducted. The t-test found there was a statistically significant difference between the 
religious affiliations (t(1298)=-4.68, p<.001), as Christians (M=-0.58, SD=0.81) perceived 
significantly greater differences between the value of sex speech and the value of commercial 
speech than Non-Christians (M=-0.37, SD=0.70). The findings suggest that all of the participants 
reported a lower third-person value of sex speech than third-person value of commercial speech, 
but Christians perceived the greatest difference between the value of sex speech and the value of 
commercial speech. 
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In total, the paired t-test and the repeated measures ANOVA found that the third-person 
value of sex speech was significantly lower than the third-person value of commercial speech. 
Additionally, post-hoc analyses revealed all the participants, in the view of “most U.S citizens,” 
reported a lower third-person value of sex speech than third-person value of political speech, but 
older participants and Christians perceived the greatest difference between the value of sex 
speech and the value of commercial speech. 
 Sex Speech vs. Hate/Violent Speech: When the third-person value of sex speech was 
compared against the third-person value of hate/violent speech,365 the unadjusted paired t-test 
found that the value of sex speech (M=1.21, SD=0.80) was not significantly different from the 
value of hate/violent speech (M=1.23, SD=0.96), t(1299)=-0.70, p=.49.366 Similarly, when the 
control variables were considered, the repeated measures ANOVA,367 with a Greenhouse-
Geisser correction, found that the value of sex speech was not statistically different from the 
value of hate/violent speech (F(1, 1288)=0.51, p=.48. Moreover, the results showed no 
significant differences between the value of sex speech and the value of hate/violent speech 
based on any of the demographic variables.  
In sum, the paired t-test and the repeated measures ANOVA found no significant 
differences between the third-person values of sex speech and hate/violent speech. Additionally, 
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the repeated measures ANOVA determined no significant differences between the third-person 
values of sex speech and hate/violent speech based on any of the demographic variables.  
Summary of Findings: Overall, the findings from these third-person speech comparisons 
revealed two conclusions: 1) that participants perceived “most U.S. citizens” think sex speech is 
significantly less valuable than political speech and commercial speech, and 2) that participants 
perceived “most U.S. citizens” think sex speech is not significantly more or less valuable than 
hate/violent speech. First, the analyses determined the participants perceived “most U.S. 
citizens” think sex speech is significantly less valuable than political speech and commercial 
speech. These findings held true across demographic variables. The post-hoc analyses found that 
younger participants, such Millennials and Generation Xers, and Non-Christians, perceived less 
of a difference between the third-person value of sex speech and the third-person values of 
political speech and commercial speech. But even so, the younger and Non-Christian participants 
perceived “most U.S. citizens” think sex speech is less valuable than political speech and 
commercial speech.  
Second, the analyses determined the participants perceived “most U.S. citizens” think sex 
speech is no more or less valuable than hate/violent speech. Furthermore, no significant 
differences emerged between participants’ third-person value of sex speech and third-person 
value of hate/violent speech based on demographic characteristics of the participants.  
Collectively, these results suggest that, according to third-person perceptions, sex speech 
is less valuable than political speech and commercial speech, but sex speech is neither more or 
less valuable than hate/violent speech. Thus, the third-person speech hierarchy is as follows: 
political speech at the top, commercial speech in the middle, and sex speech and hate/violent 




Third-Person Effect: First-Person Speech Comparisons vs. Third-Person Speech Comparisons 
The reason for asking the participants about the value of sex speech compared to other 
speech types in the first-person and in the third-person was to determine if differences emerged 
between the two sets of findings. Perhaps the participants, themselves, would perceive no 
significant differences between any of the speech types, but perceive that “most U.S. citizens” 
think there is a significant difference between the speech types? Or perhaps the participants, 
themselves, would perceive a different speech hierarchy than that of “most U.S. citizens”? Any 
number of possibilities could have occurred that suggested differences between the first- and 
third-person speech comparisons, but, interestingly, differences did not emerge.  
Based on the findings from the first- and third-person speech comparisons, there is strong 
evidence of like mindedness rather than a third-person effect. Across both the first- and third-
person data, the same speech hierarchy emerged. According to the participants’ personal views 
and their perceptions of “most U.S. citizens,” political speech is the most valuable speech type, 
followed by commercial speech, sex speech and hate/violent speech. Moreover, both the first- 
and third-person data found that sex speech is significantly less valuable than political speech 
and commercial speech, and that sex speech is not significantly more or less valuable than 
hate/violent speech. Even without the significance tests, the descriptive data shows the 
similarities between the first- and third person data. For example, the average first-person value 
of political speech was 1.97, while the average third-person value of political speech was 1.94; 
between the first- and third-person answers, there is less than a .05 difference, thus 
demonstrating the strong closeness between the first- and third-person value perceptions. 
Altogether, the first- and third-person data demonstrate that sex speech is less valuable 




person perceptions on the value of sex speech and the value of other speech types. According to 
both the participants’ personal perceptions and the participants’ perceptions of “most U.S. 
citizens” there is a shared belief that sex speech is significantly outranked by other speech types. 
How do the values of sex speech differ across demographic characteristics? 
 The analyses thus far have focused on within-subjects testing which compared 
participants against themselves, such as the difference between a participant’s first-person value 
of sex speech and third-person value of sex speech. But now the analyses switch to between-
subjects testing, which compares participants against other participants. Specifically, the 
following analyses test how the value of sex speech vary across participants based on their age, 
gender, sexuality, race, political ideology, and religious affiliation.   
 In total, three variables were tested for differences across demographic characteristics: 
the first-person social purpose of sex speech, the first-person political purpose of sex speech, and 
the overall first-person value of sex speech from the speech comparison data. These variables 
were selected for two reasons: First, because these variables represent data from both the 
preceding research questions, thereby connecting the results of these analyses with the previous 
findings. And second, because the previous analyses already include in-depth third-person effect 
analyses based on demographics, these analyses focused only on first-person variables.  
To assess the variables across demographics, three univariate general linear models 
(GLM) were conducted. For each of these models, the variable related to sex speech was entered 
as the dependent variable and the demographic variables were entered as independent fixed 
factors. If any significant findings emerged, then the simple main effects analyses, which were 
calculated with the models, were used to explain differences based on demographic 




First-Person Social Purpose of Sex Speech 
The first univariate GLM focused on the first-person social purpose of sex speech. For 
this analysis “first-person social purpose of sex”368 was entered as the dependent variable and 
age, gender, sexuality, race, political ideology and religious affiliation were entered as 
independent fixed factors. Results found significant differences in first-person social purpose of 
sex speech based on age (F(3, 1288)=18.89, p<.001),369 political ideology (F(2, 1288)=33.93, 
p<.001) and religious affiliation (F(1, 1288)=20.01, p<.001).  
First, for age, simple main effects analyses showed that younger participants reported 
significantly higher first-person social purpose of sex speech than older participants. 
Millennials370 (M=1.58) reported significantly higher first-person social purpose of sex speech 
than Generation Xers371 (M=1.43; p<.05), Baby Boomers372 (M=1.19; p<.001), and Silent 
Generationers373 (M=1.06; p<.001). Additionally, Generation Xers reported significantly higher 
first-person social purpose of sex speech than Baby Boomers  (p<.001) and Silent Generationers 
(p<.001), but no significant difference emerged between Baby Boomers and Silent Generationers 
(p=.12).  
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Second, for political ideology, the analyses showed that Liberals (M=1.55) reported 
significantly higher first-person social purpose of sex speech than Moderates (M=1.35; p<.001) 
and Conservatives (M=1.06; p<.001), while Moderates reported significantly higher first-person 
social purpose of sex speech than Conservatives (p<.001).  
Last, for religious affiliation, the analyses showed that Non-Christians (M=1.43) reported 
significantly higher first-person social purpose of sex speech than Christians (M=1.20; p<.001). 
First-Person Political Purpose of Sex Speech 
The second univariate GLM followed the same procedures as the first but entered “first-
person political purpose of sex”374 as the dependent variable. The results found significant 
differences in first-person political purpose of sex speech based on age (F(3, 1288)=31.51, 
p<.001),375 gender (F(2, 1288)=3.84, p<.05), sexuality (F(2, 1288)=7.34, p<.001), and political 
ideology (F(2, 1288)=24.87, p<.001).  
First, for age, simple main effects analyses showed that younger participants reported 
significantly higher first-person political purpose of sex speech than older participants. 
Millennials (M=1.33) reported significantly higher first-person political purpose of sex speech 
than Generation Xers (M=1.08; p<.001), Baby Boomers (M=0.84; p<.001), and Silent 
Generationers (M=0.67; p<.001). Additionally, Generation Xers reported higher first-person 
political purpose of sex speech than Baby Boomers (p<.001) Silent Generationers (p<.001), and 
Baby Boomers reported significantly higher first-person political purpose of sex speech than 
Silent Generationers (p<.05), 
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Second, for gender, the analyses showed males (M=0.98) reported significantly higher 
first-person political purpose of sex speech than females (M=0.76; p<.05), while no significant 
difference emerged between males and participants who identified as “Other” for their gender 
(M=1.20; p=.47). Similarly, no significant differences emerged between females and participants 
who identified as “Other” for their gender (p=.14). 
Third, for sexuality, the analyses found participants who prefer multiple types of partners 
(M=1.21), such as both male and female partners, reported significantly higher first-person 
political purpose of sex speech than participants who prefer only male partners (M=0.82; p<.001) 
and participants who prefer only female partners (M=0.92; p<.05). However, no significant 
differences emerged between participants who prefer only female partners and participants who 
prefer only male partners (p=.28).  
Last, for political ideology, the analyses determined Liberals (M=1.18) reported 
significantly higher first-person political purpose of sex speech than Moderates (M=0.99; 
p<.001) and Conservatives (M=0.78; p<.001), while Moderates reported significantly higher 
first-person political purpose of sex speech than Conservatives (p<.001).  
First-Person Value of Sex Speech 
The third univariate GLM also followed the same procedures as the first but entered 
“first-person value of sex”376 as the dependent variable. Results found significant differences in 
the first-person value of sex speech based on age (F(3, 1288)=12.76, p<.001),377 political 
ideology (F(2, 1288)=15.27, p<.001) and religious affiliation (F(1, 1288)=7.70, p<.05).  
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First, for age, simple main effects analyses showed that younger participants reported 
significantly higher first-person value of sex speech than older participants. Millennials 
(M=1.60) reported significantly higher first-person value of sex speech than Baby Boomers 
(M=1.35; p<.001), and Silent Generationers (M=1.20; p<.001). Generation Xers (M=1.49) 
reported significantly higher first-person value of sex speech than Baby Boomers (p<.05) and 
Silent Generationers (p<.001). And Baby Boomers reported significantly higher first-person 
value of sex speech than Silent Generationers (p<.05). However, no significant difference 
emerged between Millennials and Generation Xers (p=.06).  
Second, for political ideology, the analyses found that Liberals (M=1.54) reported 
significantly higher first-person value of sex speech than Moderates (M=1.43; p<.05) and 
Conservatives (M=1.26; p<.001). Additionally, Moderates reported significantly higher first-
person value of sex speech than Conservatives (p<.001).  
Last, for religious affiliation, the analyses showed that Non-Christians (M=1.47) reported 
significantly higher perceptions first-person value of sex speech than Christians (M=1.35; 
p<.001).  
Summary of Findings 
 In sum, the findings from the three univariate GLMs suggest that perceptions of sex 
speech, such as its social purpose, political purpose and overall value, vary by demographics. In 
particular, the analyses found age, political ideology and religious affiliation as driving forces of 
variance. For example, across all three variables, the analyses found younger participants 
reported significantly higher perceptions of sex speech than older participants. Similarly, across 
all three variables Liberals significantly higher perceptions of sex speech than both Moderates 




Non-Christians reported significantly higher perceptions of sex speech than Christians. Overall, 
these findings demonstrate that differences in the purposes and value of sex speech are driven, in 
part, by demographic characteristics, particularly age, political ideology, and religious affiliation.    
Conclusion 
 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, sex speech is low-value because it serves little 
social and/or political purposes and because it is less valuable than other speech types.378 But it 
was unknown if the U.S. public perceived the same of sex speech. As a result, this public opinion 
survey adapted the findings from the case analysis to ask citizens about the value of sex speech, 
particularly its purposes and value in comparison to other speech types.   
 According to the survey results, American citizens perceived sex speech is low-value. On 
average, participants reported that sex speech serves low social and political purposes, and that 
sex speech is less valuable than political speech and commercial speech. Furthermore, 
similarities between participants’ responses to the first- and third-person questions are evidence 
that the participants believe their personal opinions about sex speech mirror the opinions of 
“most U.S. citizens.” Admittedly, the analyses revealed differences in first- and third-person data 
based on demographic characteristics, such as age and political ideology, but there were few 
instances of an overall third-person effect. Thus, the results suggest that sex speech as low-value 
speech is the majority opinion held by the participants, themselves, and “most U.S. citizens.”   
 But there are caveats to these conclusions. For example, a deeper look at the data reveals 
a wide margin of variance across all the survey variables. The results about the social and 
political purpose of sex speech show that for both of these variables there was a standard 
                                                          
378 The case analysis found that speech value is dependent on the purpose/service speech has to society and the 
degree to which society prioritizes the speech. See Chapter III “What does it mean for speech to be ‘low-value’ 




deviation of nearly 1. This means there were participants who reported more extreme answers 
that fell to both poles of the repose options, such as “sex speech has high social purpose” and 
“sex speech has zero political purpose.” The same trend occurred across the speech comparisons, 
as the average answer also had a standard deviation of nearly 1. Meaning, there were participants 
who reported more extreme answers that fell to both poles of the repose options, such as 
“political speech has zero value,” “commercial speech has low value,” and “sex speech has high 
value.” These observations show high levels of variance in participants’ responses, and thus 
demonstrate that perceptions about sex speech, both its purposes and value compared to other 
speech types, varied greatly. Similarly, differences in the value of sex speech definitely emerged 
on the basis of demographics, such as age, political ideology, and religious affiliation. 
Specifically, the results found that higher, more positive, perceptions about the value of sex 
speech were reported by younger, more liberal and/or less Christian participants. As a result, the 
findings of this survey should not be accepted without acknowledging the high degree of 
variance in the participants’ responses and across demographic characteristics. 
In conclusion, the survey data suggest that the American public perceived sex speech is 
low-value speech. Specifically, citizens perceived sex speech serves low social and political 
purposes to society, and sex speech is less valuable than political speech and commercial speech. 
But while the average view of sex speech was low, the data suggest that there was a wide range 
in the citizens’ perceptions of value and protection of sex speech, which are driven, in part, by 
significant demographic differences, such as age and political ideology. In other words, the 
public’s perceptions of value and protection for sex speech varied greatly, thus suggesting that 






THE VALUE OF SEX SPEECH, 
 THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN LAW & SOCIETY,  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOW-VALUE SPEECH 
 
 The overarching objective of this dissertation was to determine the value of sex speech. 
This was done, first, by an in-depth case analysis of U.S. Supreme Court case law on sex speech 
and, second, by a national public opinion survey on the value of sex speech, which was 
developed from the case analysis findings. Now that the findings from both those methods have 
been reviewed, this third and final part of the dissertation answers the remaining two research 
questions: What do the findings from the case analysis and the public opinion survey suggest 
about the value of sex speech in the U.S.? And, what do the findings from the case analysis and 
the public opinion survey suggest about sex speech and the concept of low-value speech in First 
Amendment doctrine?  
 To begin, the chapter discusses the similarities and differences that emerged between the 
case analysis and the national survey on the value of sex speech. This discussion includes 
information about a speech hierarchy within the law, sex speech’s position in that hierarchy as a 
result of its perceived value, and the level of protection sex speech should receive from 
government regulation. This discussion also includes possible explanations for the disconnect 
that exists between law and society on the value of sex speech. The chapter then transitions into 




about the value of social science, specifically public opinion research, in First Amendment law. 
The chapter then closes the dissertation with suggestions for future research.  
What do the findings from the case analysis and the public opinion survey suggest about 
the value of sex speech in the U.S.? 
 
 The concept of low-value speech rests on the notion that there is a hierarchy of speech 
based on speech value,379 and findings from both the case analysis and the public opinion survey 
confirm such a hierarchy exists. For example, the case analysis found that when the Court had to 
determine the level of protection for sex speech the Court regularly compared sex speech to 
political speech.380 The Court decided that sex speech was less valuable, and therefore received 
less legal protection, due to the perception that political speech was more valuable: “It is 
manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression [sex speech] is of a wholly 
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired 
Voltaire’s immortal comment.”381 Comparisons like this by the Court create and reinforce a 
value-based speech hierarchy. Similarly, the public opinion survey revealed that U.S. citizens 
discern a value-based speech hierarchy. Data from both first-person and third-person questions 
about the value, importance, and protection of different speech types revealed that U.S. citizens 
                                                          
379 According to the Court there are types of speech that serve less purpose and benefit to society than others. As a 
result, speech types that serve less purpose receive little to no First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
380 For example, in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976), the Court explained that 
though the First Amendment would not tolerate total suppression of the adult movie theaters, “society’s interest in 
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled 
political debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal comment.”  Thus, the regulations of sex speech implicated in 
Young were justified by the Court’s beliefs that sex speech lacked the level of value held by the political speech by 
Voltaire. In other words, sex speech was less valuable when compared to sex speech. See Chapter III “Sex Speech 
vs. Political Speech” for additional information on the comparisons the Court made among sex speech and other 
speech types. 




perceive political speech is the most valuable type of speech, followed by commercial speech, 
sex speech and hate/violent speech. Like the Court, U.S. citizens perceive differences, explicitly 
a hierarchy, in the value and protection of speech types.  
 Specific to sex speech, both the case analysis and public opinion survey found that sex 
speech sits near the bottom of the speech hierarchy. Sex speech is outranked by political 
speech,382 and the public opinion survey found that sex speech also falls behind commercial 
speech. This suggests that the Court and the U.S. public share low-level perceptions about the 
value of sex speech when compared to other speech types. These findings are explained, in part, 
by shared perceptions between the Court and the U.S. public about sex speech’s lack of social 
and political purposes. For example, according to the Court, sex speech, particularly obscenity, 
serves minimal social and political purposes: “It has been well observed that such utterances 
[obscenity] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as 
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality,”383 and “in our view, to equate the free and robust exchange of 
ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand 
conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom.”384 
Likewise, data from the public opinion survey about the value of sex speech revealed that 
citizens perceive sex speech contributes little to literature, art and/or science (i.e. social 
purposes), and little to informing government and/or democracy (i.e. political purposes). 
Together, these findings from the case analysis and the public opinion survey suggest like 
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383 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). 




mindedness between the Court and the U.S. public about the low social and political purposes of 
sex speech. Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that sex speech is low-value speech according 
to both First Amendment jurisprudence and public opinion. 
However, a very important difference emerged between the case analysis and the public 
opinion survey. The case analysis revealed that the Court translates its hierarchy of speech value 
into direct levels of speech protection.385 For example, political speech, which sits at the top of 
the hierarchy, receives the most amount of legal protection while sex speech, which sits at the 
bottom of the hierarchy, receives the least amount of legal protection.386 In other words, the 
Court perceives a direct relationship between speech value and speech protection: high-value 
speech gets equally high levels of protection387 and low-value speech gets equally low levels of 
protection.388 As a result, the Court perceives significant differences between political speech 
and sex speech. But this is not the case for U.S. citizens.  
According to the public opinion survey, citizens perceive more valuable speech types 
should receive more legal protection than less valuable speech types. As a result, a hierarchy of 
speech value and protection emerged, with political and commercial speech at the top and sex 
                                                          
385 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
386 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). In its decision to uphold a local zoning 
ordinance regulating the location of adult entertainment businesses, the Court stated, “Moreover, even though we 
recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some 
arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly 
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal 
comment.” 
387 Political speech is speech that comments on the government, policies and/or candidates for political office. For 
example, posting a yard sign that supports a candidate, or protesting outside a courthouse. Political speech is 
considered the high-value speech because it promotes a free and functioning democracy, which the Court interprets 
as the core purpose of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
388 The Court has identified types of speech that can receive less legal protection without violating the First 
Amendment protection due to their lack of contribution to society and the larger “exposition of ideas,” a central 




and hate/violent speech at the bottom. However, the citizens did not perceive differences in the 
value and protection of speech types to the same extent as the Court. For example, both the first-
person and third-person data on the value and protection of different speech types revealed that 
citizens value and protect political speech more than sex speech. However, citizens’ perceptions 
of the value and protection of political speech against sex speech were not dramatically different 
from one another. In fact, the survey data revealed ambivalence about the speech types, as none 
of the speech types, on average, were ranked as having high value or worthy of high levels of 
protection. At most, speech types like political speech and commercial speech were ranked as 
having moderate value and deserving moderate levels of protection. As a result, a speech 
hierarchy emerged from the public opinion data, but the hierarchy had small gaps between the 
speech types. Moreover, the gaps between speech types in the public’s speech hierarchy are 
much smaller than the gaps the Court perceives between speech types. 
Overall, the findings from the case analysis and the public opinion survey revealed a 
disconnect between the hierarchies of speech: Both the Court and the U.S. public perceive a 
speech hierarchy that ranks political speech at the top and sex speech near the bottom, however, 
the disconnect emerged in the distance between the speech rankings. The Court perceived 
significant differences between political speech and sex speech,389 while the U.S. public did not. 
Put another way, the Court perceived a larger gap between political speech and sex speech in the 
                                                          
389 For example, in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976), the Court explained that 
though the First Amendment would not tolerate total suppression of the adult movie theaters, “society’s interest in 
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled 
political debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal comment.”  Thus, the regulations of sex speech implicated in 
Young were justified by the Court’s beliefs that sex speech lacked the level of value held by the political speech by 
Voltaire. In other words, sex speech was less valuable when compared to sex speech. See Chapter III “Sex Speech 





speech hierarchy than did the U.S. public. This discrepancy likely explains why a disconnect 
between law and society exist regarding the value and protection of sex speech. Furthermore, this 
discrepancy points to possible solutions to remedy the disconnect. Thus, the following section 
discusses the implications of these findings and provides recommendations to the First 
Amendment protection of sex speech and the low-value speech concept.  
What do the findings from the case analysis and the public opinion survey suggest about 
sex speech and the concept of low-value speech in First Amendment doctrine? 
 
 In its current state, the law on sex speech equates its low-value speech status with 
minimal levels of First Amendment protection.390 This decision is based entirely on the Court’s 
perceptions that sex speech serves little social purpose and that society does not prioritize sex 
speech.391 Additionally, this decision is built on the Court’s perceptions that sex speech is 
dramatically less valuable than other speech types. But findings from the public opinion survey 
call this jurisprudence into question. Citizens agreed with the Court that sex speech has low 
social and political purposes, and is a lesser priority to society, particularly when compared to 
other speech types. But the public does not perceive that sex speech is dramatically less valuable 
or worthy of dramatically less protection than other speech types. In fact, the survey revealed 
ambivalence about the different speech types and their amount of value and protection. In other 
words, the public did not perceive extremes between the speech types like the Court. Based on 
this discrepancy between the Court and the public, this dissertation concludes that the value of 
sex speech should not be equated with its level of legal protection. Furthermore, this dissertation 
                                                          
390 See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
391 See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976), “it is manifest that society’s interest 
in protecting this type of expression [sex speech] is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in 




recommends an overall increase in the protection of sex speech by raising the level of 
constitutional scrutiny applied to regulations of sex speech.  
Currently, regulations of sex speech are subject to the lowest levels of constitutional 
scrutinies,392 such as rational basis review which assumes the constitutionality of reasonable 
legislation and applies a minimal level of scrutiny to government regulation.393 Additionally, sex 
speech is often times the target of secondary effects regulations, which are facially content-based 
restrictions considered content-neutral because the objective of these regulations is not to control 
speech but to control the related or resulting conduct that stems from the targeted speech.394 
These types of regulations are, in turn, subject to the Secondary Effects Doctrine (SED),395 
which ostensibly acts as a form of intermediate scrutiny but it lacks the heightened scrutiny 
traditionally applied in intermediate scrutiny.396 According to the SED, a regulation cannot 
directly suppress the message of the speech, only the “secondary effects” associated with the 
                                                          
392 Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2171 (2015). 
393 Dodger’s Bar & Grill v. Johnson County Board. of Commissioners, 889 F. Supp. 1431. A local ordinance 
regulating nude dancing and other conduct within 1,000 feet of establishment selling liquor was constitutionally 
permissible, where county had rational basis for resolution, resolution was not overbroad, resolution did not violate 
equal protection rights of bar patrons, and any vague provisions in resolution could be modified or severed. See 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 709-14 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing rational 
basis review).  See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 (1981) (discussing “the familiar 
‘rational basis’ test”). 
394 Sexually oriented businesses, such as adult movie theaters and adult dance clubs, are often subject to secondary 
effects regulations. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425,435 (2002); City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theaters, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
395 City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986). 
396 To pass intermediate scrutiny, the government must show a substantial interest in the regulation and that the 
regulation is narrowly tailored so it imposes only an incidental restriction on speech freedoms. See, e.g., Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C, 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 




speech; must serve a substantial government interest, and cannot limit access to the speech.397 To 
demonstrate a substantial interest, the government must provide evidence that shows the sex 
speech causes—or is associated with—the asserted secondary effects, and that the proposed 
regulation is a reasonable measure that will reduce those particular effects.398 If the presence of 
secondary effects and the efficiency of a regulation has been proven to effectively target the 
specific conduct that a local or state government seeks to address, the government may simply 
cite the findings of research conducted by other districts to satisfy the evidence requirement.399 
In turn, the threshold governments must meet under the SED is considerably low.400  
Together, rational basis review and the SED are examples of the low levels of 
constitutional scrutiny typically applied to regulations of sex speech and they demonstrate sex 
speech’s exposure to greater government regulation and less First Amendment protection. 
Therefore, in order to conform the protection of sex speech with public perception, the level of 
constitutional scrutiny applied to sex speech should be raised so that sex speech is not treated 
differently because of its value. To best illustrate this recommendation, the following reviews a 
series of examples about how the law should assess regulations of sex speech.  
                                                          
397 City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986). The Court formulated the Secondary Effects 
Doctrine when it held that governments may impose zoning regulations prohibiting adult theaters from operating 
within certain areas. 
398 Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460, 462 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing City of Los Angeles v. 
Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 435 (2002).). The plurality opinion in Alameda Books reasserted the Renton 
standard, where a municipality may rely on any evidence that is “reasonably believed to be relevant” for 
demonstrating a connection between speech and a substantial, independent government interest. 
399 City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986). 
400 Kyla P. Garrett Wagner & Rachel Jones, Imbalance between Speech & Health: What the Health Claims and 
Substantiating Evidence in Sexually Oriented Business Case Law Suggest about Secondary Effect Regulations and 




To increase the overall protection of sex speech, regulations of sex speech should no 
longer be subject to the lowest levels of constitutional scrutiny. For example, in the case that a 
content-based restriction is imposed on sex speech, such as a ban on sexually explicit content in 
video games, strict scrutiny should apply.401 In other words, in the case of regulations that 
attempt to ban and/or censor sex speech, such regulations should be subject to the highest level 
of constitutional scrutiny.402 Regulations of this kind should not be tolerated or accepted unless 
the highest level of government interest is proven.403  
Similarly, in the case of a content-neutral regulation, such as a ban on sexually explicit 
content during daytime hours on platforms accessible to children,404 such regulations should be 
subject to intermediate scrutiny that is applicable to traditional content-neutral regulations.405 
                                                          
401 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717-21 (2012). The Court struck down a portion of the Stolen 
Valor Act, which criminalized false statements about having a military medal, as an unconstitutional violation to the 
freedom of speech. Specifically, the Court determined that the government failed to meet the substantial interest this 
content-based restriction implicated. 
402 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717-21 (2012). 
403 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717-21 (2012). 
404 See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). During a midafternoon broadcast, a New York 
radio station aired comedian, George Carlin, and his monologue “Filthy Words,” which listed a series of profane 
words. The radio station was fined by the F.C.C. for the broadcast, and later the Court ruled that it is within the 
power of the F.C.C. to regulate and punish indecent broadcast content during the daytime hours when children are in 
the audience. Decades later, George Carlin’s monologue is still considered indent and is punishable content on 
broadcast. See also Timothy Bella, The ‘7 Dirty Words’ Turn 40, but They’re Still Dirty, THE ATLANTIC (May 24, 
2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2012/05/the-7-dirty-words-turn-40-but-theyre-still-
dirty/257374/. 
405 Intermediate scrutiny is a test applied by the courts to assess the constitutionality of laws aimed at regulating the 
manner of speech, but not the speech, itself (i.e. content-neutral regulations). To pass intermediate scrutiny, the 
government must show a substantial interest in the regulation and that the regulation is narrowly tailored so it 
imposes only an incidental restriction on speech freedoms. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C, 512 U.S. 




Moreover, weaker forms of intermediate scrutiny should not be applied.406 The constitutional 
scrutiny applied to content-neutral regulations on other speech types should apply to sex speech.  
In the case of secondary effects regulations, such as zoning laws of adult entertainment 
businesses,407 the SED should apply, but with one notable change: the level of government 
evidence required by the SED needs to be raised to that of content-neutral regulations 
traditionally applied to other speech types.408 Consider the following example: In 2012, the 
citizens of Los Angeles County California passed a local ordinance that requires all adult film 
actors to wear condoms during the production of hardcore sex scenes.409 The law is a secondary 
effects regulation designed to curb the spread of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) that occurs 
as a result of pornography production,410 but it was challenged by an adult film company, Vivid 
Entertainment, LLC, as a violation of the actors’ First Amendment rights to freedom of speech 
and expression.411 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately decided that the 
                                                          
406 A weaker form of intermediate scurinty includes the Secondary Effects Doctrine S(ED). The SED requires a 
lower threshold of government interest and evidence to substantiate regulations. See Annex Books, Inc. v. City of 
Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460, 462 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 435 
(2002).). The plurality opinion in Alameda Books reasserted the Renton standard, where a municipality may rely on 
any evidence that is “reasonably believed to be relevant” for demonstrating a connection between speech and a 
substantial, independent government interest. 
407 See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986). The Court formulated the Secondary 
Effects Doctrine when it held that governments may impose zoning regulations prohibiting adult theaters from 
operating within certain areas. 
408 Intermediate scrutiny is a test applied by the courts to assess the constitutionality of laws aimed at regulating the 
manner of speech, but not the speech, itself (i.e. content-neutral regulations). To pass intermediate scrutiny, the 
government must show a substantial interest in the regulation and that the regulation is narrowly tailored so it 
imposes only an incidental restriction on speech freedoms. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C, 512 U.S. 
622, 661-62 (1994) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).). 
409 Los Angeles County, California Code tit. 11, ch. 39 § 090 (Nov. 6, 2012) (quoting the ordinance, “The use of 
condoms is required for all acts of anal or vaginal sex during the production of adult films to protect performers 
from sexually transmitted disease.”) [hereinafter Measure B].  
410 Los Angeles County, California. Code tit. 11, ch. 39 § 090 (Nov. 6, 2012). 




mandated condom use provision was a constitutional content-neutral regulation because the law 
met the standards of the SED.412 But what if the condom mandate had been subject to a 
heightened level of government interest like the kind found in intermediate scrutiny for 
traditional content-neutral regulations?413  
In the original case, the threshold of evidence the government had to meet for the condom 
mandate was considerably low because the government was only required to meet the standards 
of the SED.414 In fact, the only evidence the government submitted to support the condom law 
was a letter written by the local health department which reported nearly 10-year-old data of 
STDs within the local adult film industry.415 No evidence was provided to demonstrate 1) that 
there was a current STD problem, 2) that the STDs were spreading to the surrounding 
community, or 3) that mandated condom use would successfully curtail the threat of STDs.416 
But had the level of constitutional scrutiny on the condom mandate been that of intermediate 
scrutiny for traditional content-neutral regulations, the government would have been required to 
provide a higher level of evidence to substantiate the mandate. More specifically, the 
government would have been required to show a substantial interest in the regulation and that the 
                                                          
412 Vivid Entertainment, LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2014) (dismissing Vivid Entertainment’s argument 
that the law was an unconditional infringement on pornography actors’ and film producer’s First Amendment rights 
to freedom of speech and expression). 
413 Intermediate scrutiny is a test applied by the courts to assess the constitutionality of laws aimed at regulating the 
manner of speech, but not the speech, itself (i.e. content-neutral regulations). To pass intermediate scrutiny, the 
government must show a substantial interest in the regulation and that the regulation is narrowly tailored so it 
imposes only an incidental restriction on speech freedoms. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C, 512 U.S. 
622, 661-62 (1994) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).). 
414 City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986). 
415 Vivid Entertainment, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1135-136 (2013). 




regulation is narrowly tailored, so it imposed only an incidental restriction on speech.417 For 
example, to demonstrate the substantial interest the government may have needed to provide data 
on the current rates of STD transmission in the local adult film industry, evidence that STDs 
were actually spreading to the surrounding community and that condoms were the most effective 
solution. These are just possible examples of type and level of evidence the government may 
have had to supply, but, at the very least, the government would have been required to give more 
than just a letter from the local health department on dated rates of STDs, like it did in the 
original case.418 Additionally, the government would have had to argue that mandated condom 
use was narrowly tailored to the point that it only had incidental impacts on the speech. In sum, 
had the condom mandate been subject to a higher level of government interest like that in 
intermediate scrutiny, the sex speech would have been better protected from regulation because it 
would have been harder for the mandate to survive the higher level of constitutional scrutiny.  
Altogether, these examples illustrate the recommendation to raise the level of 
constitutional scrutiny applied to sex speech. However, there is one exception to this 
recommendation. In the public opinion survey, citizens reported the perceived harms of sex 
speech on various populations, such as children, adults, and society as a whole.419 The survey 
found that, overall, citizens perceive sex speech has a low to moderate level of harms, but that it 
has the greatest harm on children. As a result, the one caveat to raising the level of constitutional 
                                                          
417 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C, 512 U.S. 622, 61-62 (1994) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).). 
418 Vivid Entertainment, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1135-136 (2013). 
419 The survey data on sex speech harms is located in “Table 8: First-Person Values of Sex Speech” and “Table 9: 




scrutiny applied sex speech is that regulations aimed at restricting access and use of sex speech 
because of age and potential harms should have a lower level of constitutional scrutiny applied.  
Traditionally, the Court has upheld regulations that curb the use and exposure of sexually 
explicit content to children and unsuspecting adults.420 However, a recent attempt to prevent 
children’s access to other harmful speech, specifically violent video games,421 was deemed an 
unconstitutional infringement of the First Amendment because it suppressed speech content.422 
As a result, there is a chance that age and harms-based restrictions on sex speech will be deemed 
unconstitutional for the same reasons. But data from the public opinion survey indicated that the 
public perceives sex speech has the greatest harms on children.423 Thus, lower levels of 
                                                          
420 State interests in regulating sex speech include protecting vulnerable audiences, like minors (F.C.C. v. Pacifica 
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)), protecting social order and morale (National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 
524 U.S. 569 (1998); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 204 (1975); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 
U.S. 49 (1973)), and preventing the secondary-effects of sex speech, such as increased crime and decreased property 
values (City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 
(2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 
(1986); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)). See Chapter III of this dissertation for 
additional information on the purposes and harms of sex speech according to the sex speech case law. 
421 In 2005 the state of California passed a law to banning the sale of certain violent video games to children without 
parental supervision, but the law was later struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court because the state failed to prove 
a compelling link between violent video games and its effects on children. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Association, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). Since 1965 homicide and suicide have been among the top 15 leading causes of 
death in the United States, the risk of which skyrocketed, particularly in youth, in the 1980s.  Studies showed that 
the link between experiencing violence as a child and future health problems, including violent behavior from the 
child was strong. See, Linda L. Dahlberg & James A. Mercy, The History of Violence as a Public Health Issue, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 1 (2009), 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/history_violence-a.pdf.  As a result, many scholars started to 
hypothesize that violent video games would have similar deleterious effect on children. See e.g. Kevin D. Browne & 
Catherin Hamilton-Giachritsis, The Influence of Violent Media on Children and Adolescents: A Public-Health 
Approach, THE LANCET, 365, 9460, 702 (Feb. 19, 2005)  https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(05)17952-5, Ashlee 
M. Wiedeman, Jacqueline A. Black, Autumn L. Dolle, Emmanuel J. Finney, Kendell L. Coker, Factors Influencing 
the Impact of Aggressive and Violent Media on Children and Adolescents, Aggression and Violent Behavior 25 
(2015) 191–198, & Brad J. Bushman & Craig A. Anderson, Media Violence and the American Public, AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGIST June/July 477 2001 56. 
422 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799-804 (2011). 
423 The survey data on sex speech harms is located in “Table 8: First-Person Values of Sex Speech” and “Table 9: 




protection for sex speech may be acceptable when the regulations aim to protect children. In 
other words, content-based regulations aimed at censoring sex speech access and use by children 
due to potential harms should be subject to a lower level of constitutional scrutiny, such as 
intermediate scrutiny.424  
In sum, this dissertation found that the value of sex speech should not be translated into 
its level of protection. As a result, the recommendation is to raise the level of constitutional 
scrutiny applied to regulations of sex speech, with the exception of regulations aimed at the 
harms of sex speech access and use by children. This recommendation, however, may be resisted 
as there is a longstanding history in First Amendment law of sex speech being treated differently 
because of its value.425 Moreover, evidence from the survey supports the Court’s claims that sex 
speech serves little social purpose and is not a priority to society.426 But the public opinion 
survey debunks the Court’s practice that perceptions of value are a reason for giving sex speech 
minimal levels of protection. The survey found that despite sex speech having low social purpose 
and priority, citizens did not perceive extreme differences between sex speech and other speech 
types. In other words, the perceptions of sex speech were not so low that they were reason 
enough to give sex speech dramatically less protection. Thus, if the Court continues to give sex 
speech significantly less protection, then it needs to use justifications unrelated to value.  
                                                          
424 To pass intermediate scrutiny, the government must show a substantial interest in the regulation and that the 
regulation is narrowly tailored so it imposes only an incidental restriction on speech freedoms. See, e.g., Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C, 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781, 799 (1989).), when the Court held that the must-carry provisions (the provisions that said cable systems to 
allocate a percentage of their channels to local public broadcast stations) were content neutral regulations that 
survived intermediate scrutiny. 
425 See Chapter I, “Sex Speech as Low-Value Speech” of this dissertation. 
426 The case analysis found that speech value is dependent on the purpose/service speech has to society and the 
degree to which society prioritizes the speech. See Chapter III “What does it mean for speech to be ‘low-value’ 




Based on the recommendation for sex speech, this dissertation closes with an overall 
recommendation for the low-value speech concept: that the speech hierarchy be open to speech 
mobility. In its current state, the speech hierarchy is very rigid. Once classified as low-value, 
speech rarely, if ever, moves out of its low-rank position.427 But evidence from the public 
opinion survey suggests rigidity may be an ineffective approach for the speech hierarchy. For 
example, the variance data showed a wide range of opinions on the value and protection of sex 
speech, which suggests that always classifying speech as low-value may not correct. This is 
supported by the social acceptability data which found citizens perceived differences in the use 
and access to sex speech depending on the community in question. Together, these findings 
suggest that the value of sex speech likely varies based on the person and community in 
question. As a result, the low-value speech concept will do well to allow for speech mobility in 
the speech hierarchy as that will let the context and community of speech to be considered.  
Furthermore, speech mobility in the speech hierarchy will likely improve the low-value 
speech concept’s survival in the future. This dissertation was built on the notion that a disconnect 
currently exists between law and society on the value of sex speech. For instance, there have 
been significant changes in society’s relationship with sex speech but the law on sex speech has 
not changed since the late 1950s.428 However, adjusting the low-value speech concept to allow 
for speech mobility may bridge this disconnect on sex speech, as well as prevent similar 
                                                          
427 Throughout the 20th century, seminal First Amendment cases changed the landscape of speech freedoms, with 
some categories, such as commercial speech, gradually gaining protection when it originally had none, Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). However other speech 
types, such as sex speech, have never had their level of protection changed; their position on the speech hierarchy 
remains unchanged, See, e.g., Vivid Entertainment, LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2014). 
428 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See Chapter I for a discussion of the changes and lack thereof 




disconnects in the future. Allowing speech mobility in the speech hierarchy opens the 
opportunity for the hierarchy to change as society changes, thus ensuring the survival of a speech 
hierarchy and the concept of low-value speech throughout times of change.  
In closing, it is clear that both law and society perceive differences between speech types, 
and as a result, a ranking order based on speech value is likely an effective approach for First 
Amendment doctrine. However, this dissertation recommends that the value of sex speech not be 
equated to its First Amendment protection and that a higher level of constitutional scrutiny be 
applied to government regulations of sex speech. Additionally, this dissertation recommends that 
the low-value speech concept allows for speech mobility. As society changes so may the value of 
speech. As a result, the low-value speech concept needs to allow the value and status of speech 
to change. All told, raising the level of constitutional scrutiny on sex speech and allowing for 
speech mobility in the speech hierarchy will bridge the disconnect that currently exists between 
law and society on the value of sex and ensure the survival of the low-value speech concept.   
Public Opinion in First Amendment Law 
 At its core, this dissertation was a public opinion assessment of First Amendment 
doctrine. But the very nature of this work raises red flags about its applicability. At the start of 
this dissertation it was acknowledged in the study limitations that this research may struggle to 
be accepted because, in general, public opinion research has had little to no impact on the U.S. 
Supreme Court or the law, generally.429 Moreover, some may question the purpose of public 
opinion in First Amendment doctrine. In truth, it is fair to question the utility of public opinion 
research in First Amendment law. Law and legal research approach questions normatively, not 
                                                          





empirically.430 Additionally, law, particularly the First Amendment, is mindful of minority 
audiences while public opinion tends to focus on averages and majorities.431 Inherently, the two 
fields are direct opposites. But this dissertation is evidence that, despite their differences, law and 
public opinion research can work together in the areas of law where the Court opens the 
opportunity for public opinion. Consider the findings from this dissertation:  
 The case analysis revealed that sex speech is classified as low-value because the Court 
perceived that sex speech serves little purpose and that society, itself, does not prioritize sex 
speech. These beliefs are inherently driven by what the Court believes society thinks about sex 
speech. But at no point in its decisions does the Court explain why it believes society thinks so 
poorly of sex speech. In other words, the Court never supplies a reason for thinking society does 
not prioritize sex speech. Herein lies the opportunity for public opinion research, like the survey 
conducted for this dissertation: instead of assuming what the public perceives of sex speech, 
research can be done to know what the public perceives of sex speech. In other words, public 
opinion can eliminate these assumptions and replace them with empirical evidence.    
 Admittedly, public opinion should not be the one and only reason for the Court to make a 
decision, and this dissertation would never suggest that the public opinion data be reason alone 
for determining the level of protection speech receives. Instead, it recommends that empirical 
findings, like the kind gained from this dissertation’s public opinion survey, be used as a tool and 
incorporated into the decision-making/decision-justifying process used by the Court. Thus, while 
public opinion research may not, currently, have much impact on the Court or First Amendment 
                                                          
430 JEREMY COHEN & TIMOTHY GLEASON, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN COMMUNICATION AND LAW 13-15, 38-42 (1990). 




law,432 this dissertation is a reason to believe that public opinion research can be impactful and 
useful to law. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that public opinion is gaining acceptance in 
law, particularly First Amendment law. For example, commercial speech and trademark law 
regularly use survey data to assess the likelihood of consumer confusion.433 Specific to sex 
speech, public opinion was previously used to determine community standards and served as 
evidence in obscenity cases.434 These are only a few examples, but they demonstrate the use of 
and opportunities for public opinion in law.   
In closing, part of this dissertation’s contribution to First Amendment law and 
communication research is its demonstration of how public opinion can be used in First 
Amendment law. Not all areas and topics of First Amendment law implicate public opinion, and, 
thus, it cannot and will not be incorporated in law entirely. But, as this dissertation demonstrates, 
there are doctrines that inherently call on public opinion. Doctrine like the low-value speech 
concept is an excellent example: The concept is built on the notion that speech is more or less 
valuable to society and that society more or less prioritizes speech. Instead of assuming what the 
public perceives of speech, public opinion research can be used to determine speech perceptions 
and can then be used to inform the decisions about speech value and speech protection. Thus, 
public opinion has a place in law. Moreover, just because public opinion might not apply to all 
                                                          
432 Marvin Ammori, Public opinion and freedom of speech, JOHN S. & JAMES L. KNIGHT FOUNDATION (July 14, 
2006), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Public_Affairs/ISP_PublicOpinion_fos.pdf. 
433 See, e.g., Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers Imports Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Surveys were 
used to test consumer confusion about a new lighter that looked like the name brand, Zippo, but was made by a 
competitor, Rogers Imports.  See also JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL 
SCIENCE IN LAW 9-35 (2006). 
434 See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 88 Ill. App. 3d 196 (1980). An expert was brought in for an obscenity charge to 
assess, through public opinion survey, the local community standards for sexually explicit materials. See also JOHN 




areas of First Amendment law, does not mean it is entirely useless or inapplicable to law. 
Moving forward, future research should continue to identify the opportunities of public opinion 
in law and execute mixed-methods research like this dissertation.   
Future Research 
 In addition to a general call to future research to identify more opportunities for mixed-
methods research and uses of public opinion in law, the following are recommendations for 
future research related to sex speech and speech value:  
First, future research should explore the attitudes and perceptions of specific types of sex 
speech. In the public opinion survey, participants answered questions about the rights and social 
acceptance of different types of sex speech, such as “viewing adult movies” and “playing adult 
video games,” but the data gathered lacked depth. Future research should ask more about the 
different types of sex speech and determine if and how attitudes and perceptions of sex speech, 
generally, differ based on specific sex speech types.  
Second, this dissertation calls for qualitative research on the value of sex speech. This 
dissertation determined that sex speech is low-value speech, but it is not well understood as to 
why sex speech is low-value. The public opinion survey revealed opinions from a large sample, 
but much of what the survey gathered is only surface-level information. Future research should 
consider qualitative research methods, such as in-depth interviews or focus groups, to delve 
further into the reasons and motivations citizens perceiving sex speech as low-value. Gathering 
this qualitative information would go a long way in understanding what possibly causes or 
influences citizen perceptions of sex speech and may point to instances of misinformation and/or 




Last, future research should consider expanding beyond sex speech. While this 
dissertation focused on answering questions about the value and protection of sex speech, the 
project can easily be edited and replicated to study the value of other speech types, such as 
commercial speech or hate/violent speech. The concept of high- and low-value speech impacts 
all types of speech in First Amendment law, thus it would be interesting to continue this research 
and to determine the value of other speech types as doing so may lead to other recommendations 





APPENDIX A:  
 
LIST OF THE SEX SPEECH CASES FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS 
  
Case & Citation Date 
Roth v. United States & Alberts v. California, 54 U.S. 476 (1957).  1957 
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). 1957 
Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958). 1958 
Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 
(1959). 
1959 
Smith v. People of the State of California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 1959 
Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property at 104 East Tenth St., Kansas City, Mo., 367 U.S. 
717 (1961). 
1961 
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962). 1962 
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) 1963 
Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 1964 
Quantity of Copies of Books v. State of Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964). 1964 
Freedman v. State of Md., 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 1965 
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). 1966 
Mishkin v. State of N. Y., 383 U.S. 502 (1966). 1966 
A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney Gen. of 
Com. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
1966 
Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 385 U.S. 12 (1966). 1966 
Redrup v. State of N. Y., Austin v. Kentucky & Gent v. Arkansas, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). 1967 
Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967). 1967 
Friedman v. New York, 388 U.S. 441 (1967).  1967 
Ratner v. California, 388 U.S. 442 (1967). 1967 
Cobert v. New York, 388 U.S. 443 (1967).  1967 
Sheperd v. New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967).  1967 
Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446 (1967).  1967 
Aday v. New York, 388 U.S. 447 (1967). 1967 




A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967). 1967 
Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967). 1967 
Schackman v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967). 1967 
Potomac News Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967). 1967 
Conner v. City of Hammond, 389 U.S. 48 (1967). 1967 
Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967). 1967 
Chance v. California, 389 U.S. 89 (1967). 1967 
I.M. Amusement Corp. v. Ohio, 389 U.S. 573 (1968). 1968 
Robert-Arthur Management Corp. v. Tennessee, 389 U.S. 578 (1968). 1968 
Felton v. City of Pensacola, 390 U.S. 340 (1968). 1968 
Henry v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 655 (1968). 1968 
Hartstein v. Missouri, 404 U.S. 988 (1971). 1968 
Wiener v. California, 404 U.S. 988 (1971). 1968 
Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462 (1968). 1968 
Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968). 1968 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 1969 
Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278 (1970).  1970 
Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (1970). 1970 
Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970). 1970 
Childs v. Oregon, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971). 1971 
Bloss v. Michigan, 402 U.S. 938 (1971). 1971 
Burgin v. South Carolina, 404 U.S. 806 (1971). 1971 
Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971). 1971 
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). 1971 
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971). 1971 
Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972). 1972 
Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972). 1972 




Papish v. Board of Curators of University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973). 1973 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 1973 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 1973 
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973). 1973 
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) 1973 
United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973). 1973 
Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973). 1973 
Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973). 1973 
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). 1974 
Hamling v. U.S., 418 U.S. 87 (1974). 1974  
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 1975 
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 204 (1975). 1975 
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975). 1975 
McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976). 1976 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 1976 
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 1977 
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977). 1977 
Splawn v. State of Cal., 431 U.S. 595 (1977). 1977 
 Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977). 1977 
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 1978 
Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979). 1979 
Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 445 U.S. 308 (1980). 1980 
California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90 (1981). 1981 
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 1981 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 1982 
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985). 1985 
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985). 1985 




New York v. P. J. Video, Inc. 475 U.S. 868 (1986) 1986 
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 1986 
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986). 1986 
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987). 1987 
Virginia v. American Booksellers Association, Inc., 484 U.S. 383 (1988). 1988 
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989). 1989 
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989). 1989 
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 1989 
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990). 1990 
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 1990 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 1991 
Alexander v. U.S., 509 U.S. 544 (1993). 1993 
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727 
(1996). 
1996 
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 1997 
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 1998 
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 2000 
United States. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 2000 
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564 (2002). 2002 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 2002 
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 2002 
United States v. American Library Association, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 2003 
City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004). 2004 
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 2004 
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008). 2008 
Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 
(2009). 
2009 








COPY OF THE QUANTITATIVE NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 
 
A Public Opinion Survey on Speech, Information, Entertainment, and Other Expressions Dealing with 
Sexuality in American Society 
 
We are conducting a research study to learn about opinions and attitudes about how people view different 
types of speech and expression dealing with sex and sexuality, as well as other types of speech and 
expression found in news, entertainment and other types of media in the United States.  
 
The survey will ask you questions about your opinions on the rights to free speech; social value of sexual 
speech/expression; amount of legal protection different types of speech should receive; social 
acceptability of and attitudes toward different types of sexual speech/expression. This survey will NOT 
ask you about your use of free speech and sexual speech/expression. The study will take about 20 minutes 
or less of your time and is voluntary. 
 
If you have any questions regarding this survey, you may contact us via email at kpgarret@live.unc.edu. 
All research on human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to protect your rights and 
welfare. If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a research subject you may 
contact, anonymously if you wish, the Institutional Review Board at (919) 966-3113 or via email at 
IRB_subjects@unc.edu with study number 18-2452.   
    
By clicking “I agree to participate” and completing the survey, you agree to be a participant in this study 
and you verify that you are 18 years of age or older. 
o I agree to participate  






This survey asks questions about “Free Speech,” in the United States (U.S.). For these questions, “Free 
Speech” is defined as “the right to speak and/or express oneself through spoken and/or written words, or 
physical expressions (like dance and art) without punishment or suppression from the government.”   
    
The questions you are about to answer ask for your opinions about Free Speech. Your answers are 
entirely confidential, so please be as open and honest as possible.  
 
To begin, please select your level of agreement with the following statements:  
Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree, 
Strongly agree 
1. Free speech is important to me. 
2. Free speech is important to U.S. citizens.  
3. Free speech is important to U.S. democracy (i.e. free speech makes the U.S.’s 
democracy/government work and effective).  
 
Next, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree, 
Strongly agree 
 
U.S. citizens should have a right to: 
1. Publicly express unpopular political feelings and opinions.  
2. Make a speech about politics on a downtown street corner. 
3. Picket with other labor union members against a company. 
4. Refuse to pay union dues. 
5. Refuse to pay union dues if the union endorses a particular political candidate 
6. Wear a black armband to protest the policies of a school or government office. 
7. Drive through a neighborhood with a loudspeaker truck advertising for a political candidate. 
8. Talk with people about a religious organization while they are walking through a store. 
9. Wear a shirt with a swastika, the symbol of the Nazi Party, on it. 
10. Interrupt or heckle someone who is making a speech. 
11. Burn a cross on his or her own property. 
12. Burn a selective service or draft card. 
13. Burn the Confederate flag as part of a political protest. 
14. Burn a state flag as part of a political protest. 
15. Burn the American (U.S.) flag as part of a political protest. 
16. Kneel/not stand for the National Anthem as part of a political protest. 
17. Stand outside the funeral services of a United States soldier or veteran and protest the war he or 
she served.  
18. Start a musical group using a racial slur in its name.   
19. Tell lies and false information to one another/other people.  
20. Tell lies and false information in the news.    
21. Wear clothing with offensive language, such as curse words, on it.  
22. Use racist language in a speech. 
23. Embed threats of violence within music or art. 
24. Advertise for prostitution or other sexual services. 
25. Advocate illegal drug use. 
26. Be naked in public.  
27. Read adult books and magazines that describe nudity and sexual activities. 




29. Watch broadcast/network television that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
30. Watch cable television that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
31. Watch adult movies that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
32. Call and listen to phone messages that describe nudity and sexual activities. 
33. Play adult video games that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
34. Attend live entertainment clubs that offer/allow nude dancing. 
35. Use the internet to access erotic or sexually explicit writings/literature.  
36. Use the internet to access pictures and/or videos of that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
37. View art that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
38. Look at depictions of nudity and sexual activities of minors (i.e. children under the age of 18).  
 
Now that you’ve considered U.S. citizens’ rights to a wide variety of speech, we want to know your 
opinions about a specific category/type of speech: “Sex Speech.”  
 
“Sex Speech” is speech and/or expression about sex. Specifically, it is speech that involves the 
descriptions or depictions of nudity and actual or pretend sexual activities. Examples include nude/sexual 
art, nude dancing, phone sex services, adult films (X-rated movies), adult literature (books and 
magazines, like Playboy and online literature), etc.  
NOTE: This does NOT include descriptions or depictions of illegal sex acts, such as non-consensual sex 
(i.e. rape), sex with a child or minor (i.e. child pornography), or sex with an animal (i.e. bestiality and/or 
“crush” films).  
The next questions ask for your opinions about the value and purposes of such Sex Speech. Please answer 
these questions based on your thoughts and beliefs.  
.  
1. In your view, how much does Sex Speech serve a social purpose, such as contributing to 
literature, art and/or science?  
a. Zero, Low, Moderate, High 
 
2. In your view, how much does Sex Speech serve a political purpose, such as informing 
government and/or democracy? 
a. Zero, Low, Moderate, High 
 
3. In your view, how much does Sex Speech harm children/minors, such as corrupting their minds 
and causing deviant/delinquent behavior? 
a. Zero, Low, Moderate, High 
 
4. In your view, how much does Sex Speech harm adults, such as causing antisocial or violent 
behavior? 
a. Zero, Low, Moderate, High 
 
5. In your view, how much does Sex Speech harm society emotionally, such as disrupting social 
order and morale? 
a. Zero, Low, Moderate, High 
 
6. In your view, how much does Sex Speech harm society physically, such as threatening 
community property values and safety? 






7. In your view, how important is Sex Speech to society? 
a. Zero importance, Low importance, Moderate importance, High importance 
 
8. In your view, how much interest does society have in protecting Sex Speech from government 
regulation and suppression? 
a. Zero interest, Low interest, Moderate interest, High interest 
 
9. In your view, how much does society value Sex Speech? (i.e. how much value does Sex Speech 
have to society?) 
a. Zero value, Low value, Moderate value, High value 
 
10. In your view, how much legal protection (i.e. protection under the law and protection from 
punishment or suppression from the government) should Sex Speech receive? 
a. Zero protection, Low protection, Moderate protection, High protection 
 
11. In your view, do the social and/or political purposes of Sex Speech exceed (i.e. outweigh, beat) 
the damages/harms of these descriptions, or do the damages/harms exceed the purposes? 
a. Harms exceed Purposes, Harms and Purposes are equal, Purposes exceed Harms  
 
You just told us your opinions about the values and purposes of Sex Speech, but now we want to know 
what you think U.S. citizens believe about Sex Speech. Specifically, we want to know what you think 
“most U.S. citizens” believe are the values and purposes of Sex Speech. This means you will answer the 
questions again, but this time telling us what you think “most U.S. citizens” believe about Sex 
Speech.  
 
1. In the view of most U.S. citizens, how much does Sex Speech serve a social purpose, such as 
contributing to literature, art and/or science?  
a. Zero, Low, Moderate, High 
 
2. In the view of most U.S. citizens, how much does Sex Speech serve a political purpose, such as 
informing government and/or democracy? 
a. Zero, Low, Moderate, High 
 
3. In the view of most U.S. citizens, how much does Sex Speech harm children/minors, such as 
corrupting their minds and causing deviant/delinquent behavior? 
a. Zero, Low, Moderate, High 
 
4. In the view of most U.S. citizens, how much does Sex Speech harm adults, such as causing 
antisocial or violent behavior? 
a. Zero, Low, Moderate, High 
 
5. In the view of most U.S. citizens, how much does Sex Speech harm society emotionally, such as 
disrupting social order and morale? 
a. Zero, Low, Moderate, High 
 
6. In the view of most U.S. citizens, how much does Sex Speech harm society physically, such as 
threatening community property values and safety? 





7. In the view of most U.S. citizens, how important is Sex Speech to society? 
a. Zero importance, Low importance, Moderate importance, High importance 
 
8. In the view of most U.S. citizens, how much interest does society have in protecting Sex Speech 
from government regulation and suppression? 
a. Zero interest, Low interest, Moderate interest, High interest 
 
9. In the view of most U.S. citizens, how much does society value Sex Speech? (i.e. how much 
value does Sex Speech have to society?) 
a. Zero value, Low value, Moderate value, High value 
 
10. In the view of most U.S. citizens, how much legal protection (i.e. protection under the law and 
protection from punishment or suppression from the government) should Sex Speech receive? 
a. Zero protection, Low protection, Moderate protection, High protection 
 
11. In the view of most U.S. citizens, do the social and/or political purposes of Sex Speech exceed 
(i.e. outweigh, beat) the damages/harms of these descriptions, or do the damages/harms exceed 
the purposes? 
a. Harms exceed Purposes, Harms and Purposes are equal, Purposes exceed Harms  
 
Moving back to your views, now we want to know your opinion about Sex Speech compared to three 
other categories of speech and expression: Political Speech, Commercial Speech, and Hate/Violent 
Speech. Definitions for and examples of these speech categories are as follows:     
• Again, Sex Speech involves the descriptions or depictions of nudity and actual or pretend sexual 
activities. Examples include adult books, magazines, and/or movies that depict nudity or 
characters engaging in sex.    
• Political Speech comments on the government, policies and/or candidates for political office. 
Examples include making a speech about politics on a downtown street corner, 
picketing/protesting a company, supporting a candidate for President by putting a sign in your 
yard.    
• Commercial Speech speaks on behalf of a business or service provider with the intent of earning a 
profit. Examples include television commercials for goods and/or services, or flyers and 
advertisement promoting a product or service.    
• Hate/Violent Speech is speech that some view as deliberately offending, insulting, intimidating, 
or threatening an individual or group based on a trait or attribute, such as sexual orientation, 
religion and/or race. For some people, examples include using racial slurs to insult someone, 
burning a cross or wearing a swastika (the symbol of the Nazi Party).    
 
The next questions ask about your opinions about the different types of speech. To answer these 
questions, select an option from the scale provided.  
 
1. In your view, how important to society are the following types of speech?  
a. Sex Speech 
b. Political Speech 
c. Commercial Speech 
d. Hate/Violent Speech 





2. In your view, how much interest does society have in protecting the following types of speech 
from government regulation and suppression? 
a. Sex Speech 
b. Political Speech 
c. Commercial Speech 
d. Hate/Violent Speech 
i. Zero interest, Low interest, Moderate interest, High interest 
  
3. In your view, how much does society value the following types of speech?  
a. Sex Speech 
b. Political Speech 
c. Commercial Speech 
d. Hate/Violent Speech  
i. Zero value, Low value, Moderate value, High value  
 
4. In your view, how much legal protection should be given the following types of speech? 
a. Sex Speech 
b. Political Speech 
c. Commercial Speech 
d. Hate/Violent Speech 
i. Zero protection, Low protection, Moderate protection, High protection  
Now, answer these questions again, but this time answer these questions based on what you believe are 
the opinions of “most U.S. citizens.” To answer these questions, select an option from the scale 
provided.  
1. In the view of most U.S. citizens, how important to society are the following types of speech?  
a. Sex Speech 
b. Political Speech 
c. Commercial Speech 
d. Hate/Violent Speech 
i. Zero importance, Low importance, Moderate importance, High importance  
 
2. In the view of most U.S. citizens, how much interest does society have in protecting the following 
types of speech from government regulation and suppression? 
a. Sex Speech 
b. Political Speech 
c. Commercial Speech 
d. Hate/Violent Speech 
i. Zero interest, Low interest, Moderate interest, High interest  
 
3. In the view of most U.S. citizens, how much does society value the following types of speech?  
a. Sex Speech 
b. Political Speech 
c. Commercial Speech 
d. Hate/Violent Speech  







4. In the view of most U.S. citizens, how much legal protection should be given the following types 
of speech? 
a. Sex Speech 
b. Political Speech 
c. Commercial Speech 
d. Hate/Violent Speech 
i. Zero protection, Low protection, Moderate protection, High protection  
 
Finally, please tell us your perceptions of and attitudes toward Sex Speech. Whether or not you personally 
like or use any of the following types of content below, please indicate how much you agree or disagree 
with the following statements:  
Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree, 
Strongly agree 
 
It is acceptable to you to... 
1. Read adult books and magazines that describe nudity and sexual activities. 
2. View photographs that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
3. Watch broadcast television that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
4. Watch cable television that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
5. Watch adult movies that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
6. Call and listen to phone messages that describe nudity and sexual activities. 
7. Play adult video games that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
8. Attend live entertainment clubs that depict nude dancing. 
9. Use the internet to access nudity and sexual activities. 
10. View art that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
 
It is acceptable in your community (i.e. your city/state) to… 
1. Read adult books and magazines that describe nudity and sexual activities. 
2. View photographs that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
3. Watch broadcast television that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
4. Watch cable television that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
5. Watch adult movies that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
6. Call and listen to phone messages that describe nudity and sexual activities. 
7. Play adult video games that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
8. Attend live entertainment clubs that depict nude dancing. 
9. Use the internet to access nudity and sexual activities. 
10. View art that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
 
It is acceptable in the U.S. to… 
1. Read adult books and magazines that describe nudity and sexual activities. 
2. View photographs that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
3. Watch broadcast television that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
4. Watch cable television that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
5. Watch adult movies that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
6. Call and listen to phone messages that describe nudity and sexual activities. 
7. Play adult video games that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
8. Attend live entertainment clubs that depict nude dancing. 
9. Use the internet to access nudity and sexual activities. 





Please tell us your personal feelings toward the following types of Sex Speech by answering the 
following question:  
 
How do you feel – positive or negative – about each of the following types of Sex Speech? 
Extremely negative, Somewhat negative, Negative, Neither negative nor positive, Somewhat positive, 
Positive, Extremely positive 
1. Adult Books and Magazines that describe nudity and sexual activities. 
2. Photographs that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
3. Broadcast Television that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
4. Cable Television that depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
5. Adult Movies that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
6. Phone Services and Messages that describe nudity and sexual activities. 
7. Adult Video Games that depict nudity and sexual activities. 
8. Live Entertainment clubs that depict Nude Dancing. 
9. Internet Content that describes or depicts nudity and sexual activities. 
10. Art that depicts nudity and sexual activities 
 
To finish this survey, please enter the following information about yourself. As a reminder, your answers 
are entirely confidential, so please be as open and honest as possible.  
 
1. What is your current age in years? 
a. ___________ (fill-in box) 
 
2. Which gender identity best describes you? Please choose all that apply.  
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. Transgender Male 
d. Transgender Female  
e. Gender variant/Non-conforming  
f. Not listed 
 
3. Which of the following best describes your sexual preference? Please choose all that apply.  
a. Prefer male partner 
b. Prefer female partner 
c. Prefer intersex or gender fluid partner 
d. Prefer more than one preference (e.g., two or more of the above choices) 
e. None of the above 
 
4. If you had to choose, which of the following best represents your ancestry or heritage? Please 
choose all that apply.  
a. American Indian or Alaskan Native 
b. Asian 
c. Black, of African descent   
d. Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
e. White, of European descent  






5. Which of the following best describes your political ideology? 
a. Extremely Liberal 
b. Liberal 
c. Slightly Liberal 
d. Moderate, middle of the road 
e. Slightly Conservative 
f. Conservative 
g. Extremely Conservative  
 
6. Which of the following best represents your religious tradition/practice?  
a. Catholic 
b. Protestant 









7. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
a. Less than a high school diploma 
b. A high school diploma or GED 
c. Associate’s degree  
d. Bachelor’s degree 
e. Graduate degree 
 
8. In which state is your current residence? 
 
Alabama Hawaii Massachusetts New Mexico South Dakota 
Alaska Idaho Michigan New York Tennessee 
Arizona Illinois Minnesota North Carolina Texas 
Arkansas Indiana Mississippi North Dakota Utah 
California Iowa Missouri Ohio Vermont 
Colorado Kansas Montana Oklahoma Virginia 
Connecticut Kentucky Nebraska Oregon Washington 
Delaware Louisiana Nevada Pennsylvania West Virginia 
Florida Maine New Hampshire Rhode Island Wisconsin 
Georgia Maryland New Jersey South Carolina Wyoming 
 
9. What is your current zip code? 
a. ___________ (fill-in box) 
 
 
Thank you so much for your participation! Your answers are greatly appreciated, and they will go a long 
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